Because the City of Gulfport is entitled to discretionary function immunity under the MTCA, there is no need to reach whether it is also entitled to police protection immunity. See Hayes v. Univ. of S. Mississippi, 952 So.2d 261, 266 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that “[b]ecause we affirm the grant of police protection immunity, we do not reach whether USM was entitled to discretionary function immunity as well.”) (Emphasis added).
See, e.g. , McGrath v. City of Gautier , 794 So.2d 983 (Miss. 2001) (holding that the maintenance of a police vehicle was a police-protection activity entitled to police-protection immunity); Hayes v. Univ. of S. Miss. , 952 So.2d 261 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the training of a student police corps was a police-protection activity entitled to police-protection immunity). But for its own allegedly negligent actions, the City did not assert police-protection immunity.
[4] ¶19. Since McGrath, the appellate courts have considered other law enforcement activities and held them to be related to police protection, among them 911-dispatcher activities, Lee County v. Davis, 838 So. 2d 243, 245 (¶8) (Miss. 2003), and police training activities, Hayes v. Univ. of S. Miss., 952 So. 2d 261, 265 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). "Immunity under the MTCA can apply in cases where the employee is engaged in "ordinary duties related to police and fire protection."
"A circuit court judge sitting without a jury is accorded the same deference with regard to his findings as a chancellor, and his findings will not be reversed on appeal where they are supported by substantial, credible, and reasonable evidence." Hayes v. Univ. of S. Miss., 952 So. 2d 261, 263 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Donaldson v. Covington Cnty., 846 So. 2d 219, 222 (¶11) (Miss. 2003)).