Opinion
Civil Action No. 17-1327
05-17-2018
STEVEN J. HAYES, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT GILMORE, Facility Manager SCI Greene, TRACEY SHAWLEY, Grievance Officer SCI Greene, DOCTOR PILLAI, Treating Psychiatrist SCI Greene, EARL BAKER, RN SCI Greene, DAN KARPENCY, RN SCI Greene, PSS WAINE, Treating Psych SCI Greene, PSA LINDSEY, Treating Psych SCI Greene, ADAM SEDLOCK, Treating Psychologist SCI Greene, SHELLY MANKEY, Unit Manager SCI Greene, MAJOR CORO, Unit Major, SCI Greene, LT STICKLES, Unit Brass SCI Greene, DORINA VARNER, (SOIGA) Central Office, ROBERT MARSH, Chief Psych Central Office, and JOHN/JANE DOES, to be named after review of discovery documents. All named defendants sued in both individual and official capacity, Defendants.
District Judge Arthur J. Schwab
Re: 23, 25 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Steven J. Hayes ("Plaintiff"), an inmate currently confined to the State Correctional Institution at Greene ("SCI-Greene"), in Waynesburg, Pennsylvania, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff names as defendants Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC") and SCI-Greene supervisory and corrections personnel who are responsible for inmate medical and mental health treatment, inmate grievance review, and Plaintiff's housing unit ("DOC Defendants"). In addition, Plaintiff names Dr. Pillai, who serves as a DOC-contracted psychiatrist at SCI-Greene. Plaintiff asserts that all of the Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by their deliberate indifference to his personal safety and mental health for the period of November 23, 2016, through December 1, 2016. ECF No. 1.
Dr. Pillai and the DOC Defendants have filed Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. ECF Nos. 23 and 25. In particular, Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") before initiating this lawsuit; failed to allege the personal involvement of nearly all named Defendants; and failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for the violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Eighth Amendment.
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Motions to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 23 and 25, be granted.
Although it may appear that the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge, this Report and Recommendation is issued because the John/Jane Does have not been identified and, as such, have not filed consent forms.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Plaintiff's Complaint
In the context of the pending Motions to Dismiss, the following facts alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint are accepted as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). Plaintiff is an inmate serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, imposed by the New Haven Connecticut Superior Court in lieu of a death sentence after trial. ECF No. 6 at 3. Pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact, Plaintiff has been assigned to the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and to the Diversionary Treatment Unit ("DTU") at SCI-Greene. Id .
As indicated in DOC Policy No. 13.8.1, Access to Mental Health Care (March 2, 2015), the DTU is designed to provide secure housing and mental health care for inmates who present safety or security needs, and suffer Serious Mental Illness. http://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Documents/DOC%20Policies/13.08.01%20Access%20to%20Mental%20Health%20Care.pdf
Plaintiff states that on November 23, 2016, at approximately 8:30 a.m., he was denied his request to make a telephone call to his attorney. Dissatisfied with the denial, Plaintiff threatened suicide, packed his belongings, and requested immediate assistance from "psych." Id. at 7. Unidentified unit staff called prison psychology staff. Defendant Lindsay, a Psychological Services Associate ("PSA"), responded to Plaintiff's cell at 8:45 a.m. and listened to Plaintiff's complaints and his threat to "do something" if he didn't receive access to a phone. Lindsay told Plaintiff she would "see what she could do" and left the unit. Id. At 9:30 a.m., Plaintiff began to "grind his wrist" in a back and forth motion with "a broken stainless steel toilet paper tube." Id. After 45 minutes, he managed to cut his wrist and wrote "no more punishment" in blood on his cell wall adjacent to the door. At 10:15 a.m., two unit corrections officers arrived to deliver Plaintiff's lunch. Plaintiff showed the officers his wrist and they saw the "blood message" on the wall. The officers immediately reported the incident as a mental health emergency.
Plaintiff was escorted to a unit medical triage room, and Defendant Waine, a Psychological Services Specialist ("PSS"), conducted a brief evaluation. Plaintiff informed Waine that he was denied a phone call and that he had not received recently ordered psychotropic medication. Waine told Plaintiff he would check on both the availability of a call and the status of Plaintiff's medication. A nurse dressed Plaintiff's wound and Plaintiff alleges he repeatedly told the nurse, "you're lucky I don't have a razor." Id. at 8.
Defendant Lt. Stickles, a unit supervisor, informed Plaintiff he would be returned to his cell in the DTU because a Psychiatric Observation Cell ("POC") was not available. While walking back to his cell, Plaintiff again saw Waine in the hallway, and asked to speak with him. Waine did not intervene to alter Plaintiff's cell assignment. Id.
At 12:30 p.m., group therapy commenced in the unit dayroom, with Waine facilitating as the PSS. Plaintiff was on cell restriction and so could not participate. In response to Plaintiff's yells for attention, Waine interrupted the session to motion to Plaintiff that he would speak with him. Once the session concluded, Waine spoke to Plaintiff at his cell, in the presence of a corrections officer. Plaintiff informed Waine he was not engaging in self-harm. After a brief consultation with Plaintiff, Waine went to check on Plaintiff's medication and phone privileges. Id. at 9.
At 6:00 p.m., unidentified unit staff "appeared unaware of the earlier incident" and handed Plaintiff his evening mail. Id. Plaintiff was not on "razor restriction" and requested a razor. Id. After receiving the razor, Plaintiff broke the front guard and began to cut his arm. Plaintiff states he cut himself a few times before realizing he needed to remove the blade completely to "achieve depth." Id. At this point, a corrections officer appeared at Plaintiff's cell and requested that Plaintiff hand him the razor. Plaintiff complied.
Plaintiff was escorted to the unit medical triage room and his wounds were bandaged. Defendant Dr. Pillai, a psychiatrist on contract with the DOC, was contacted regarding Plaintiff's conduct. Dr. Pillai ordered that Plaintiff be placed in a bare DTU cell with a safety gown/blanket to prevent further self-harm, and because no POC cells were available. A corrections officer was stationed outside the cell for approximately 90 minutes. Plaintiff complains that he did not receive a "psych consult." In addition, Plaintiff states he was left in the bare cell for six days, and did not see a psychiatrist until November 28, 2016, when medication was ordered. He was seen again on November 29, 2016, and released from suicide watch. Id. at 10.
Plaintiff complains that this treatment is in violation of applicable DOC policy governing Access to Mental Health Care, and constitutes deliberate indifference to his safety and serious mental health condition. As a result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff alleges he was able to harm himself and was cruelly treated. He seeks injunctive relief in the form of an assigned psychological services specialist located in each DTU 365 days per year, 24 hours per day; replacement of SCI-Greene's staff psychologist; replacement of the DTU supervising officer with a "trained psychological professional"; weekly psychotherapy sessions; a transfer to a different DOC facility; and compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 12-13.
Plaintiff's Complaint also describes his relevant participation in DOC's Inmate Grievance Process. Plaintiff states that on November 29, 2016, Plaintiff submitted Grievance No. 654303, reporting his dissatisfaction with his treatment and requesting a transfer to another DOC facility. Id. Plaintiff states this grievance was improperly rejected by Defendant Shawley, the SCI-Greene Grievance Coordinator. Plaintiff appealed the rejection on December 2, 2016. On January 3, 2017, Defendant Shawley reversed the earlier rejection and remanded the grievance for investigation. Id. Plaintiff states that he did not receive a timely response by January 27, 2017, and so filed an appeal to final review to the DOC Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals ("SOIGA"). SOIGA rejected the appeal as Plaintiff failed to appeal the initial denial to the SCI-Greene Superintendent, as required by DOC Grievance Policy DC-ADM 804. Id.; and see ECF No. 26-3 at 36. On February 15, 2017, Plaintiff received the initial response to the remanded grievance, dated January 27, 2017. The response indicates that Defendant Adam Sedlock investigated Plaintiff's claims, and determined that DOC policy was followed with regard to Plaintiff's treatment during the challenged six-day period. Accordingly, the grievance was denied.
Plaintiff next appealed Grievance No. 654303 to the Facility Manager, as required by the Inmate Grievance Policy. This Grievance was submitted on March 24, 2017, and was denied as unfounded on April 21, 2017. Plaintiff thereafter filed an appeal to final review to the SOIGA, and Defendant Varner, the SOIGA Chief Grievance Officer, referred the incident to Defendant Dr. Robert Marsh, DOC Chief of Psychological Services to investigate. Id. Plaintiff states that on June 15, 2017, Dr. Marsh "rubber stamped [the] grievance denial," and Plaintiff received the final denial of his grievance on June 21, 2017.
Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint on October 16, 2017, bringing Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against all Defendants for failing to provide adequate treatment during the period November 23, 2016, through December 1, 2016, and for failing to protect Plaintiff from self-harm. ECF No. 6. The DOC Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and an accompanying brief on February 12, 2018, ECF Nos. 23, 24. Dr. Pillai also filed a Motion to Dismiss and an accompanying brief on February 12, 2018, ECF Nos. 25, 26. Plaintiff has filed his brief in opposition to the Motions to Dismiss in the form of "Objections to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss." ECF No. 34. Accordingly, both Motions to Dismiss are ripe for review.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In assessing the sufficiency of the complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court, however, need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Empl. Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004), citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id., citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, or where the factual content does not allow the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that, under Twombly, "labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" do not suffice but, rather, the complaint "must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct" and that are sufficient "to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s] of his claim").
In addition, pro se pleadings, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). In a civil rights action, the court must liberally construe the pro se litigant's pleadings and "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002), quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002).
C. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has brought his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), which provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 provides remedies for deprivations of rights established in the Constitution or federal laws. It does not, by its own terms, create substantive rights." Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006), citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3 (1979) (footnote omitted). Thus, in order to state a claim for relief under Section 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts from which it could be inferred that "the defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived him or her of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States." Id. at 423. As previously discussed, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights provided by the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.
A. Personal Involvement
The DOC Defendants broadly argue that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to set forth sufficient facts in the Complaint to show that they were personally involved in the alleged underlying constitutional violations.
It is well established that "[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable, and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved." Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007). Personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing may be shown "through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence." Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005), quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). See Ruff v. Health Care Adm'r, 441 F. App'x 843, 846 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) ("[t]o be liable under § 1983, a defendant must have some personal involvement in the underlying unconstitutional conduct"). See also Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d at 432 n.7, quoting Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[i]n order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against multiple defendants, a plaintiff must show that each individual defendant violated his constitutional rights"). See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d at 1207-08 ("[a]llegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity" such as stating time, place and persons responsible").
Moreover, liability of an individual government defendant cannot be predicated on the unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinate under a theory of respondeat superior. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d at 353, quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d at 1207. See Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d at 210 (a supervisor can only be held liable if his or her own actions resulted in the constitutional injury).
It is also well established that participating in the grievance process is not sufficient to show the actual knowledge necessary for a defendant to be found personally involved in the alleged unlawful conduct. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d at 1207. See Ramos v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., No. 06-1444, 2006 WL 2129148, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2006) ("review and denial of the grievances and subsequent administrative appeal conducted does not establish personal involvement by those Defendants in the alleged underlying unconstitutional conduct"); Jefferson v. Wolfe, No. 04-44 E, 2006 WL 1947721, at *17 (W.D. Pa. July 11, 2006) (finding that allegations that the defendants denied the plaintiff's appeal of his grievance was insufficient to establish the defendant's personal involvement in the challenged conduct); Watkins v. Horn, No. 96-4129, 1997 WL 566080, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 1997) (concurrence in an administrative appeal process is not sufficient to establish personal involvement).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support a finding that Defendants Gilmore, Sedlock, Mankey, and Caro were personally involved in the alleged unconstitutional conduct at issue. Rather, Plaintiff seeks to hold them liable based solely on the fact that they hold supervisory positions. ECF No. 6 at 4, 5. Because these Defendants cannot be held liable for the actions of their subordinates, the claims brought against them are properly dismissed.
Similarly, Plaintiff seeks to also hold Defendants Gilmore, Shawley, Sedlock, Varner and Marsh liable because they participated in reviewing the grievances and subsequent appeals filed by Plaintiff relative to the alleged underlying constitutional violations. Id. Plaintiff fails to allege facts from which it could be inferred that these Defendants were personally involved in the alleged violations themselves. Accordingly, the claims brought against these Defendants are properly dismissed as well.
B. Deliberate Indifference to Mental Health Condition
Plaintiff brings a claim against all DOC Defendants and Dr. Pillai for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's mental health needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on November 23, 2016, and for the next seven days, Defendants failed to place him in a designated POC cell, failed to maintain a continuous "suicide watch" over Plaintiff; failed to provide medication, failed to provide counseling as requested, and failed to abide by Plaintiff's interpretation of DOC policy with respect to the treatment of inmates with severe mental illness.
The Eighth Amendment "requires prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has incarcerated." Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). In order to establish an Eighth Amendment medical claim, an inmate must allege acts or omissions by prison officials sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2004); Natale v. Camden Cty. Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). In the context of medical care, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant was: (1) deliberately indifferent (the subjective component) to (2) the plaintiff's serious medical needs (the objective component). Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987); West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1978).
A serious medical need is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Mines v. Levi, 2009 WL 839011 *7 (E.D. Pa. March 26, 2009); Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates, 834 F.2d at 347. "[I]f unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain results as a consequence of denial or delay in the provision of adequate medical care, the medical need is of the serious nature contemplated by the Eighth Amendment." Young v. Kazmerski, 266 F. A'ppx. 191, 193 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates, 834 F.2d at 347).
With respect to the serious medical need requirement, it is conceded that Plaintiff was deemed to have a serious mental illness by prison officials. Based upon that designation, this Court is satisfied at this juncture that the serious medical need requirement has been satisfied.
With respect to the subjective deliberate indifference component, the United States Supreme Court has established that the proper analysis for deliberate indifference is whether a prison official "acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841 (1970). Accordingly, a plaintiff must make a "'subjective' showing that defendant acted with a 'sufficiently culpable state of mind.'" Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002), citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). "[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Wilson v. Burks, 423 F. App'x 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2011), quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. A complaint that a physician or a medical department "has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment [as] medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
Further, with particular relevance here, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed that,
[w]here a prisoner has received some amount of medical treatment, it is difficult to establish deliberate indifference, because prison officials are afforded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners. Allegations of mere negligent treatment or even medical malpractice do not trigger the protections of the Eighth Amendment. "Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law." Deference is given to prison medical authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of patients, and courts "disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment ... [which] remains a question of sound professional judgment."Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 227-28 (2017) (internal citations omitted).
Nonetheless, there are circumstances in which some care is provided yet it is insufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements. For instance, prison officials may not, with deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the inmate, opt for "an easier and less efficacious treatment" of the inmate's condition. Nor may "prison authorities deny reasonable requests for medical treatment ... [when] such denial exposes the inmate 'to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.'" And, "knowledge of the need for medical care [may not be accompanied by the] ... intentional refusal to provide that care."
In the instant case, Plaintiff's allegations establish that Plaintiff's conduct on November 23, 2016, was treated by unit staff as a mental health emergency and gave rise to individualized assessments and treatment decisions by various mental health professionals. Plaintiff was personally examined and counseled repeatedly throughout the day by specialized staff, and his mental health providers assessed the seriousness of his claims of suicidal ideation. Under the circumstances alleged, Plaintiff's claim is one of general dissatisfaction with the adequacy and propriety of treatment stating, at best, a claim for negligence against each of involved Defendants based upon his or her determination of the likelihood of self-harm and suffering, and Plaintiff's apparent use of minor injury as a tool to manipulate prison personnel.
As indicated by the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was placed in the DTU as a result of his history of serious mental illness with particular security concerns. This placement provided him access to counseling and programming for approximately 20 hours per week. On November 23, 2016, upon the initiation of his demand for a phone a call, apparent suicide threats and attempts at self-harm, Defendant Lindsay, a psychological services associate and Defendant Waine, a psychological services specialist, were immediately contacted by unit staff to attend to Plaintiff's mental health needs. Both assessed Plaintiff at critical moments during the day and determined that Plaintiff could be left in a DTU cell. Each time Plaintiff cut himself, sustaining apparent minor injuries, he received immediate medical and psychological assistance. After using his razor to cut his arm, Dr. Pillai, a psychiatrist, was contacted. Based upon the information provided, Dr. Pillai ordered that Plaintiff be placed in a bare cell, and that Plaintiff be provided a safety blanket. ECF No. 6 at 9, 10. Given Plaintiff's use of a toilet paper roll and a razor edge to cut himself, this decision and course of treatment plainly falls within the discretion of Dr. Pillai as a mental health professional. While Plaintiff finds fault with Defendants' failure to consider him a serious suicide risk as well as the decision to maintain him in the DTU with a safety blanket for several days, these medical decisions, based upon the evaluation of various mental health professionals, may be given deference as a question of sound professional judgment. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment medical indifference claim fails and dismissal is again appropriate.
3. Failure to Protect
In addition to a deliberate indifference to serious medical need claim, Plaintiff also alleges a failure to protect claim against all Defendants. This claim is predicated upon Defendants' alleged failure to comply with DOC mental health care policies, as well as the conditions of his confinement in the DTU for the period November 23, 2016 through November 29, 2016. ECF No. 6 at 1, 2, and 12. Based upon the facts alleged in his Complaint, Plaintiff again fails to allege the requisite deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of health or safety upon which liability may be imposed.
Whether Plaintiff's claim is couched in terms of inhumane conditions of confinement, or failure to protect from harm, Plaintiff is required to plead facts that show: (1) he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the named Defendant was deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to Plaintiff's health and safety; and (3) the Defendant's deliberate indifference caused him harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d at 225; Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367-68 (3d Cir. 2012).
However, where, as here, the facts alleged establish that Defendants acted reasonably under the circumstances to prevent serious harm, and the conditions of incarceration were not inhumane, even in light of Plaintiff's mental illness, liability cannot be imposed. Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d at 225.
According to Plaintiff, unit staff acted immediately when made aware of Plaintiff's physical and mental health emergencies, and Plaintiff was timely assessed by several mental health professionals. While Plaintiff alleges he was deprived medication; this was rectified on November 28, 2016, when he was seen by a psychiatrist at his cell, and medication was ordered. ECF No. 6 at 10. Plaintiff was "pulled out" to see the same psychiatrist the next day, and judged to be safe for release from "suicide watch." Id. Plaintiff's temporary discomfort resulting from physician-ordered placement in a bare cell with a safety blanket successfully prevented further self-harm, and was not so prolonged as to give rise to a constitutional claim for the deprivation of the minimal necessities of civilized life. As alleged by Plaintiff, staff were present on the unit throughout his confinement, and no further physical harm occurred. Simply put, under the circumstances alleged, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that any named Defendant acted with the requisite recklessness or deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm upon which liability may be imposed. Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiff's claim for failure to protect be dismissed.
In light of the Court's recommended disposition of Plaintiff's Complaint, the Court need not address whether Plaintiff properly exhausted available administrative remedies prior to filing this action, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), or the application of qualified immunity as a defense to Plaintiff's claims. --------
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Motions to Dismiss filed on behalf of all named Defendants, ECF Nos. 23, 25, be granted.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Maureen P. Kelly
MAUREEN P. KELLY
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Dated: May 17, 2018 cc: The Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Judge
All counsel of record by Notice of Electronic Filing