Opinion
Case No. 03-4209-RDR.
October 26, 2004
ORDER
This matter is presently before the court upon plaintiff's motion for review pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a) and D.Kan. Rule 72.1.4. Plaintiff seeks review of the magistrate's order of July 28, 2004. Having carefully reviewed the arguments of the parties, the court is now prepared to rule.
The magistrate's order of July 28th contained rulings on three pending motions. It appears to the court that the plaintiff is only challenging the magistrate's ruling on his earlier filed motion for protective order. Accordingly, the court will not consider the other rulings made by the magistrate in that order.
This case arises from certain actions that were taken by the defendants when plaintiff was terminated from his employment as an assistant attorney general with the Kansas Attorney General's office on October 13, 2003. Plaintiff contends that his constitutional rights were violated when members of the Attorney General's office viewed private information on his work computer.
The plaintiff's deposition was taken by the defendant on July 3, 2004 in Daytona Beach, Florida. During the deposition, defendants' counsel propounded questions to the plaintiff regarding various aspects of his employment at the Attorney General's office. Plaintiff refused to answer these questions, stating that he did not believe they were relevant. He contended the questions were relevant only to a discrimination complaint that is currently pending before the Kansas Human Rights Commission (KHRC) and/or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Shortly after the deposition, plaintiff filed a motion for protective order to prevent the defendants from inquiring into such matters. On July 28, 2004 the magistrate denied plaintiff's request for a protective order. The magistrate stated the following:
Plaintiff is correct with regard to the exclusivity of the administrative jurisdiction, with regard to any court action on a claim while it is the subject of a pending administrative review; however, this does not preclude discovery into facts that the claim may have in common with another, separate claim that is already the subject matter of litigation. The court's ability to have jurisdiction over the employment discrimination claim prior to the expiration of the 180-day period of exclusivity does not in any way affect the court's ability to have jurisdiction over the instant claim, nor does it infringe defendants' right to full discovery of all information relevant to the instant claim arising out of plaintiff's employment.
Here, plaintiff has brought a claim for injunctive relief and monetary damages as a result of alleged deprivations of his Constitutional rights during and after his period of employment with the Kansas Attorney General's Office. This is a separate and distinct claim from any employment discrimination claim; however, this claim arises from the same employer-employee context, and covers, at least partially, the same time period, as is apparently the basis for the administrative employment discrimination claim. Indeed, plaintiff makes it clear that the claim in the instant case arises from the context of his former employment with the Kansas Attorney General's office in his amended complaint when he characterizes the instant case as "an action brought by plaintiff against [sic] for various unconstitutional and unlawful acts experienced by plaintiff during his employment and shortly after termination of his employment with the defendant [sic]."
Because the administrative employment discrimination claim and the instant civil rights claim arise from the common background of plaintiff's former employment it is reasonable to assume that facts relating to the circumstances of the employment are likely to be relevant to each. Certainly, the likelihood is reasonable enough for the court to find that the information sought falls within the scope of proper discovery under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate good cause why a protective order should issue and this motion for protective order should be denied.
In the instant motion, plaintiff contends that the magistrate's order should be reversed because (1) the court does not have jurisdiction over the plaintiff's KHRC/EEOC complaint; (2) the information is not relevant to this case; and (3) the order conflicts with a previous order of the case.
A party may object to a magistrate judge's order pertaining to a discovery matter. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). Upon objection, the district court may "modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate judge's order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Under this standard, the district court must affirm the magistrate's rulings "unless it on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1464 (10th Cir. 1988) (citation and quotation omitted). Because a magistrate is afforded broad discretion in the resolution of non-dispositive discovery disputes, the court will overrule the magistrate's determination only if this discretion is abused. Comeau v. Rupp, 762 F.Supp. 1434, 1450 (D.Kan. 1991).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party. . . . Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Relevancy is broadly construed, and a request for discovery should be considered relevant if there is "any possibility" that the information sought may be relevant to the claim or defense of any party. Sheldon v. Vermonty, 204 F.R.D. 679, 689-90 (D.Kan. 2001) (citations omitted). A request for discovery should be allowed "unless it is clear that the information sought can have no possible bearing" on the claim or defense of a party.Id.
The court finds no abuse of discretion in the ruling made by the magistrate. The magistrate correctly analyzed and decided the issues concerning the questions offered by defendants' counsel at the plaintiff's deposition. The questions involved matters that could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Plaintiff believes that the present case must be separated from his employment discrimination claims. We do not agree. For the purposes of the discovery in this case, we believe that the magistrate correctly decided that these questions were fair game. The court is not persuaded that this ruling interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the KHRC and/or EEOC or with any prior orders of the court. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for review shall be denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for review and motion for interlocutory appeal (Doc. # 69) be hereby denied. The magistrate's order of July 28, 2004 is hereby affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.