Moreover, this Court has otherwise construed "the phrase `full time student' to mean continuous attendance during the normal school year." Hayward v. Lawrence, 252 Ga. 337, 338 ( 312 S.E.2d 609) (1984). The evidence was undisputed that the son was not in continuous attendance for the duration of the normal school year after the conclusion of the 1989-1990 academic year. During that first year, the son was enrolled in a private college and on partial scholarship.

Accordingly, rather than construing “corporate income tax liability” as referring to a liability that cannot exist, we construe that term to mean those tax liabilities that flow from the corporation. See Knott, 277 Ga. at 381 (declining to adopt construction of divorce agreement that would have rendered certain provisions meaningless); Horwitz, 275 Ga. at 468 (rejecting literal construction of agreement that would have rendered certain language meaningless and contravened intent of the parties); Hayward u. Lawrence, 252 Ga. 337 , 337 (312 SE2d 609 ) (1984) (construing the word “or” to mean “and,” where doing so would effectuate the clear intent of the parties and avoid rendering certain provision meaningless). To be sure, this Agreement could have been more clearly drafted, and we caution parties to a divorce to ensure that their intentions are plainly expressed.

Bullard filed a counterclaim asking that Swafford be held in contempt for his failure to pay child support since May 21, 2004. Citing Mattocks v. Matus, 266 Ga. 346 ( 466 SE2d 840) (1996), and Hayward v. Lawrence, 252 Ga. 337 ( 312 SE2d 609) (1984), the superior court focused on the son's absences, tardiness, and failure to attend summer school and concluded that the son was not a "continuous full time student"; consequently, it ruled that Swafford's child support obligation terminated as of May 20, 2004, "when the 2003-04 school year ended and the [son] ceased attending school on a full time basis." 1. Bullard asserts that the superior court erred by expanding the scope of OCGA § 19-6-15 (e) to require that a child be a full-time student in order to receive support when the child's efforts to complete his secondary education extend beyond the child's eighteenth birthday because there is no such requirement in the statute.

However, applying the applicable rules of construction to resolve the ambiguity, Weil's obligation to pay became unconditional after April 1, 2001, even though he did not sell the house by that date. See Hayward v. Lawrence, 252 Ga. 337 ( 312 S.E.2d 609) (1984). The agreement does not require the existence of "actual" sales proceeds, and the lack of such proceeds does not defeat Ms. Horwitz's right to payment.

Although the settlement agreement does not define "full-time student," this Court has construed the phrase to mean "continuous attendance during the normal school year." See Mims v. Mims , 297 Ga. 70, 772 S.E.2d 674 (2015) ; Bullard v. Swafford , 279 Ga. 577, 619 S.E.2d 665 (2005) ; Mattocks v. Matus , 266 Ga. 346, 466 S.E.2d 840 (1996) ; Hayward v. Lawrence , 252 Ga. 337, 338, 312 S.E.2d 609 (1984). Though Husband contends that there is evidence in the record to establish that the parties intended to adopt the school's definition of "full-time student" being a student who is scheduled into seven instructional segments per day, this definition was neither incorporated into the parties' agreement, nor is there any evidence that both contracting parties intended the school's definition of "full-time student" to control.

This Court has previously construed the phrase “full time student” to “mean continuous attendance during the normal school year.” See Bullard v. Swafford, supra, 279 Ga. at 580(2), 619 S.E.2d 665; Hayward v. Lawrence, 252 Ga. 337, 338, 312 S.E.2d 609 (1984). Although VSU defines a full-time student as one who is registered for twelve or more semester hours, this definition was not incorporated into the parties' agreement.

We acknowledge there is little case law on what constitutes a full-time student. The trial court cited the case of Hayward v. Lawrence, 252 Ga. 337, 312 S.E.2d 609, 610 (1984), where the Georgia Supreme Court held: "We further construe the phrase `full time student' to mean continuous attendance during the normal school year." We hold, for purposes of this appeal, Lauri applied her full time, in good faith study attending classes in academic study and in training through an internship with Kathy Skewes. Her time was utilized in study and training during the 1987 fall semester.