However, we agree with plaintiff that the court erred by holding that the portion of the lien relating to materials for the later period was defeated by the so-called "rule of segregation." In Hays v. Pigg, 267 Or. 143, 148, 515 P.2d 924 (1973), the Supreme Court described and explained that rule: "The general rule has been that where unsegregated lienable and nonlienable charges are lumped together in the lien as one item so that extrinsic evidence is necessary to segregate them, the right to a lien is lost as to all such unsegregated items.

"In order for the overstatement to invalidate the lien, it must be an intentional one or one made through culpable negligence." Hays v. Pigg, 267 Or. 143, 147, 515 P.2d 924 (1973). For a negligent overstatement to invalidate a lien, that overstatement must be "so grossly and palpably negligent as to raise a presumption of fraud."

First Interstate recognizes that a valid lien filed pursuant to ORS 87.010(1) is preferred to all prior liens, mortgages or encumbrances, ORS 87.025(2), but contends that plaintiff's lien contains unsegregated lienable and nonlienable claims and is, therefore, invalid. Hays v. Pigg, 267 Or. 143, 515 P.2d 924 (1973). First, it contends that more than $50,000 of the lien claim relates to work performed off the leased premises, such as landscaping and the excavation and grading of the parking area, and is nonlienable under ORS 87.010(1), under which plaintiff claims its lien, because that statute permits a lien only for labor performed on and materials incorporated in an "improvement," which includes:

In the cited authority, the Oregon Supreme Court examined rules pertaining to unsegregated liens, liens which contained correctly included items, i.e. lienable items, and incorrectly included items, i.e. nonlienable items. Hays v. Pigg, 267 Or. 143, 147-48 (1973). The Hays court encountered a conflict in rules pertaining to unsegregated liens.

Plaintiffs assert that, although the $57 item includes both lienable and nonlienable items, it can and should be disregarded. See Hays v. Pigg, 267 Or. 143, 148, 515 P.2d 924 (1973). We agree. Although the items included in the $57 claim are not segregable without extrinsic evidence, the claim can be segregated from the remaining lien items without extrinsic evidence.

Defendants contend that, although ORS 87.035(2) does not require that Larson segregate lienable items, once he elected to specify labor, materials and rental equipment, they were entitled to rely on the segregation shown in the lien claim. In Hays v. Pigg, 267 Or. 143, 148, 515 P.2d 924 (1973), the Supreme Court stated: "The general rule has been that where unsegregated lienable and nonlienable charges are lumped together in the lien as one item so that extrinsic evidence is necessary to segregate them, the right to a lien is lost as to all such unsegregated items.

A minor error in a lien claim does not invalidate the lien. In Hayes v. Pigg, 515 P.2d 924 (Or. 1973), the Oregon court held: If the non-lienable charge is extremely small as compared to the total item in which it is included, and if it is inserted without malicious intent, the rule of de minimum non curat lex should apply.

This court has held that where unsegregated lienable and nonlienable charges are lumped together in a lien notice so that extrinsic evidence is necessary to segregate them, the right to a lien is lost as to all such unsegregated items. Hays v. Pigg, 267 Or. 143, 148, 515 P.2d 924 (1973). In Benj. Franklin S L v. Hallmark, 257 Or. 436, 441, 479 P.2d 740 (1971), we said the reason for this rule is that the owner of the encumbered property should be able to tell from the face of the lien as filed the amount of valid claims, so that he may discharge the property from the encumbrance without incurring the cost of foreclosure proceedings.

Surely each owner named in the lien, or person taking an interest through him, is capable of telling if the description of the owner's property in which he is interested is involved when such description is set forth separately in the lien. See Hays v. Pigg, 267 Or. 143, 148, 515 P.2d 924 (1973). This is not a case where the properties of both owners were included in one metes and bounds description and technical skill would be necessary to separate them to determine if one's property was involved.

See ORCP 68 C(2)(a) ("A party seeking attorney fees shall allege the facts, statute, or rule that provides a basis for the award of such fees in a pleading filed by that party."); ORCP 68 C(2)(b) ("If a party does not file a pleading but instead files a motion or a response to a motion, a right to attorney fees shall be alleged in such motion or response, in similar form to the allegations required in a pleading."). Further, at the time that ORCP 15 D was promulgated, Oregon law had long treated statements of costs and disbursements as pleadings.See former ORS 20.210 (1978), repealed by Or Laws 1981, ch 898, § 53 (statute on which ORCP 68 was predicated characterized statements of costs and disbursements as "pleadings * * * subject to amendment like pleadings in other cases"); Hays v. Pigg, 267 Or 143, 150, 515 P2d 924 (1973) (concluding, in reliance on former ORS 20.210, that trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting amendment of statement of costs and disbursements); Hill v. Hill et ux., 128 Or 177, 180, 270 P 911 (1928) (statement of costs and disbursements and objections to that cost bill constitute the "pleadings"); Perkins v. Perkins, 72 Or 302, 309, 143 P 995 (1914) (same); McFarlane v. McFarlane, 43 Or 477, 487, 75 P 139 (1904) (same). The attorney fee statements contemplated by ORCP 68 resemble those statements of costs and disbursements that the drafters of ORCP 15 D would have viewed as pleadings.