Opinion
No. 14-06-00098-CV
Opinion filed October 31, 2006.
On Appeal from the 127th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 05-47070.
Dismissed.
Panel consists of Justices ANDERSON, HUDSON, and GUZMAN.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this ad valorem tax case, appellants Harris County Appraisal District ("HCAD"), the Appraisal Review Board for the Harris County Appraisal District ("the ARB"), Chief Appraiser Jim Robinson, and former chairman of the ARB, Robert Cunningham, appeal the trial court's denial of their plea to the jurisdiction. Because the trial court's order pertains only to a superceded pleading, our ruling can have no practical legal effect on a current controversy. We therefore dismiss this appeal as moot.
I. Factual Procedural History
In its original petition, O'Connor Associates ("O'Connor") stated the following complaints: (a) HCAD rather than the ARB scheduled the hearings for the 2005 tax year protests; (b) HCAD or the ARB "routinely postpone hearings"; (c) ARB board members have asked the ARB panel "to not consider the property owner's evidence on uniform and equal appraisal because no income and expenses information was presented"; (d) the ARB determines protests of unequal appraisal in favor of HCAD even when HCAD presents insufficient evidence or no evidence regarding the equality of the appraisal of the property; (e) when O'Connor protests both the appraised value of the property and unequal appraisal of the property, the ARB issues only one order, rather than issuing a written order on each protest; (f) the ARB considers evidence that was not produced to the taxpayer at least fourteen days before the hearing.
O'Connor does not contend that any of its complaints against appellants arose in connection with appraisals or hearings pertaining to O'Connor's tax account, nor did O'Connor complain on behalf of any identified client.
O'Connor requested mandamus requiring appellants to abide by statutory provisions or "an order providing that protest hearings cease immediately until proper procedures can be put into place to provide Plaintiff, tax agents[,] and property owners the requisite protest hearing as provided by the [Tax] Code." O'Connor also requested a temporary restraining order requiring appellants "to immediately cease conducting protest hearings until procedures are established to insure that [O'Connor's] rights and the property owner's rights are adequately protected by the implementation of guidelines requiring the ARB and [HCAD] to comply with the clear mandates of the [Tax] Code." Specifically, O'Connor sought an order of mandamus or a restraining order that: prohibits HCAD from scheduling protest hearings and requires the ARB to schedule hearings; prohibits the ARB and/or HCAD from postponing scheduled hearings under circumstances not permitted by the Code; requires the ARB to consider O'Connor's presentation of protests of unequal appraisal; requires the ARB to require HCAD to meet the burden of proof as established in TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.43 (Vernon Supp. 2006) or determine the protest in favor of the property owner; requires the ARB to exclude all evidence offered at a hearing by the HCAD that O'Connor or the property owner establishes was not produced at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 41.461 and 41.67(d) (Vernon 2001); prohibits HCAD from offering any evidence that was not produced at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 41.461 and 41.67(d) (Vernon 2001); requires the ARB to issue written orders determining all protests including multiple protests on the same property; and requires the ARB to conduct hearings in accordance with the provisions of the Tax Code. Finally, O'Connor sought declaratory judgment and an order that "determines that the ARB has exceeded its authority by permitting improper evidence at hearings and by not determining each protest by written order as required by the provisions of the Code."
Appellants filed a plea to the jurisdiction, alleging the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 2001). Relying on Taufiq v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 6 S.W.3d 652, 654 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.), appellants additionally contend, both in the trial court and on appeal, that O'Connor lacks standing.
The day before the hearing on the plea to the jurisdiction, O'Connor filed a first amended petition, adding Wolverine Crosby Green LP, E Pointe Properties I Ltd., Baker-Orr Joint Venture, and J. Frederick Welling as plaintiffs. In the amended petition, appellees claim that various statutes and constitutional provisions confer jurisdiction on the trial court, including TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 41.45(f), 42.01(1)(A) and (B), 42.21(a) and (b) (Vernon 2001), Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 24.007, 24.008, 24.011 (Vernon 2004), and TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8.
In addition to adding parties, the amended petition added allegations that (a) "Plaintiffs have filed or will likely file timely protests of the appraised value of the property for the tax year 2005 pursuant to Section 41.41 of the Texas Property Tax Code"; (b) O'Connor timely protested its business personal property appraisal on the grounds that the appraisal was excessive and unequal and received a notice that a hearing was to be held; (c) at the scheduled time for O'Connor's tax protest, no proper hearing in accordance with Chapter 41 was held; (d) at the hearing on O'Connor's tax protest, the ARB failed to consider both of O'Connor's protests and failed to require HCAD to meet its burden of proof; (e) at the hearing on O'Connor's tax protest, the ARB permitted HCAD to use inadmissible evidence and failed to make decisions and determine O'Connor's protests by written order as required; (f) no hearing was scheduled to address Baker-Orr's timely-filed protest; (g) Baker-Orr received notice that a hearing was to be held and at the scheduled time, "no proper hearing in accordance with Chapter 41 was held"; (h) Wolverine and E Pointe allegedly filed notices of protest and received notice that their hearings were to be held on January 17, 2006, five days after the amended petition was filed; and (i) Welling had not yet received notice that a hearing was to be held on his tax protest.
At the hearing on appellants' plea to the jurisdiction, the parties drew the trial court's attention to the amended petition; however, the trial court ruled on the original petition:
Mr. Stewart: May I ask? Yesterday afternoon, yesterday evening, the plaintiff filed an amended petition the plaintiff referenced just a moment ago.
The Court: I haven't seen it. It's here now.
Mr. Stewart: Yes, ma'am.
The Court: It did get here yesterday at 3:00 o'clock.
Mr. Stewart: There are — I guess —
The Court: I got the file before the amended pleading did, but that's okay. It's here now and it's here before my ruling.
* * * * *
Mr. Stewart: Just for the purpose of clarification —
The Court: I'm trying to find an order. Then we will get it clear. You can object to it all the time. What's going to matter is what I sign.
That doesn't say enough. This was —
Okay. At the time the plea to the jurisdiction was filed there was only one party. Okay?
Mr. McKenney: Correct.
The Court: So the plea to the jurisdiction can only address that one party. So let's just address that one party. That's all your motion went to. His amended pleading as to adding other people doesn't change your claim with regard to [the] plea to the jurisdiction with regard to whoever it was at the time.
Mr. McKenney: O'Connor Associates.
The Court: Was it O'Connor Associates? Plea to the jurisdiction.
To the defendants, do you believe that the parties that were added in the pleadings filed yesterday in any way changes your view as to the jurisdiction of the court?
Mr. Stewart: Yes, ma'am.
* * * * *
The Court: All I had when I was looking at this is the original petition, and that's what I had, and that's what I'm looking at. Okay? And I guess we will have these other issues may or may not come up, but the Court will find jurisdiction. Defendant's plea to the jurisdiction as to the claim by O'Connor Associates is what I heard.
Mr. Stewart: And the original petition.
The Court: Correct. And finding that there is jurisdiction as to the claims in the original petition, it's hereby ordered that the defendant's plea to the jurisdiction is denied. You could not have filed to [sic] the plea to the jurisdiction of claims that were only filed yesterday, and that I'm making clear. So there may be additional issues that need to get addressed on this, and I'll leave that to y'all to look at that. But where we stand now, I believe, that — that this Court does have jurisdiction —
Mr. Stewart: On the original petition?
The Court: — to review — yes. To review.
The trial court's order denying appellants' plea to the jurisdiction contains the handwritten additions noted in italics below:
The Court, having heard the Defendants' Plea to the Jurisdiction as to the claim by O'Connor Associates and finding that there is jurisdiction as to the claims in the Original Petition, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the Defendants' Plea to the Jurisdiction be and is hereby DENIED.
II. Issue Presented
The parties present various issues for our review; however, before reaching those issues, we first address, sua sponte, the effect of the amendment of the petition prior to the court's ruling. Because this issue is dispositive of the appeal, we do not reach the merits of the issues presented by appellants.
III. Analysis
The trial court ruled on the appellants' plea to the jurisdiction only with regard to appellees' original petition; however, the petition was amended the day before the hearing on the plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court was aware of the amended pleading, and stated that the issues raised in the amended petition would be addressed separately.
An amended petition adds or withdraws from that which was previously pleaded for correction or to plead new matter. TEX. R. CIV. P. 62. An amended petition also supersedes all prior petitions. J.M. Huber Corp. v. Santa Fe Energy Resources, Inc., 871 S.W.2d 842, 844 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied.). As a superseded pleading, the original petition "shall no longer be regarded as a part of the pleading in the record of the cause, unless some error of the court in deciding upon the necessity of the amendment, or otherwise in superseding it, be complained of, and exception be taken to the action of the court, or unless it be necessary to look to the superseded pleading upon a question of limitation." Tex. R. Civ. P. 65; see also Sosa v. Cent. Power Light, 909 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1995) (reversing summary judgment on a superseded petition). The parties do not contend that any of such exception applies, nor do we find this to be the case. Thus, O'Connor's original petition was not the live pleading at the time of the trial court's ruling, and should not have been regarded as part of the record at that time.
If "the issues presented are no longer `live,'" those issues become moot. Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2000). Generally, an appeal is moot when the court's action on the merits cannot affect the rights of the parties. VE Corp. v. Ernst Young, 860 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1993). Here, any ruling this court would make on the merits of the appeal would not affect the rights of the parties. Whether this court affirms or reverses the trial court's ruling, the appellants are nevertheless free to file a plea to the jurisdiction challenging the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction over the parties and causes of action encompassed within the amended petition.
If the only issues presented on appeal are moot, the appeal must be dismissed. See Gen. Land Office v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1990). Because the trial court ruled on a pleading that was no longer "live," we must dismiss the appeal of that ruling.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal as moot.