Opinion
C.A. No. 00A-06-007 SCD
Submitted: April 3, 2001
Decided: June 29, 2001
Upon Appeal from the Industrial Accident Board — AFFIRMED
ORDER
This 29th day of June, 2001, upon consideration of the briefs filed by counsel and the record below, it appears that:
(1) This is an appeal from the Industrial Accident Board ("Board"), following the Board's decision of May 16, 2000, awarding claimant LaRue Johns ("Johns") compensation at the rate of $302.46 per week.
(2) On July 8, 1999, while employed as a truck driver for Hayes Trucking, Inc. ("Employer"), Johns suffered a compensable injury. While driving a dump truck for Employer, Johns was involved in a collision when an automobile pulled in front of him. This accident caused injuries to Johns' head, jaw, left eye, left arm, and right leg.
(3) The Board conducted a hearing on October 6, 1999 to determine whether Employer carried workers' compensation insurance at the time of Johns' injury. The hearing was also held to determine if a bond was required to secure payment of any possible future award to Johns. Employer was not represented by counsel at the time of the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board decided that a $25,000 was required.
(4) On February 10, 2000, a Board hearing was scheduled regarding the merits of the case. Immediately prior to the hearing, counsel for Johns and Employer met and managed to settle the merits of Johns' claim. The settlement agreement stated that Johns was entitled to total disability benefits beginning July 8th, the date of the accident. The benefit payments to Johns would be ongoing and payment made by Employer to Johns would be credited against the outstanding workers' compensation payments. Counsel also agreed to exchange wage rate information in order to determine the appropriate wage rate at which Johns would be paid. Counsel then informed the Board that they had reached an agreement on the merits of the claim. Shortly thereafter, on February 25, 2000, Employer's counsel discontinued its representation of Employer.
(5) The Board then heard arguments pursuant to Johns' request for enforcement of the October 1999 order regarding the $25,000 bond. However, an order was apparently never issued as there was not a copy of the order in the case file and neither Johns nor Employer had ever received a copy. At the hearing, at which Employer was represented by counsel, Employer acknowledged that it did not have workers' compensation insurance at the time of Johns' injury, but had since obtained coverage. However, Employer had paid Johns for lost wages and Employer's Personal Injury Protection ("PIP") vehicle insurance had paid Johns' medical bills. Employer also argued that if he were required to obtain a large bond, it would impede his ability to conduct his business as his company's assets only consisted of four dump trucks. The Board found that Employer had demonstrated that he accepted responsibility for the claim, and issued an order requiring Employer to obtain a secured bond for $15,000.
(6) On May 2, 2000, the Board conducted another hearing pursuant to Johns request to enforce the February 10th settlement agreement. At the time of the hearing, Employer had retained new counsel. Employer contested the February 10th settlement agreement, arguing that former counsel did not have the authority to settle the claim, the exchange of correspondence between counsel did not sufficiently memorialize the alleged agreement, and that factual issues existed regarding the terms of the settlement. Counsel for Johns argued that Employer's former counsel did have authority to enter into a settlement agreement on behalf of Employer, and that the exchange of correspondence between counsel memorialized the terms and was sufficient.
(7) At the hearing, Johns presented the Board with a letter from his counsel to Employer's counsel dated February 10, 2000. The letter confirmed the discussion between counsel on the morning of February 10th in which Employer's counsel stated that Employer agreed to compensate Johns consistent with his petition for benefits, with a credit for payments already made, and with the understanding that Johns would process the medical bills under PIP while it was available. The letter also stated that Employer would provide counsel with copies of Johns' wage records so that his actual average wages could be calculated. By letter dated February 16, 2000, Employer's counsel forwarded copies of the wage records and included an Agreement as to Compensation reflecting his calculation of the appropriate wage rate. On March 6, 2000, Employer's counsel sent a letter stating that he would be withdrawing as counsel since he no longer worked for the law firm that had been representing Employer, and that he had not been retained to continue representation at his new law office. However, the letter did confirm that the February 10th letter from Johns' counsel "accurately represented the agreement which we reached at the Legal Hearing before the Board in February." Employer argued that since neither the attorney nor the law firm who reached the agreement currently represented Employer, the settlement agreement was not binding.
(8) After the May 2, 2000 hearing, the Board issued an order dated May 16, 2000, in which it found that Employer's former counsel did bind Employer to the settlement reached on February 10, 2000. The Board stated that counsel represented Employer at the time of the agreement, thus had apparent and actual authority to enter into a settlement agreement on behalf of Employer. The Board also found that the correspondence between counsel contained sufficient specific terms to bind the parties to an agreement. Therefore, consistent with Johns' petition, Employer would be liable for total disability benefits for as long as Johns remained totally disabled.
(9) The Board then calculated Johns' average weekly wage based on the payroll records of Johns' entire employment history with Employer. The Board determined that "[w]hen wages are fixed by the output of the employee . . . then the weekly wage is "the average weekly earnings for so much of the preceding six months as the employer has worked for the same employer." Thus, since Johns worked for Employer for four full weeks and two partial weeks, the two partial weeks would be disregarded in the average weekly wage rate calculation and the rate would be based on Johns' wage during his four full weeks of employment. The Board reasoned that disregarding the partial weeks was a better method of calculation because since Johns' output varied during the week, prorating the rate did not necessarily approximate the wage for the week had Johns worked the entire week. The Board disagreed with Employer's argument that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to determine Johns' wage rate, finding that since the payroll figures were not in dispute, the only issue was the appropriate manner of calculating the average weekly wage, an issue appropriate for resolution via a legal hearing.
(10) The Delaware Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly emphasized the limited appellate review of the factual findings of an administrative agency. On appeal from a decision of the Board, the Court is limited to determining whether substantial evidence in the record supports the Board's findings, and that such findings are free from legal error. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. If this Court finds substantial evidence and the Board has not committed an error of law, the Board's decision must be affirmed.
See Employment Ins. Appeals Bd. of the Dep't of Labor v. Duncan, Del. Supr., 337 A.2d 308, 309 (1975); Longobardi v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., Del. Super., 287 A.2d 690, 692 (1972), aff'd, Del. Supr., 293 A.2d 295 (1972).
See Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (1994); Battisa v. Chtysler Corp., Del. Super., 517 A.2d 295, 297 (1986), app. dism., Del. Supr., 515 A.2d 397 (1986).
Windsor v. Bell Shades and Floor Coverings, Del. Supr., 403 A.2d 1127, 1129 (1979).
(11) In this case, the Court is satisfied that the Board's decision that the February 10th settlement agreement was enforceable is based on substantial evidence and supported by the record. Employer's counsel at the time of the agreement had the apparent and actual authority to enter into the agreement, and counsel's subsequent termination of representation does not affect the validity of the settlement agreement. In addition, the Board's finding that the correspondence exchanged between counsel provided sufficient terms to enforce the agreement is supported by substantial evidence. The letters clearly stated that Employer would compensate Johns consistent with his petition for benefits, that Employer would be entitled to a credit for compensation already paid, and that the medical bills would be paid through Employer's PIP coverage.
(12) The Court also finds that the Board properly determined that calculation of the average weekly wage rate was a legal issue that did not require an evidentiary hearing. The rate is a measured calculation based on an employee's payroll records and is inherently objective. Therefore, the Court agrees that the calculation of Johns' wage rate is a legal matter since the facts were not in dispute.
(13) Having reviewed the record, the Court finds the Board's decision that there was a valid settlement agreement is supported by substantial evidence on the record. In addition, the Court agrees with the Board that the calculation of the average weekly wage rate in this case is a legal issue. Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the decision of the Industrial Accident Board is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.