Accordingly, we deem as abandoned under Supreme Court Rule 22 any assertion that this trial court ruling was error. See Felix v. State, 271 Ga. 534, 539, n. 6 ( 523 SE2d 1) (1999); Hayes v. State, 261 Ga. 439, 444 (6) (d) ( 405 SE2d 660) (1991). In fact, Sosniak's counsel expressed at oral argument his belief that it is premature to address the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel at this point in the proceedings, as prujudice that could affect the outcome of the case cannot yet be shown.
"A charge on involuntary manslaughter is not warranted even if it is the sole defense if the evidence does not support the charge." Hayes v. State, 261 Ga. 439, 443 (6) (a) ( 405 SE2d 660) (1991). The evidence to which Folson points in asserting his right to a charge on involuntary manslaughter was his own testimony that he struck Canashus on the back to clear his airway and pressed the child's abdomen in an effort to perform CPR. If the jury believed Folson's testimony, it could have found that the child's injuries were inflicted by accident, and that no crime was committed (see Hayes v. State, 268 Ga. 809 (9) ( 493 SE2d 169) (1997)), but his testimony did not suggest, and he has not pointed out on appeal, and our review of the record has not revealed any evidence of an unlawful manner in which his lawful act of attempting to resuscitate the child was performed.
We affirmed appellant's conviction in part, but remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Hayes v. State, 261 Ga. 439 ( 405 S.E.2d 660) (1991). The trial court found that appellant received reasonably effective assistance of trial counsel within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 ( 104 S.C. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674) (1984), and denied his motion for new trial made on this ground.
Having reviewed the transcript of this juror's voir dire testimony, however, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike juror 1 on the basis of bias because juror 1 did not indicate a bias she was unable to lay aside. Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 425 ( 349 S.E.2d 717) (1986); Hayes v. State, 261 Ga. 439, 441 ( 405 S.E.2d 660) (1991); OCGA §§ 15-12-163; 15-12-164. Moreover, even assuming that a juror's unequivocal statements of indecisiveness may serve as a ground for striking a juror for cause, we conclude that juror 1's equivocal statements about her reluctance to pass judgment did not disqualify her to serve on the jury.
However, during the trial, the prosecution presented, and the trial court permitted, evidence of Petitioner's prior felony conviction in Michigan for attempted aggravated assault with the intent to kill for the sole purpose of establishing that Petitioner had been convicted of a felony at the time that he shot his wife, thereby establishing the elements necessary for a felony murder conviction under Georgia law. See Hayes v. State, 405 S.E.2d 660, 665 (Ga. 1991) (upholding conviction for felony murder even though state had not indicted or convicted criminal defendant of underlying felony); Jolly v. State, 392 S.E.2d 527 (Ga. 1990) (same). Also at Petitioner's trial, Petitioner's attorney was successful in convincing the trial judge to charge the jury that they could not find Petitioner guilty of both malice murder and felony murder (Counts 1 2), but could convict him of only one or the other.
Broxton's defenses were not antagonistic to the defenses identified by Pena, particularly self-defense in the case of his actions at the Stone Mountain Inn and the State's alleged failure to show that he was a party to the shooting of Nelson and Turner. See Styles v. State , 279 Ga. 134, 135-136 (2), 610 S.E.2d 23 (2005) (the two co-defendants' defenses were not antagonistic when they both denied involvement in the crimes); Hayes v. State , 261 Ga. 439, 442 (3), 405 S.E.2d 660 (1991) (the two co-defendants' theories of defense were different, with one claiming that he was attempting to lawfully arrest the victim and the other contending that he did not shoot at the victim, but those defenses were not antagonistic), disapproved on other grounds, Willis v. State , 304 Ga. 686, 706 (11) (a) n.3, 820 S.E.2d 640 (2018). Furthermore, to require severance, the moving defendant must "do more than raise the possibility that a separate trial would give him a better chance of acquittal.
(2015) ; Edenfield v. State, 293 Ga. 370, 379 (7), 744 S.E.2d 738 (2013) ; Ellington v. State, 292 Ga. 109, 140 (8) (b), 735 S.E.2d 736 (2012) ; Rice v. State, 292 Ga. 191, 194-195 (3), 733 S.E.2d 755 (2012) ; Hargrove v. State, 291 Ga. 879, 881 (2) (a), 734 S.E.2d 34 (2012) ; Stolte v. Fagan, 291 Ga. 477, 478-479 (1), 731 S.E.2d 653 (2012) ; Ledford v. State, 289 Ga. 70, 77 (7), 709 S.E.2d 239 (2011) ; Humphreys v. State, 287 Ga. 63, 71 (4), 694 S.E.2d 316 (2010) ; Maxwell v. State, 282 Ga. 22, 26 (2) (d) & n.12, 644 S.E.2d 822 (2007) ; Sealey v. State, 277 Ga. 617, 620 (7), 593 S.E.2d 335 (2004) ; Wallace v. State, 275 Ga. 879, 881 (3) & n.11, 572 S.E.2d 579 (2002) ; Lance v. State, 275 Ga. 11, 15 (8), 560 S.E.2d 663 (2002) ; Kirkland v. State, 274 Ga. 778, 779-780 (2), 560 S.E.2d 6 (2002) ; Terrell v. State, 271 Ga. 783, 783-784 (1), 523 S.E.2d 294 (1999) ; Menefee v. State, 270 Ga. 540, 542 (2), 512 S.E.2d 275 (1999) ; Walker v. State, 262 Ga. 694, 696 (2), 424 S.E.2d 782 (1993) ; Hayes v. State, 261 Ga. 439, 441 (2), 405 S.E.2d 660 (1991) ; Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195, 202 (7) (e), 345 S.E.2d 831 (1986).The following cases from the Court of Appeals are also overruled or disapproved to the extent that they relied on or referred to the holdings in Harris and Fortson: Coffee v. State, No. A18A0960, 2018 WL 4698373 at *1-2, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 544 at *4-5 (1) (Ga. App. Oct. 1, 2018) ; DeSantos v. State, 345 Ga. App. 545, 549 (1) & n.3, 813 S.E.2d 782 (2018) ; Budhani v. State, 345 Ga. App. 34, 40 (2) n.6, 812 S.E.2d 105 (2018) ; Scarpaci v. Kaufman, 328 Ga. App. 446, 446, 762 S.E.2d 172 (2014) ; Wheeler v. State, 327 Ga. App. 313, 316 (1) n.6, 758 S.E.2d 840 (2014) ; Futch v. State, 326 Ga. App. 394, 398 (1) (c), 756 SE2d 629 (2014) ; Carter v. State, 326 Ga. App. 144, 149 (4), 756 S.E.2d 232 (2014) ; Stolte v. Fagan, 322 Ga. App. 775, 775, (746 S.E.2d 255) (2013) ; Bates v. State, 322 Ga. App. 319, 323 (3) n.3, 744 S.E.2d 841 (2013) ; Ham v. State, 303 Ga. App. 232, 240 (2) (a) n.23, 692 S.E.2d 8
But "[a] charge on involuntary manslaughter is not warranted even if it is the sole defense if the evidence does not support the charge." Hayes v. State, 261 Ga. 439, 443 (6) (a) ( 405 SE2d 660) (1991). Contrary to Williams's assertion, there was no evidence to support a charge on involuntary manslaughter.
Glover v. State, 266 Ga. 183, 184 ( 465 SE2d 659) (1996). See Hayes v. State, 261 Ga. 439, 446 ( 405 SE2d 660) (1991). As noted above, appellate counsel was not appointed until after the notice of appeal was filed.
"A charge on involuntary manslaughter is not warranted even if it is the sole defense if the evidence does not support the charge." Folson v. State, 278 Ga. 690, 693 (4) ( 606 SE2d 262) (2004), quoting Hayes v. State, 261 Ga. 439, 443 (6) (a) ( 405 SE2d 660) (1991). Reed claimed that the revolver accidentally discharged, and the jury was charged on the defense of accident.