Opinion
No. 79CA0076
Decided August 16, 1979.
From the dismissal of complaint seeking a declaratory judgment relative to statute concerning the salaries of Colorado county officials, the representative plaintiffs in the class action appealed.
Affirmed
1. APPEAL AND ERROR — No Controverted Issues — Trial Court Ruling — Declaratory Judgment — Technical Error — Dismissal — Not Reversible Error. Although since there were no disputed issues of fact, trial court's ruling should have taken the form of a declaratory judgment rather than a dismissal, that technical defect is not reversible error.
2. PUBLIC OFFICIALS — Salaries — County Officials — Specified in Statute — Fixed Dollar Amounts — No Implication — Requirement — Cost of Living Increases. Where statute, § 30-2-102, C.R.S. 1973, specified salaries of county officials in fixed dollar amounts, the court may not resort to strained interpretations of the statute to imply a provision requiring cost of living salary increases.
Appeal from the District Court of Pueblo County, Honorable Thomas H. Phelps, Judge.
Edwin K. McMartin, P.C., for plaintiffs-appellants.
J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Deanna E. Hickman, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant-appellee.
Plaintiffs brought this class action on behalf of elected county officials in Colorado seeking a declaratory judgment that their salaries, established by § 30-2-102, C.R.S. 1973, should be interpreted in terms of actual purchasing power, resulting in salary increases based on changes in the Consumer Price Index. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint.
The plaintiffs' complaint requested a declaratory judgment that "the plaintiffs are entitled during each year that they hold office to a salary expressed in terms and amounts of the current purchasing power of their statutorily established salary, basing such current purchasing power upon the Consumers Price Index as promulgated by the United States Government."
After trial, the court entered a judgment with findings of fact and conclusions of law, dismissing the complaint. Plaintiffs' primary assertions of error are that the trial court made inadequate findings of fact and conclusions of law and that it should have entered a judgment on the merits rather than dismissing the complaint.
[1] There are no disputed issues of fact, and the trial court's findings present an adequate basis for review. Under these circumstances, although the trial court's ruling against plaintiffs should have taken the form of a declaratory judgment rather than a dismissal, that technical defect is not reversible error. Karsh v. City County of Denver, 176 Colo. 406, 490 P.2d 936 (1971).
As to the merits of the dismissals, § 30-2-102, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Cum. Supp.), lists the dollar amount of the yearly salaries to be paid elected officials of each county. The essence of plaintiffs' complaint is that the dollar signs in this statute should be interpreted as meaning the purchasing power of the statutory sums. We disagree.
[2] The question of interpretation of a statute is a matter of legislative intent. If the language used is clear, then forced, subtle, strained or unusual interpretations should never be used. Harding v. Industrial Commission, 183 Colo. 52, 515 P.2d 95 (1973). "In construing statutes, words of common usage are to be given their ordinary and generally accepted meaning, unless the context indicates otherwise." People v. Williams, 172 Colo. 434, 473 P.2d 982 (1970).
Although it might be proper and constitutional for the General Assembly to provide for inflation by including cost of living increases in its salary legislation, Pressler v. Simon, 428 F. Supp. 302, (D.C. 1976), aff'd sub nom., Pressler v. Blumenthal, 434 U.S. 1028, 98 S.Ct. 758, 54 L.Ed.2d 776 (1978), it did not choose to do so. And in light of the clear statutory language setting salaries for elected county officers in specific, fixed dollar amounts it is beyond the power of a court to add such a provision to the statute. The trial court did not err in finding that the statute calls for the payment of salaries in fixed dollar amounts, and that cost of living increases could not be implied.
Judgment affirmed.
JUDGE VAN CISE and JUDGE RULAND concur.