Other jurisdictions, however, which have addressed this issue in the context of their various consumer protection acts have widely held that "although the entrepreneurial or commercial aspects of the practice of medicine are covered as `trade or commerce' under that state's consumer protection act, violations predicated on negligence or malpractice, whether medical or legal, are not covered because those claims address only competence." Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 243 Conn. 17, 35 ( 699 A2d 964) (1997), adopting rule set forth in Quimby v. Fine, 45 Wash. App. 175, 180 ( 724 P2d 403) (1986). The Michigan Court of Appeals applied a similar analysis, holding that
Id. As the court finds that the defendants were not engaged in any trade or commerce when the allegedly defamatory article was written, it is unnecessary to address the other arguments in the defendants' memorandum of law. The reasoning employed by the Supreme Court in the case of Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 699 A.2d 964 (1997), is applicable to the present case. In that case, the plaintiff's decedent was involved in a severe motor vehicle accident.
The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that "although physicians and other health care providers are subject to CUTPA, they may be liable only for 'unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts, or practices in the conduct of the entrepreneurial, commercial, or business aspect of the practice of medicine.'" Janusauskas v. Fichman, 826 A.2d 1066, 1075 (Conn. 2003) (quoting Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 699 A.2d 964 (Conn. 1997)). [T]he touchstone for a legally sufficient CUTPA claim against a health care provider is an allegation that an entrepreneurial or business aspect of the provision of services is implicated, aside from medical competence or aside from medical malpractice based on the adequacy of staffing, training, equipment or support personnel.
The 'entrepreneurial' exception is just that, a specific exception from CUTPA immunity for a well defined set of activities — advertising and bill collection for example." See Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 34-38, 699 A.2d 964 (1997) (reasoning that practice of law and medicine may give rise to CUTPA claims only for entrpreneurial aspects, such as solicitation of business and billing, and not for claims involving issues of competence and strategy). It is not a catch-all provision intended to subject any arguably improper attorney conduct to CUTPA liability.
The entrepreneurial exception is just that, a specific exception from CUTPA immunity for a well-defined set of activities—advertising and bill collection, for example. See Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital , 243 Conn. 17, 34–38, 699 A.2d 964 (1997) (reasoning that practice of law and medicine may give rise to CUTPA claims only for entrepreneurial aspects, such as solicitation of business and billing, and not for claims involving issues of competence and strategy). It is not a catch-all provision intended to subject any arguably improper attorney conduct to CUTPA liability.
The provision of medical services falls within CUTPA's definition of trade or commerce. Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 243 Conn. 17, 32 (1997). That said, it is well-established that “professional negligence-that is, malpractice-does not fall under CUTPA.” Id. at 34.
On the other hand, there are several cases where the Connecticut Supreme Court found it more suitable to view the uninsured motorist carrier as paying a tort obligation, not a contractual obligation. In Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17 (1997), the Court was asked whether a tort victim who had been fully compensated by his uninsured motorist carrier was permitted to pursue a tort claim against an insured co-tortfeasor. The Court distinguished uninsured motorist payments from other insurance payments, which under the "collateral source" rule do not count against further recovery, because uninsured motorist benefits "operate in part as a liability insurance surrogate for the underinsured motorist third party tortfeasor."
The Connecticut Supreme Court has endorsed this view in resolving CUTPA claims against a hospital and a physician. See Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 36-38, 699 A.2d 964 (1997). "We do not consider the [legislature's] use of `trade or commerce' in defining the application of the act to exhibit an intent to include the actual performance of medical services or the actual practice of medicine."
Thus, the collateral-source rule generally precludes the trial court from deducting from the damages award the benefits the plaintiff received from an insurance policy, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff may receive what appears to be a "double recovery." Barnett argues that we should follow Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 27, 699 A.2d 964, 969 (1997), which held that "for the particular purpose of characterizing underinsured motorist payments, the relationship . . . between the underinsured carrier and the defendant may be viewed as analogous to that of joint tortfeasors, and thus that the general tort rule precluding double recovery from joint tortfeasors should apply." (Footnote omitted.)
(Citation omitted.) Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 37 (1997). In the case of Harris v. Bradley Memorial Hospital Health Center, Inc., 296 Conn. 315, 994 A.2d 153 (2010), a surgeon whose medical staff privileges had been suspended by his hospital brought a lawsuit which included CUTPA allegations.