Opinion
No. 2004-CT-00759-SCT.
April 27, 2006. Petition For Rehearing Filed May 11, 2006.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LEFLORE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT, TRIAL JUDGE: HON. WILLIAM G. WILLARD, JR., DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/16/2003
DISPOSITION: THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED AND RENDERED. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LEFLORE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: GEORGE S. WHITTEN, JR
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: WILLIE JAMES PERKINS, SR
EN BANC.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 1. On November 14, 1995, an order was entered into the minute books of the Leflore County Board of Supervisors ("Board"). This order reflected that all five members of the Board agreed to authorize the exchange of lands between Leflore County and two companies, Goldkist and Scott Petroleum; to convey two easements to the companies; and to grant an ad valorem tax exemption for the two companies. Phil Wolfe, a member of the Board, claimed the Board never considered, discussed, nor approved the order, and on April 17, 1998, filed a petition for injunctive relief in the Leflore County Chancery Court against the Board and Leflore County ("County"). In that petition, which was filed under the Open Meetings Act, Wolfe requested that the trial court purge the order from the minute books and enjoin the enforcement of the order, or in the alternative, remove his name from the recorded vote.
The facts are taken from those provided by the Mississippi Court of Appeals in Hayes v. Leflore County Bd. of Supervisors , 2005 WL 1870252, at *1 (Miss.App. Aug. 9, 2005).
Miss. Code Ann. 25-41-1, et seq. (Rev. 2003).
¶ 2. While Wolfe's case was pending, Southern States Cooperative ("Southern") purchased the land that was the subject of the 1995 order. Because Wolfe's suit was a cloud on Southern's title to the land, Southern filed a separate suit in late 2002 to quiet and confirm title and named Wolfe as a defendant. On March 7, 2003, in an agreed order entered in Southern's suit, Wolfe agreed to dismiss any claims pending in his action against the Board and County. In exchange, Wolfe would be released from Southern's action. After receiving word that Wolfe was dismissing his suit, Harold Emerson, Jack Hayes, and George Whitten (collectively "Hayes"), filed a motion on March 21, 2003, to intervene in Wolfe's action. Hayes, like Wolfe, alleged the order was not an action taken by the Board. Hayes requested an injunction commanding the Board to purge the 1995 order from their minutes, or a decree that would strike the 1995 order from the Board's minutes.
¶ 3. On May 5, 2003, the chancellor entered an order dismissing Wolfe's action with prejudice. When Hayes challenged the dismissal in a motion for relief, the Chancellor responded by noting the March 7, 2003, order in Southern's suit wherein Wolfe had agreed to dismiss his open meetings case. The Chancellor ruled that Hayes had no basis for the motion to intervene because Wolfe had agreed to dismiss his suit on March 7, 2003.
¶ 4. Hayes appealed, and in a 7-0 vote, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Hayes' motion to intervene was timely and that Hayes should have been allowed to intervene. The Court of Appeals found that as a taxpayer, Hayes had an interest in Wolfe's action under Miss. Code Ann. section 25-41-15 (Rev. 2003). Leflore County filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court, which we granted. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstate and affirm the Chancellor's decision to dismiss Hayes' petition.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 5. "[A] trial court has considerable discretion in ruling on a motion to intervene." City of Tupelo v. Martin , 747 So. 2d 822, 826 (Miss. 1999) (citing Cummings v. Benderman , 681 So. 2d 97, 101 (Miss. 1996); Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Pittman , 501 So. 2d 377, 381 n. 1 (Miss. 1987)). "The standard of review of a chancellor's denial of a motion to intervene is abuse of discretion." Cohen v. Cohen , 748 So. 2d 91, 93 (Miss. 1999) (citing Perry County v. Ferguson , 618 So. 2d 1270, 1271-72 (Miss. 1993)).
DISCUSSION
¶ 6. Hayes filed his motion to intervene under Miss. R. Civ P. 24(a)(2), and on appeal argued the trial court erred when it denied his motion. Rule 24(a)(2) states:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application, anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:
. . . .
(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
M.R.C.P. 24 (a)(2); see also Cohen , 748 So. 2d at 93; Pittman , 501 So. 2d at 381.
¶ 7. Hayes filed his motion to intervene claiming an interest in Wolfe's action based on the following language of Miss. Code Ann. section 25-41-15 (Rev. 2003): "[t]he chancery courts of this state shall have the authority to enforce the provisions of this chapter upon application of any citizen of the state, and shall have the authority to issue injunctions or writs of mandamus to accomplish that purpose."
¶ 8. Specifically, Hayes argues he has the authority under section 25-41-15 to intervene and force the Board to maintain accurate minutes pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. section 25-41-11 (Rev. 2003). However, the rights and powers granted by the statute are those granted to the chancellor, not a citizen, to enforce the provisions of the Open Meetings Act. Instead, Hayes rights are controlled by Rule 24(a)(2).
"Minutes shall be kept of all meetings of a public body, whether in open or executive session, showing the members present and absent; the date, time and place of the meeting; an accurate recording of any final actions taken at such meeting. . . ." Miss. Code Ann. § 25-41-11.
¶ 9. Leflore County argues the Court of Appeals erred on several points in its decision, but because we find Hayes had no interest in Wolfe's proceeding under Rule 24(a)(2), we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision and focus primarily on that issue.
¶ 10. According to Rule 24(a)(2), Hayes must first make a timely application for intervention. Second, Hayes must claim an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action. M.R.C.P. 24(a)(2). Third, he must be so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest. Id. Finally, if Hayes does have an interest, the interest must not already be adequately represented by existing parties. Id.
¶ 11. While the Court of Appeals addressed these elements of Rule 24(a)(2), they only addressed the second and third elements at the surface level. As to the second element, the Court of Appeals spoke of Hayes' interest as a taxpayer, but never clearly defined that interest. The Court of Appeals stated: "Hayes, as a taxpayer of Leflore County, clearly had an interest in the action and his interest was protected by Section 25-41-15." Hayes , 2005 WL 1870252 at *3. The Court of Appeals appears to reason that under section 25-41-15, any taxpayer has an interest simply by virtue of being a taxpayer.
¶ 12. In Hayes' motion to intervene, as well as other motions, he described his interests that he believes to be protected: (1) the right not to bear a disproportionate share of the ad valorem tax burden because an exemption from the same tax is secretly granted to another property owner in the County; (2) knowing what decisions their representatives on the Board of Supervisors make and in seeing that the Supervisor's decision is obeyed by other county officials; (3) knowing whether the Board of Supervisors transacts the public's business and protections from inaccurate minutes; (4) maintenance of the representative form of government and a democratic society; (5) "[u]nless the 1995 minutes are corrected, the two sets of minutes are likely to mislead the reasonable, otherwise un-informed voter to believe that Mr. Wolfe was the supervisor who most favored the whole package framed in the purported Order. . . . This may influence the votes of voters when the incumbent is up for re-election. The incumbent is the candidate Movants desire to be re-elected"; and (6) "[a]s a member of Taxpayers for Good Government operating The Taxpayers Channel which weekly broadcasts by cable the complete, un-edited coverage of local public bodies . . . movant George S. Whitten Sr. is adversely affected if final actions by the County can be accomplished by insertion in the Board Minutes after a meeting without the Board deliberating . . . for there is then no reason to film and cover the meetings; the coverage is rendered worthless to him and all other viewers of The Taxpayers Channel."
¶ 13. We must consider, using these interests in relation to the transaction, whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Hayes' motion to intervene. The subject of the action here was that the minutes did not accurately reflect what occurred at the November 14, 1995, meeting. It is clear that what occurred was not the buying or selling of any land; instead, Hayes seeks this intervention so that the Board's eleven-year-old minutes will accurately reflect that there may or may not have been the appearance of some impropriety. We point out that Hayes' prayer for relief, which requests an injunction commanding the Board to purge the 1995 order from their minutes, or a decree that strikes the 1995 order from the Board's minutes, is moot considering the Board adopted an amended version of the minutes from the November 14, 1995, meeting at its November 5, 2001, meeting to clear up any confusion with the 1995 order. In the 2001 order, the Board approved by a majority, including a "nay" vote from Wolfe, that:
Be it resolved that the minutes of the minutes of the meeting of November 14, 1995, which cast a cloud on the title of the property to Goldkist, be and are hereby amended nunc pro tunc to convey to Goldkist the property described as follows. . . . [T]he County is under no obligation to build a rail spur to the property herein above described as owned by Goldkist, any requests for ad valorem tax exemption is withdrawn, and Goldkist seeks no easement for an underground pipe.
Thus, the 2001 order eliminates Hayes' claim that the ad valorem tax creates a disproportionate burden on Leflore County Citizens, and more importantly, that the minutes are inaccurate.
¶ 14. As to the rest of Hayes' claims of interest, we look to the third element of Rule 24(a)(2). The rule requires that Hayes must also be so situated that the disposition of Wolfe's action may as a practical matter impair or impede the ability to protect those other interests. Miss. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Hayes claims his other interests in having the 1995 order purged from the minutes are so that he is able to know what is going on, that Wolfe would be re-elected, the Board meetings make for good television, and the maintenance of a democratic society. When considering whether these interests will be impaired, we must note that regardless of the outcome of these proceedings, Hayes still may never know what exactly happened in the 1995 meeting; Wolfe may not be re-elected; the Taxpayer's Channel may not interest all individuals; and we doubt that a democratic society will cease to exist. Hence, as a practical matter, the disposition of this matter will do nothing to protect these other interests that Hayes seeks to protect. Accordingly, we agree with the chancellor.
For clarity, this is the same Wolfe who already abandoned his action against the Board and County.
Hayes asserts the order was entered by "a high-handed sleight-of-hand wherein the Clerk of the Board and/or the Board Attorney surreptitiously insert an official-looking Order into the Minutes they prepare after the Board meeting and before the President of the Board signs the minutes."
CONCLUSION
¶ 15. The Court of Appeals stopped short of a complete Rule 24(a)(2) analysis when it discussed only timeliness and only casually addressed Hayes' interests in Wolfe's action and the protection of those interests that an intervention would provide. We find the Chancellor did not abuse his discretion when he found Hayes did not have an interest in Wolfe's underlying action to purge or strike the 1995 order, nor as a practical matter, was impaired to protect any of his other so-called interests. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate and affirm the Chancellor's order denying Hayes' motion to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2).
¶ 16. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED AND RENDERED. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LEFLORE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED. WALLER AND COBB, P.JJ., CARLSON AND DICKINSON, JJ., CONCUR. EASLEY, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. DIAZ, GRAVES AND RANDOLPH, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.