Opinion
No. 05-17-01116-CV
05-28-2019
CHRISTY HAYES A/K/A CHRISTY MAYO, Appellant v. MAYLON S. JOHNSON, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4 Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 004-01963-2017
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Myers, Osborne, and Nowell
Opinion by Justice Nowell
This is a forcible detainer action. Following a bench trial, the county court at law determined appellee Maylon Johnson had a superior right to possession of the property at issue ("Property"), which required appellant Christy Hayes to relinquish possession of the Property. Hayes appeals the judgment of the county court, raising three issues. Because we conclude the county court was required to determine the issue of title to resolve the forcible detainer action, we vacate the county court's judgment and dismiss Johnson's forcible detainer lawsuit for want of jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
Johnson acquired the Property from her mother, Ann Warfield, in May 2017. The facts giving rise to this lawsuit primarily occurred before 2017 while Warfield owned the Property.
In September 2006, Warfield was approached by her friend, Francis Clark, about selling the Property to Clark's granddaughter, Christy Hayes. The following month, Warfield and Hayes entered into a verbal agreement for Hayes to live in the house on the Property, and Hayes moved in shortly thereafter. The parties verbally agreed that Hayes would: (1) live in the house with her nephew and no one else; (2) pay Warfield $350 by the fifth day of each month; (3) pay the home owner's insurance and property taxes; and (4) be responsible for "upkeep."
Warfield testified the parties had an oral month-to-month rental arrangement terminable by either party upon thirty days' notice. She did not agree to sell the Property to Hayes and, if she had, she would have "wanted all my money up front." However, Hayes and Clark testified the parties entered into a contract-for-deed arrangement pursuant to which Warfield agreed to sell the property for $48,000, which Hayes would pay in $350 monthly installments. Although Hayes and Clark repeatedly asked Warfield for a written contract; Warfield told Clark "it was never going to happen."
Warfield stated she did not lease the Property; she rented the Property.
Hayes and Clark testified about extensive repairs and improvements they made to the house, including repairing broken plumbing, replacing boards and a banister on the porch, replacing the hot water heater, removing mold, replacing carpet, installing sheetrock, and painting the house. They estimated they spent $20,000 to $30,000 on repairs and improvements. Hayes testified she also paid the property taxes from 2006 through 2016.
Hayes made monthly payments, which generally were late, until October 2015. However, when she stopped paying, she did not move out of the house. Warfield testified she initially attempted to collect the missed payments, but eventually stopped doing so because Hayes refused to pay. Hayes testified she stopped paying because Warfield, who is an older woman with Parkinson's Disease and dementia, said to her: "I've got some stuff going on right now, I'll get a hold of you when I'm ready to get the rest of it [the payments]."
On May 4, 2017, Warfield conveyed the Property to Johnson. On May 17, 2017, through her attorney, Johnson served written notice of termination of the lease, notice to vacate the Property, and notice of debt collection on Hayes and demanded Hayes pay the delinquent rent and vacate the property by June 15, 2017. After Hayes refused to pay the delinquent rent and surrender possession of the Property, Johnson filed a petition for forcible detainer in the justice court. The justice court awarded possession of the property to Johnson and Hayes appealed the ruling to the county court. Following a bench trial, the county court also awarded possession of the Property to Johnson. This appeal followed.
LAW & ANALYSIS
A forcible detainer action is a special proceeding intended to provide a speedy, simple, and inexpensive means for resolving the question of the right to immediate possession of the premises. Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.). "To prevail in a forcible detainer action, a plaintiff is not required to prove title, but is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. However, where the right to immediate possession necessarily requires resolution of a title dispute, the justice court has no jurisdiction to enter a judgment and may be enjoined from doing so." Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Elwell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 267 S.W.3d 566, 568 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).
Where a contract-for-deed arrangement is established, but a landlord-tenant relationship is not, the justice court lacks jurisdiction over a forcible detainer case because a determination of title ordinarily will be required. See Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 712-13; see also Mendoza v. Murrieta, No. 07-16-00010-CV, 2016 WL 6599611, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 7, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); Aguilar v. Weber, 72 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) ("[i]f the right to immediate possession depends upon title to the property under the terms of the contract for deed, the county court at law lacks subject matter jurisdiction to issue the writ of possession"). "One indication that a justice court (and county court on appeal) is called on to adjudicate title to real estate in a forcible detainer case—and, thus, exceed its jurisdiction—is when a landlord[-]tenant relationship is lacking." See Aguilar, 72 S.W.3d at 733 (citing Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 712 n.4); see also Mendoza, 2016 WL 6599611, at *3; Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 712-13 ("Without a landlord-tenant relationship, the justice court could not determine the issue of immediate possession without necessarily determining the owner of the real estate pursuant to the contract between the parties.").
The appeal pending before us is similar to Valdez v. Gonzalez Equities, Ltd., No. 04-12-00466-CV, 2013 WL 3871063 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 24, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). Gonzalez Equities owned a house and offered to sell it to Valdez in 2006. See id. at *1. Valdez made a down payment and subsequently made monthly payments. See id. The parties disputed whether the monthly payments were made pursuant to a contract for deed or a landlord-tenant arrangement. See id. In 2010, David Gonzales wrote letters to Valdez alleging nonpayment of taxes and insurance; the letters alternated between referring to the contract between them as a mortgage/purchase agreement and a rental agreement. See id. Eventually, Gonzalez Equities filed a forcible detainer action in the justice of the peace court; the justice court and, on appeal, the county court found in favor of Gonzalez Equities on the ground that Valdez was a tenant. See id. On appeal, both parties acknowledged that their original agreement was a contract for deed to purchase the home. See id. at *2. However, they disputed whether the contract was oral or written and whether Valdez remained a purchaser under the contract or became a tenant-at-will. See id.
Considering the contradictory evidence in the record about whether the contract was oral or written and whether the parties originally had a landlord-tenant relationship or a buyer-seller relationship, which could have become a landlord-tenant relationship if Valdez defaulted under the contract, the Fourth Court of Appeals concluded Gonzalez Equities did not sufficiently establish an agreed landlord-tenant relationship or prove a sufficient ownership interest in the property to establish a superior right to possession. See id. at *3, *4. The court stated: "Questions remain regarding the type of agreement at issue, the terms of the agreement, the rights of the parties in relation to the agreement, and whether there was a default under the agreement. Due to the number of unresolved questions and the necessity of resolving title issues before these questions can be answered, we conclude the issues of title and possession are inextricably intertwined." Id. at *4.
Similarly, in the case before us, the primary disputed issue between the parties at trial was whether the relationship between them is landlord-tenant or seller-buyer. Before the justice court or county court could determine the issue of immediate possession, it was required to determine whether the parties' oral agreement created a landlord-tenant or a buyer-seller relationship. The parties presented conflicting evidence. Warfield testified she only agreed to a month-to-month rental arrangement and would have "wanted all my money up front" if she agreed to sell. She also dictated that only Hayes and Hayes's nephew could live in the house. However, Warfield required Hayes to pay home owner's insurance and taxes on the Property. Payment of property taxes by the tenant "is an exceedingly uncommon term in a rental agreement." Mendoza, 2016 WL 6599611, at *4. On the other side, Hayes and Clark testified the parties agreed to a contract-for-deed arrangement pursuant to which Hayes made monthly payments until Warfield asked her to stop until further notice. Hayes and Clark testified they spent a substantial amount of money making improvements to the house, including improvements that a tenant generally is not responsible for.
Considering the conflicting evidence in the record, we conclude Johnson did not sufficiently establish an agreed landlord-tenant relationship or prove a sufficient ownership interest in the property to establish a superior right to possession. See Valdez, 2013 WL 3871063, at *3, *4. Without an established landlord-tenant relationship, neither the justice court nor the county court could determine the issue of immediate possession without necessarily determining the owner of the real estate pursuant to the contract between the parties. See Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 712-13. As in Valdez, questions remain regarding the type of agreement at issue, the terms of the agreement, the parties' rights in relation to the agreement, and whether there was a default under the agreement. "Due to the number of unresolved questions and the necessity of resolving title issues before these questions can be answered, we conclude the issues of title and possession are inextricably intertwined." Valdez, 2013 WL 3871063, at *4.
CONCLUSION
Based on our review of the record, we conclude the justice court and county court lacked jurisdiction over this matter because the issue of immediate possession necessarily implicates issues of title on these particular facts. Therefore, the lower courts were without jurisdiction to render any judgment awarding possession of the Property in this matter.
We vacate the county court's judgment and dismiss Johnson's forcible detainer lawsuit for want of jurisdiction.
/Erin A. Nowell/
ERIN A. NOWELL
JUSTICE 171116F.P05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 004-01963-2017.
Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell. Justices Myers and Osborne participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the county court at law is VACATED, and the forcible detainer action filed by Maylon S. Johnson is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.
It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal. Judgment entered this 28th day of May 2019.