Nevertheless, the amendment did not "eliminate the need to meet the condition precedent of a judgment against the uninsured motorist; it simply provided the means by which the condition precedent could be met."McCrary v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 198 Ga. App. 727, 728, 402 S.E.2d 519 (1991) (punctuation omitted); accord State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Noble, 208 Ga. App. 518, 519, 430 S.E.2d 804 (1993); see Hayward v. Retention Alternatives Ltd., 291 Ga. App. 232, 235 (2), 661 S.E.2d 862 (2008) ("[A]bsent sufficient service on the tortfeasor, a claimant cannot recover from his or her UM carrier.").Noble, 208 Ga. App. at 519, 430 S.E.2d 804.

DECIDED JUNE 1, 2009. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 291 Ga. App. 232. Hawkins Parnell, Michael J. Goldman, Assunta S. Fiorini, for appellant.

As a result, "the act of publication alone is insufficient to establish proper service under OCGA § 33-7-11 (e)." Hayward v. Retention Alternatives , 291 Ga. App. 232, 235 (2), 661 S.E.2d 862 (2008) ; see also Williams , 306 Ga. App. at 629 (2), 703 S.E.2d 74. Here, the trial court found, and the record confirms, that Durland undertook no effort to locate Colotl once service by publication was complete — a span running from March 2, 2017 to January 12, 2019.

And regardless of whether the claimant served the [uninsured motorist] carrier in the original suit, proper service in a renewal action" satisfies the service requirements of the Uninsured Motorist Act. Hayward v. Retention Alternatives , 291 Ga. App. 232, 233 (1), 661 S.E.2d 862 (2008), aff'd, 285 Ga. 437, 678 S.E.2d 877 (2009) (citations and punctuation omitted). Geico challenged the sufficiency of the complaint in its answer and also moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs "failed to include ... the required pleadings to have a valid renewal action."

See id. See also Hayward v. Retention Alternatives , 291 Ga.App. 232, 234 (1), 661 S.E.2d 862 (2008). It follows that the retrial of Mrs. Evans's medical malpractice claim against Rockdale must encompass both liability and damages.

While OCGA § 33–7–11 (d) was amended after the Supreme Court's decision in Stout, see Ga. L. 1998, p. 1064, § 3, the amendment did not undercut the conclusions reached in that case regarding the basic purpose of the statutory subsection. See Hayward v. Retention Alternatives Ltd., 291 Ga. App. 232, 233–234 (1), 661 S.E.2d 862 (2008). In light of our conclusion that OCGA § 33–7–11 (d) did not conflict with Silva's contractual obligation to promptly notify Liberty Mutual of the automobile collision, we need not address whether the statutory subsection conflicted with Silva's separate contractual obligation to promptly send Liberty Mutual copies of legal papers if any suit was brought.

Cohen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 Ga. App. 437, 438 ( 626 SE2d 628) (2006).Hayward v. Retention Alternatives Ltd., 291 Ga. App. 232, 235 (2) ( 661 SE2d 862) (2008).Luca v. State Farm c. Ins. Co., 281 Ga. App. 658, 660 (1) ( 637 SE2d 86) (2006).

Hayward v. Retention Alts. Ltd., 661 S.E.2d 862, 865 (Ga.Ct.App. 2008), aff d, 678 S.E.2d 877 (Ga. 2009); accord Barabont v. Villanueva, 584 S.E.2d 74, 77 (Ga.Ct.App. 2003) ("[S]ervice on the tortfeasor is a condition precedent for recovery against the uninsured motorist carrier.")