Hayden v. Lundgren

10 Citing cases

  1. Bird v. Johnson

    272 N.W. 168 (Minn. 1937)   Cited 5 times

    The statute simply makes driving a motor vehicle in excess of the statutory speed limits a prima facie violation of the statute itself. Hayden v. Lundgren, 175 Minn. 449, 221 N.W. 715; see 19 Minn. L.Rev. 666, 679, note 67. Defendant's negligence was a question of fact for the jury. Hayden v. Lundgren, 175 Minn. 449, 221 N.W. 715. Plaintiff's contributory negligence was submitted to the jury, and he has no complaint in this respect.

  2. Anderson v. Mid-Motors, Inc.

    256 Minn. 157 (Minn. 1959)   Cited 14 times
    In Anderson v. Mid-Motors, Inc., 256 Minn. 157, 98 N.W.2d 188 (1959), the supreme court addressed the applicability of the forfeiture provision of Minn.Stat. § 169.20, subd. 1. The court interpreted the phrase "any right-of-way * * * hereunder" contained in the forfeiture provision to mean any right-of-way.

    We said that the charge as a whole would not mislead the jury and that failure of the trial court to read § 169.20, subd. 1, was not prejudicial. Greenberg v. Holfeltz, 244 Minn. 175, 69 N.W.2d 369; Peterson v. Lang, 239 Minn. 319, 326, 58 N.W.2d 609, 614, and authorities cited: 1 Mason's Dunnell, Minn. Practice, §§ 1543, 1544; Hayden v. Lundgren, 175 Minn. 449, 451, 221 N.W. 715, 716; Cressy v. Republic Creosoting Co. 108 Minn. 349, 122 N.W. 484; MacIllravie v. St. Barnabas Hospital, 231 Minn. 384, 43 N.W.2d 221; Bohnen v. Gorr, 234 Minn. 71, 47 N.W.2d 459. We thereafter granted an application for rehearing on the petition of plaintiff in which she asked that this court reconsider the import of the trial court's instruction from the standpoint of its bearing upon the subject of plaintiff's contributory negligence.

  3. Stedman v. Norlin

    243 Minn. 389 (Minn. 1955)   Cited 9 times

    While the fact that the Baker car was. approaching from the rear would not seem to constitute a bar to the witness's expression of his opinion as to its speed (see, Aasen v. Aasen, 228 Minn. 1, 36 N.W. [2d] 27; Hayden v. Lundgren, 175 Minn. 449, 221 N.W. 715), his own doubt as to his qualification to estimate such speed in miles per hour would indicate the trial court had not abused its discretion in rejecting his further expressions of opinion with reference thereto. See, Marsh v. Henriksen, 213 Minn. 500, 7 N.W.2d 387; City of Grand Rapids v. Crocker, 219 Mich. 178, 189 N.W. 221.

  4. Butler v. Engel

    243 Minn. 317 (Minn. 1954)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that in case where defendant's speed is unlawful, defendant forfeits whatever right of way he may have had, and failure to instruct on forfeiture of right of way lets jury consider a defendant's contributory fault with the impression that defendant possessed statutory right-of-way notwithstanding speed, constituting error of fundamental law

    " In support of this statement we cited Duffey v. Curtis, 193 Minn. 358, 258 N.W. 744; Hayden v. Lundgren, 175 Minn. 449, 221 N.W. 715; Hustvet v. Kuusinen, 184 Minn. 222, 238 N.W. 330. We apparently overlooked the fact that all these cases were decided before the passage of L. 1939, c. 430, which changed the rule with respect to making the speed limit specified for municipalities an absolute speed limit and any speed in excess thereof unlawful.

  5. Dose v. Yager

    42 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 1950)   Cited 16 times
    In Dose v. Yager, 231 Minn. 90, 42 N.W.2d 420 (1950), and Strandjord v. Exley, 287 Minn. 145, 177 N.W.2d 48 (1970), the actions of both drivers in intersection collisions were held to be a proximate cause.

    There was evidence that at the time he first saw the Yager car it was traveling 55 to 70 miles per hour. Under those circumstances, we conclude that the evidence, as a whole, reasonably tends to support a finding of negligence on his part and that such negligence was a contributing proximate cause of the collision. Mahowald v. Beckrich, 212 Minn. 78, 2 N.W.2d 569; Duffey v. Curtis, 193 Minn. 358, 258 N.W. 744; Hayden v. Lundgren, 175 Minn. 449, 221 N.W. 715; Hustvet v. Kuusinen, 184 Minn. 222, 238 N.W. 330; Brown v. Murphy Transfer Storage Co. 190 Minn. 81, 251 N.W. 5. See, Nees v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. 218 Minn. 532, 16 N.W.2d 758. 3. Bunge contends that the trial court erred in excluding testimony of deputy sheriff Kermit R. Lohmar, who interviewed defendant Yager and plaintiff at the Glencoe Hospital shortly after the accident for the purpose of making an official report, required by § 169.09, subd. 8.

  6. Mahowald v. Beckrich

    2 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1942)   Cited 20 times
    In Mahowald v. Beckrich, 212 Minn. 78, 80, 2 N.W.2d 569, 572 (1942), we considered whether negligence per se results from a violation of the driver's license statute.

    Whether such speed was unreasonable and whether such violation contributed proximately to the collision were questions for the jury. Duffey v. Curtis, 193 Minn. 358, 258 N.W. 744; Hayden v. Lundgren, 175 Minn. 449, 221 N.W. 715; Hustvet v. Kuusinen, 184 Minn. 222, 238 N.W. 330. Furthermore, plaintiff had the statutory right of way, and if the facts were as claimed by her, it was defendant's duty to yield to plaintiff. Mason St. 1940 Supp. § 2720-196; Pearson v. Norell, 198 Minn. 303, 269 N.W. 643.

  7. Duffey v. Curtis

    258 N.W. 744 (Minn. 1935)   Cited 13 times

    It was for the jury to determine whether plaintiff was traveling at a speed greater than was reasonable. Hayden v. Lundgren, 175 Minn. 449, 221 N.W. 715; Hustvet v. Kuusinen, 184 Minn. 222, 238 N.W. 330, 331. In the latter case plaintiff, at a speed of 20 to 25 miles an hour, entered an intersection that was obstructed as defined by the above quoted statute.

  8. Guthrie v. Brown

    256 N.W. 898 (Minn. 1934)   Cited 19 times
    In Guthrie v. Brown, 192 Minn. 434, 256 N.W. 898, plaintiff as she entered an intersection observed defendant's car a block away, and it was held that she might reasonably assume that he would diminish his speed and yield the right of way.

    She had the right to assume that defendant would exercise ordinary care in driving unless and until she became aware of the contrary. Hillstrom v. Mannheimer Bros. 146 Minn. 202, 178 N.W. 881; Soderberg v. Taney, 152 Minn. 376, 188 N.W. 993; Klare v. Peterson, 161 Minn. 16, 200 N.W. 817; Primock v. Goldenberg, 161 Minn. 160, 200 N.W. 920, 37 A.L.R. 484; Joncas v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. 169 Minn. 278, 211 N.W. 462; Anderson v. Duban, 170 Minn. 155, 212 N.W. 180; Hayden v. Lundgren, 175 Minn. 449, 221 N.W. 715; Reynolds v. Goetze, 192 Minn. 37, 255 N.W. 249. It is only in the clearest cases, where the facts are undisputed, and it is plain that all reasonable men can draw but one conclusion from them that the question of contributory negligence becomes one of law.

  9. Tully v. Flour City Coal Oil Co.

    191 Minn. 84 (Minn. 1934)   Cited 15 times

    If the jury believed that the speed was in excess of the statutory rate it might still believe that plaintiff was not negligent, since violation of the statute merely creates a rebuttable presumption of fact. Hayden v. Lundgren, 175 Minn. 449, 221 N.W. 715; Hustvet v. Kuusinen, 184 Minn. 222, 238 N.W. 330. The evidence does not compel a finding adverse to plaintiff.

  10. Brixey v. Craig

    49 Idaho 319 (Idaho 1930)   Cited 25 times

    The presumption is that one approaching such an intersection at a rate of speed greater than fifteen miles per hour is doing so in violation of law and the presumption is that he is guilty of negligence, not less and not more than that. With the burden shifted by this presumption, negligence is still an issuable fact. The statutory law of Idaho on this subject, and the basic Uniform Act similar, adopted in many other states, apparently evade positive iron-clad rules, indeed this flexibility dependent upon different conditions is conspicuous. Courts interpreting these statutes in other states recognize that feature, and we think rightly so. ( Hayden v. Lundgren, 175 Minn. 449, 221 N.W. 715.) It is claimed the jury disregarded the court's instructions.