Whether or not an individual has the capacity to contract calls for a legal conclusion.Hayes, Conservator v. Candee, 75 Conn. 131, 138, 52 A. 826, 828 (1902). " A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings."
Kelly v. Waterbury, 96 Conn. 494, 500, 114 A. 530; Lentine v. McAvoy, 105 Conn. 528, 533, 136 A. 76. Nor were the witnesses, in order to answer the questions, required to weigh facts which were not related to their opinion as experts and so to draw a conclusion which the trier must ultimately determine upon the basic of the facts which he finds proven. St. George Pulp Paper Co. v. Southern N.E. Telephone Co., 91 Conn. 563, 570, 100 A. 358. The questions fall into the category of those allowed in Hayes v. Candee, 75 Conn. 131, 139, 52 A. 826, and Atwood v. Atwood, 84 Conn. 169, 79 A. 59; while they might have been regarded as calling for the statement of a legal conclusion, they were allowed as expressing no more than the opinion of the witness formed from his observation as to the condition of the defendant due to the intoxicating liquor he had drunk. After the accused had been tried and found guilty on the first two counts of the information, for the purpose of proving a second conviction the State offered in evidence a certified copy of a prior conviction of the accused on March 7th, 1935.
Mental perception and power to think and reason of a lesser degree than that which is required in the understanding and transaction of ordinary business may be all that is requisite to the full understanding of everything involved in the execution of a will." ( In re Sexton's Estate, 199 Cal. 759, 251 Pac. 778; In re Holloway's Estate, 195 Cal. 711, 235 P. 1012; Turner v. Houpt, 53 N.J. Eq. 526, 33 Atl. 28; People v. Baskin, 254 Ill. 509, 98 N.E. 957; Alexander on Wills, sec. 332; Coleman v. Marshall, 263 Ill. 330, 104 N.E. 1042, at 1046; Greene v. Maxwell, 251 Ill. 335, 96 N.E. 227, 36 L.R.A., N. S., 418; Jones v. Belshe, 238 Mo. 524, 141 S.W. 1130; Succession of Jones, 120 La. 986, 45 So. 965; Hayes v. Candee, 75 Conn. 131, 52 Atl. 828.) [6] Testamentary capacity was correctly defined, but there was no instruction to the effect that one might possess testamentary capacity even though unable to transact business. This evidence produced by respondent having been admitted over appellant's objection might well have influenced the jury to believe that if a person was not able to transact ordinary business he would not possess testamentary capacity and appellants were therefore prejudicially affected.
Where the evidence is conflicting, as in this case, it is for the trier to find the fact or draw the conclusion based upon the conflict of evidence. The futility of an attempt to retry in this court questions of fact conclusively settled by the finding of the trial court has been frequently pointed out by us. Hesse v. Meriden, S. C. Tramway Co., 75 Conn. 571, 573, 54 A. 299; Hayes v. Candee, 75 Conn. 131, 133, 52 A. 826; Kirbell v. Pitkin, 75 Conn. 301, 307, 53 A. 587; Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 369, 59 A. 487. After the defendant had filed his answer of not guilty, he moved to erase the cause from the docket because the complainant had not filed with the complaint the certificate of a reputable physician as required by General Statutes, ยง 6006.
If a question of this character called for a legal conclusion as to the capacity of one to make a particular will, or a deed, or a contract, it would be objectionable. This distinction is pointed out in Hayes v. Candee, 75 Conn. 131, 137, 52 A. 826, and the admissibility of questions of this character definitely determined in this case and in Turner's Appeal, 72 Conn. 305, 315, 44 A. 310. Mrs. Atwood was asked: "How and when did you first discover that Frank G. Atwood claimed to have any interest in it (the property in dispute)?"
The thing actually sought, in either case, is a retrial of facts by an appellate court whose jurisdiction relates only to the correction of errors of law.'" In Hayes v. Candee, 75 Conn. 131, 133, TORRANCE, C. J., delivering the opinion, says: "The appeal record in this case seems to have been prepared, for the most part, as the basis of a futile attempt, on the part of the appellant, to retry here questions of fact conclusively settled in the trial court; and hence it contains a great deal of matter not only useless and unnecessary, but harmful, in that it tends to obscure the real questions in the case." In Kirbell v. Pitkin, 75 Conn. 301, 307, HALL, J., speaking for the court, says: "The impropriety and futility of thus attempting by appeal to retry in this court questions of fact, which have been conclusively settled by the finding of the trial court, has frequently been pointed out by us.
Our Supreme Court, in construing a complaint in an action challenging the validity of the grantor to convey certain of her real estate, has had occasion to parse the allegation that the grantor was "mentally weak and incompetent." Hayes, Conservator v. Candee, 75 Conn. 131, 136, 52 A. 826 (1902). The Hayes court said that "[t]he words `mentally incompetent' have no strict technical meaning; they do not necessarily mean that the person to whom they are applied is an idiot, or non compos mentis; they merely indicate a relative, and not an absolute, lack of mental ability.
The law presumes a person's competence or sanity in the performance of legal acts. Stanton v. Grigley, 177 Conn. 558, 564, 418 A.2d 923 (1979); see also Hayes v. Candee, 75 Conn. 131, 52 A. 826 (1902), Deroy v. Estate of Baron, 136 Conn.App. 123, 128, 43 A.3d 759 (2012) " In considering the matter of mental incompetency, it must be acknowledged that mental impairments admit of a wide variety of conditions of varying degrees of severity, depending upon the particular case." (Internal quotation marks omitted).
53 Am.Jur.2d 460, Mentally Impaired Persons ยง 1 (1996). Our Supreme Court, in construing a complaint in an action challenging the validity of the grantor to convey certain of her real estate, has had occasion to parse the allegation that the grantor was `mentally weak and incompetent.' Hayes, Conservator v. Candee, 75 Conn. 131, 136, 52 A. 826 (1902). The Hayes court [explained] that `[t]he words "mentally incompetent" have no strict technical meaning; they do not necessarily mean that the person to whom they are applied is an idiot, or non compos mentis; they merely indicate a relative, and not an absolute, lack of mental ability.
That count does not allege the breach of a clear promise. Moreover, "competent," "negligent and careless," and even "incompetent" are relative terms; see, e.g., Gargilo v. Moore, 156 Conn. 359, 362-63, 242 A.2d 716 (1968); Hayes v. Candee, 75 Conn. 131, 136, 52 A. 826 (1902); that do not connote the wholesale "fail[ure] in some fundamental respect" envisioned by Gupta. The third count of the revised counterclaim incorporates by reference the allegations of the two prior counts, sounding in fraud and negligence, respectively.