Under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (103 Ill.2d R. 304(a)), a judgment as to one claim or party, in a multiple-party or multiple-claims case, is subject to revision at any time absent a special finding of appealability or an order disposing of the remaining claims or parties, and it is likely that plaintiffs could have moved to vacate the dismissal order without filing a section 2-1401 petition or satisfying its prerequisites. (See Castro v. Chicago, Rock Island Pacific R.R. Co. (1980), 83 Ill.2d 358, 362-63, 415 N.E.2d 365, 367-68, cert. denied (1981), 452 U.S. 941, 69 L.Ed.2d 956, 101 S.Ct. 3086; Mares v. Metzler (1980), 87 Ill. App.3d 881, 409 N.E.2d 447; Hazel v. Hayes (1973), 14 Ill. App.3d 292, 302 N.E.2d 458.) In such a case, Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(3) would not provide this court with a basis for hearing this appeal.
• 3 The case law has held that the effect of Rule 304(a) is to continue the jurisdiction of the trial court as to all elements of the proceeding until an adjudication of all claims of all parties unless there is the specific finding provided in the rule. Castro v. Chicago, Rock Island Pacific R.R. Co. (1980), 83 Ill.2d 358, 415 N.E.2d 365; Hazel v. Hayes (1973), 14 Ill. App.3d 292, 302 N.E.2d 458; Mares v. Metzler (1980), 87 Ill. App.3d 881, 409 N.E.2d 447. The Code and the Rule must operate upon this chronology:
By way of explanation, we point out that section 50(5) provides that (1) a default may be set aside at any time before final order or judgment; and (2) on motion filed within 30 days after entry of a final order or judgment, the court may on motion filed within 30 days set aside such final order or judgment. However, under the authority of Supreme Court Rule 304(a), the court may vacate a default judgment which was entered as to less than all parties at any time (including after 30 days), provided there was no express finding that the order was appealable and that judgment has not yet been entered as to all parties. Hazel v. Hayes (1973), 14 Ill. App.3d 292, 302 N.E.2d 458; Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc. (1966), 67 Ill. App.2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347. The judgment order entered in the instant case did not contain such express finding and if, as the Metzlers contend, the rights of "fewer than all parties" were adjudicated when the judgment was entered, the court had authority to vacate it at any time prior to the entry of a judgment which would dispose of the rights of all parties. Plaintiff reasons, however, that the default judgment was final and appealable because it disposed of the rights of all parties and that therefore the trial court, having jurisdiction to vacate the order only within 30 days after its entry, improperly granted vacatur of the June 8, 1974, judgment on October 11, 1978.
Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 304(a)) provides that in the absence of a finding of no just reason to delay appeal any judgment that adjudicates fewer than all of the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all of the parties is not enforceable or appealable and is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights and liabilities of all the parties. Absent such finding, therefore, the trial court retains jurisdiction over the entire matter until all issues have been resolved ( Petersen Brothers Plastics, Inc. v. Ullo (1978), 57 Ill. App.3d 625, 373 N.E.2d 416, appeal denied (1978), 71 Ill.2d 614; Hazel v. Hayes (1973), 14 Ill. App.3d 292, 302 N.E.2d 458), the order being merely interlocutory in nature. Daniels v. McKay Machine Co. (7th Cir. 1979), 607 F.2d 771.
Even though the parties to an appeal have not, as in this case, argued that issue, it is necessary for us to view this appeal in the light of Rule 304(a) as it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction to decide an appeal. Hazel v. Hayes (1973), 14 Ill. App.3d 292, 295, 302 N.E.2d 458; E.M.S. Co. v. Brandt (1968), 103 Ill. App.2d 445, 448, 243 N.E.2d 695. This chronological summary of a lengthy series of pleadings, motions and orders is helpful to an understanding of the reasons for the dismissal of this appeal.