'" Hayden, 447 N.W.2d at 498 (citing Claim of Bromley, 304 N.W.2d 412, 417 (N.D. 1981)). Although the ultimate resolution of conflicting medical testimony falls with the agency, this Court has required the Bureau to clarify discrepancies among inconsistent medical reports. DeChandt v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 452 N.W.2d 82, 83 (N.D. 1990); Howes v. Workers Compensation Bureau, 429 N.W.2d 730, 733 (N.D. 1988); (quoting Hayes v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 425 N.W.2d 356, 357 (N.D. 1988)). Initially, we limited the requirement of adequate clarification of discrepancies in medical testimony to situations involving internal conflicts in the attending physician's report.

Stenvold was, at the time of the hearing, engaged in a work trial and WSI was on notice by her testimony that there were problems. This Court has said: "Because the Bureau acts as both a fact finder and an advocate in considering a worker's claim and in resolving conflicting evidence, we have repeatedly cautioned that the Bureau `must not place itself in a full adversary position to the claimant.'" Blanchard v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1997 ND 118, ¶ 23, 565 N.W.2d 485 (quoting Hayes v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 425 N.W.2d 356, 357 (N.D. 1988)). [¶ 24] The Bureau's obligation to adequately consider medical evidence is one distinction from the true adversarial process.

"The claimant has the burden of establishing his or her right to participate in benefits from the Workers Compensation fund." Hayes v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 425 N.W.2d 356, 357 (N.D. 1988) (citing Steele v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 273 N.W.2d 692, 698 (N.D. 1978)). Yet this Court has said "the Bureau must adequately explain its reason for disregarding the favorable evidence in denying benefits."

Howes returned to work in July of 1985 and did not contact the Bureau for further benefits until after his headaches and hospitalization in April of 1986. Howes insists that he "proved" his case in July of 1985 and wonders "[h]ow many times must he prove his case?" We addressed the subject of Howes' question recently in Hayes v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 425 N.W.2d 356, 357 (N.D. 1988): "If the Bureau terminates benefits, after initially accepting a claim and paying benefits, the claimant has the burden of proving his or her right to continue receiving benefits." See also Gramling v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 303 N.W.2d 323, 325-26 (N.D. 1981).

Dr. Killen believed Rory Clark suffered a new injury on October 12; Dr. Redington believed that Rory Clark's history of back problems was prologue to the October 12 injury, and were aggravated by the compensable work injury. WSI bears the responsibility of weighing the credibility of medical evidence presented in a claim for benefits. Negaard-Cooley v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2000 ND 122, ¶ 18, 611 N.W.2d 898. If there is conflicting medical evidence presented in a case, some of it favorable and some unfavorable to a claimant, WSI must adequately explain its reason for disregarding the favorable evidence when it reaches a conclusion less favorable to the claimant. Hayes v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 425 N.W.2d 356, 357 (N.D. 1988). In her order aggravating benefits, the ALJ weighed the evidence before her, and explained her reason for adopting Dr. Redington's medical opinion:

A [¶ 32] Citing Blanchard v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 1997 ND 118, ¶ 23, 565 N.W.2d 485 and Hayes v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 425 N.W.2d 356, 357 (N.D. 1988), Sjostrand says "[t]his Court has `repeatedly cautioned' that the Bureau must not take a `position . . . fully adversary to the claimant . . .'"; notes this Court has said "[t]he adversary concept has only limited application to claims for workmen's compensation benefits and the Bureau . . . acts in a quasi-judicial capacity" (citing Roberts v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 326 N.W.2d 702, 706 (N.D. 1982), Bromley v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 304 N.W.2d 412, 416 (N.D. 1981), Steele v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 273 N.W.2d 692, 702 (N.D. 1978)), and further notes "this Court long ago pointedly informed the Bureau that its admonishments to the Bureau must not be `treated as empty noise'" (citingSpangler v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 519 N.W.2d 576, 578 (N.D. 1994)). That is the extent of Sjostrand's argument about impermissible adversarial conduct by the Bureau.

Id. Because the Bureau acts as both a fact finder and an advocate in considering a worker's claim and in resolving conflicting evidence, we have repeatedly cautioned that the Bureau "must not place itself in a full adversary position to the claimant." E.g. Hayes v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bur., 425 N.W.2d 356, 357 (N.D. 1988). Instead, as we explained in Siewert, 554 N.W.2d at 470, the Bureau must consider the entire record, clarify inconsistencies, and adequately explain its reasons for disregarding medical evidence favorable to the claimant.

Although the claimant has the burden of proving the right to continued benefits, the Bureau must not place itself in a position fully adversary to the claimant. Hayes v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 425 N.W.2d 356, 357 (N.D. 1988). Moreover, as we held in Beckler v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 418 N.W.2d 770, 775 (N.D. 1988), due process requires the Bureau to give a claimant prior notice of termination of disability benefits, a summary of the medical evidence supporting termination, and an opportunity to respond.

The Bureau acts as both a factfinder and an advocate when considering a worker's claim for benefits, so it "must not place itself in a full adversary position to the claimant." Hayes v. N.D. Workers Compensation Bureau, 425 N.W.2d 356, 357 (N.D. 1988). Instead, the Bureau must consider the entire record, clarify inconsistencies, and adequately explain its reasons for disregarding medical evidence favorable to the worker.

The Bureau must consider the entire medical record, and if there is conflicting medical evidence, some favorable and some unfavorable to the claimant, the Bureau must adequately explain its reasons for disregarding the favorable evidence in denying benefits. Hayes v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 425 N.W.2d 356 (N.D. 1988). Since her injury, Vail has received nearly 1,700 chiropractic treatments in all, and continues to receive two or three such treatments each week. These treatments have provided only very brief pain relief. Torson conceded Vail's condition will not be corrected by the chiropractic treatments, but she concluded that Vail should continue indefinitely taking not less than one or two weekly treatments for pain relief. The Bureau suspected the treatments were neither effective nor medically warranted because they gave only very brief respite from pain and were repeated with great frequency.