Hawthorne v. Blythewood, Inc.

10 Citing cases

  1. Bradley v. Central Naugatuck Valley Help

    1999 Ct. Sup. 9935 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)

    However, "it is said that when a patient enters a hospital maintained for private profit, he is entitled to such reasonable attention as his safety may require; and if he is temporarily bereft of reason, and is known by the hospital authorities to be in danger of self-destruction, the authorities are in duty bound to use reasonable care to prevent such an act." Hawthorne v. Blythewood, Inc., 118 Conn. 617, 623, 174 A. 81 (1934), quoting, Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 294, 175 N.W. 699. Although the defendant, Central Naugatuck Valley Help, Inc., is not a hospital, it is a facility for the care and treatment of mentally ill adults that receives consideration for doing so. The defendants received consideration for taking the plaintiff in as a resident. They knew or should have known about his problems with alcoholism and his tendencies to leave the facility to buy alcohol and to become intoxicated.

  2. United States v. Gray

    199 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952)   Cited 48 times
    In Gray, this court held that an award under the FTCA should be offset by the veteran's disability payments received by the plaintiff, but that an award should not be offset by hospitalization benefits.

    And in the case of a mental patient, the care must be reasonably adapted and proportioned to his known suicidal, homicidal, or other like destructive tendencies. Wetzel v. Omaha Maternity General Hospital Association, 96 Neb. 636, 148 N.W. 582; Torrey v. Riverside Sanitarium, 163 Wis. 71, 157 N.W. 552; Paulen v. Shinnick, 291 Mich. 288, 289 N.W. 162; Hawthorne v. Blythewood, Inc., 118 Conn. 617, 174 A. 81; Fowler v. Norways Sanitorium, 112 Ind. App. 347, 42 N.E.2d 415; Maki v. Murray Hospital, 91 Mont. 251, 7 P.2d 228. Plaintiff had been a patient in the army hospital at Camp Carson on a previous occasion.

  3. Palmer v. Garuti

    CASE NO. 3:06-CV-795 (RNC) (D. Conn. Feb. 17, 2009)   Cited 7 times

    In fact, the hospital defendants urge that his apparent need for care and treatment obliged them to detain and treat him independent of any requirement of the protective custody statute. See, e.g., Hawthorne v. Blythewood, 118 Conn. 617, 174 A. 81, 84 (Conn. 1934) ("[W]hen a patient enters a hospital maintained for private profit, he is entitled to such reasonable attention as his safety may require; and if he is temporarily bereft of reason and is known by the hospital authorities to be in danger of self-destruction, the authorities are in duty bound to use reasonable care to prevent such an act."). Because the evidence does not support a finding that the hospital defendants acted under color of state law, they are entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claims.

  4. Lyle v. Johnson

    240 Miss. 154 (Miss. 1961)   Cited 13 times
    Addressing the plaintiff's claim that a private sanitarium owed her mother heightened duties based on the admission contract

    The duty owed to a patient admitted to a hospital conducted for private gain is that he receive such reasonable care and attention for his safety as his mental and physical condition, if known, may require. Arlington Heights Sanitarium v. Deaderick (Texas), 272 S.W. 497; Bennett v. Punton Sanitarium Assn., 213 Mo. App. 363, 249 S.W. 666; Emory University v. Shadburn, 47 Ga. App. 643, 180 Ga. 595, 171 S.E. 192, 180 S.E. 137; Fetzer v. Aberdeen Clinic, 204 N.W. 364; Hawthorne v. Blythewood, 118 Conn. 617, 174 A. 81; Lagrone v. Helman, 233 Miss. 654, 103 So.2d 365; Maxie v. Laurel General Hospital, 130 Miss. 246, 93 So. 817; Meridian Sanitarium v. Scruggs, 121 Miss. 330, 83 So. 532; Palmer v. Clarksdale Hospital, 206 Miss. 680, 40 So.2d 582; Paramount-Richards Threaters v. Price, 211 Miss. 879, 53 So.2d 21; Richardson v. Dumas, 106 Miss. 664, 64 So. 459; Smith v. Simpson, 221 Mo. App. 550, 288 S.W. 69; Tate v. McCall, 57 Ga. App. 824, 196 S.E. 906; Tri-State Transit Co. v. Martin, 181 Miss. 388, 179 So. 349. II.

  5. Quick v. Benedictine Sisters Hospital Assn

    102 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 1960)   Cited 14 times
    In Quick, although the patient was mentally ill, he injured himself when he fell out of bed after having electric shock treatments.

    The general principle that a master is responsible for the torts of a servant in the scope of his employment applies to such hospitals incorporated and conducted for private gain. See, Durfee v. Dorr, 123 Ark. 542, 186 S.W. 62; Wood v. Samaritan Institution, 26 Cal.2d 847, 161 P.2d 556; Hawthorne v. Blythewood, Inc. 118 Conn. 617, 174 A. 81; Adams v. Ricks, 91 Ga. App. 494, 86 S.E.2d 329; Fowler v. Norways Sanatorium, 112 Ind. App. 347, 42 N.E.2d 415; Lexington Hospital v. White (Ky.) 245 S.W.2d 927; Paulen v. Shinnick, 291 Mich. 288, 289 N.W. 162; Maxie v. Laurel General Hospital, 130 Miss. 246, 93 So. 817; Wetzel v. Omaha Maternity General Hospital Assn. 96 Neb. 636, 148 N.W. 582, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1224; Duke Sanitarium v. Hearn, 159 Okla. 1, 13 P.2d 183; Hamilton v. Corvallis General Hospital Assn. 146 Or. 168, 30 P.2d 9; Sloan v. Edgewood Sanatorium, Inc. 225 S.C. 1, 80 S.E.2d 348; James v. Turner, 184 Tenn. 563, 201 S.W.2d 691; Hogan v. Hospital Co. 63 W. Va. 84, 59 S.E. 943; Annotations, 124 A.L.R. 195 and 37 A.L.R. 2d 1290, Hayt, Hayt Groeschel, Law of Hospital, Physician, and Patient (2 ed.) pp. 204, 205. Fowler v. Norways Sanatorium, supra; Maxie v. Laurel General Hospital, supra; Gilstrap v. Osteopathic Sanatorium Co. 224 Mo. App. 798, 24 S.W.2d 249; Wetzel v. Omaha Maternity General Hospital Assn. supra; Faw

  6. Sloan et al. v. Edgewood Sanatorium, Inc.

    225 S.C. 1 (S.C. 1954)   Cited 5 times
    Holding the issue of negligence was properly submitted to the jury and its finding of negligence was a reasonable inference because decedent had known suicidal tendencies and committed suicide while a patient at a psychiatric hospital

    T.B. Bryant, Jr., and Fred R. Fanning, Jr., of Orangeburg, for Appellant, cite: As to degree of care mentalhospital owes to patients: 56 Ga. App. 634, 193 S.E. 375; 112 Ind. App. 347, 42 N.E.2d 415; 223 Ky. 497, 4 S.W.2d 407; 91 Mont. 251, 7 P.2d 225; 180 Misc. 205, 40 N.Y.S.2d 576; 232 Wis. 6, 285 N.W. 801; (Mo.) 218 S.W. 696. As to instant case being distinguishablefrom cases where mental patient leaps fromhospital window: 57 Ga. App. 824, 196 S.E. 906; 291 Mich. 288, 289 N.W. 162; 112 Ind. App. 347, 42 N.E.2d 415; 269 N.Y. 554, 199 N.E. 667; 14 N.Y.S. 881; 264 Mo. 258, 174 S.W. 409; 48 S.D. 308, 204 N.W. 364; 113 App. Div. 68, 98 N.Y.S. 867; 166 Misc. 418, 3 N.Y.S.2d 737; 273 App. Div. 552, 78 N.Y.S.2d 584. As to instant case being distinguishable from caseswhere mental patient is negligently allowed to leave hospitalpremises and commit suicide: 118 Conn. 617, 174 A. 81; 211 Mo. 419, 111 S.W. 109; 272 S.W. 497. As toproof of negligence being necessary to recover for suicidedeath in mental hospital in action against hospital: 323 Ky. 497, 4 S.W.2d 407; 171 Misc. 635, 13 N.Y.S.2d 458; 183 Misc. 674, 50 N.Y.S.2d 342; 221 Mo. App. 550, 288 S.W. 69; 180 Misc. 205, 40 N.Y.S.2d 576; 192 Misc. 15, 78 N.Y.S.2d 860; 190 N.C. 833, 131 S.E. 42; 103 N.J.L. 458, 135 A. 817; 184 Tenn. 563, 201 S.W.2d 691. As to testimony of experts being conclusiveon question of whether or not appellant exercised propercare toward deceased patient: 96 S.E. 360, 367; 214 S.C. 125, 51 S.E.2d 383; 83 Ga. App. 548, 64 S.E.2d 330, 335; (W.Va.) 136 S.E. 837, 840; 180 Cal. 437, 181 P. 642; 29 Cal.App. 321, 155 P. 128; 45 Cal.App. 372, 187 P. 445; 180 Ill. App. 334; 181 Ill. App. 274; 92 Wis. 206, 66 N.W. Ill. As to verdict against appellant being excessive: 171 Misc. 635, 13 N.Y.S.2d 458; 186 S.C. 402, 197 S.E. 97, 104. Messrs. Marshall B. Williams, of Orangeburg, and HenryH. Edens and

  7. James v. Turner

    201 S.W.2d 691 (Tenn. 1941)   Cited 13 times
    In James v. Turner, 184 Tenn. 563, 201 S.W.2d 691, a highly nervous patient, who had threatened suicide, was admitted to a hospital specializing in the treatment of mental and nervous diseases.

    However, if it be assumed that the institution did have the right to use restraint and such added precautions as handcuffs or ropes for the safety of the patient, the record discloses that he had shown some improvement by his stay at the sanatorium for several days, and it might well be said that the use of ropes or handcuffs or other restraining forces would have retarded his natural progress in regaining his health, both physical and mental. The Court of Appeals cites and quotes from Hawthorne v. Blythewood, Inc., 118 Conn. 617, 174 A. 81, where it is insisted that although the sanatorium had been advised of the suicidal tendency of the patient, it was not liable for his death by his own hand because he had not been committed by any court, and that it was therefore without authority to restrict the liberty of the patient so as to prevent him from committing suicide. However, it appeared in that case that at the time of the suicide the private attendant had left the deceased in a room by himself and while the attendant was gone the deceased escaped and committed suicide by drowning in a pond nearby.

  8. South Highlands Infirmary v. Galloway

    233 Ala. 276 (Ala. 1936)   Cited 19 times
    In South Highlands Infirmary v. Galloway, 1936, 233 Ala. 276, 171 So. 250, 252, 80 minutes after the return of a 78-year old patient from prostatic surgery the special nurse assigned to watch over him left the room to make entries on a chart.

    We have examined numerous supplementary cases arising since the above notes were compiled. Among these we cite Timbrell et ux. v. Suburban Hospital, Inc. et al. (Cal.App.) 36 P.(2d) 435, defining the degree of care substantially as in the Coe Case, supra. See, also, Hawthorne v. Blythewood, Inc., 118 Conn. 617, 174 A. 81, 82; Emory University v. Shadburn, 47 Ga. App. 643, 171 S.E. 192; Duke Sanitarium et al. v. Hearn, 159 Okl. 1, 13 P.(2d) 183. The added expression in the Branton Case, supra, "and by the express or implied contract of the undertaking," is unquestionably correct, and pertinent in framing an inclusive statement of the law applicable to all cases. It is not to be construed as imposing a greater "degree of care, skill, and diligence" than that "used by hospitals generally in that community," unless there is some evidence of an express or implied contract imposing a higher obligation than that implied from the admission of a pay patient on the customary basis.

  9. Fowler, Admx. v. Norways Sanatorium

    112 Ind. App. 347 (Ind. Ct. App. 1942)   Cited 25 times
    In Fowler the Court recognized that a hospital was responsible for the administrative acts of its employees even though the employees were directed by a physician.

    In determining ordinary care in such cases it is proper to consider the physical and mental ailments of the patient which may affect his ability to look after his own safety. Hawthorne v. Blythewood, Inc. (1934), 118 Conn. 617, 174 A. 81; Flower Hospital v. Hart (1936), 178 Okla. 447, 62 P.2d 1248; Stansfield v. Gardner (1937), 56 Ga. App. 634, 193 S.E. 375; Smith v. Simpson (1926), 221 Mo. App. 550, 288 S.W. 69; Maki v. Murray Hospital (1932), 91 Mont. 251, 7 P.2d 228; Hignite's Admrx. v. Louisville Neuropathic Sanitorium (1928), 223 Ky. 497, 4 S.W.2d 407; Dahlberg v. Jones (1939), 232 Wis. 6, 285 N.W. 841. In the case of Iterman v. Baker (1938), 214 Ind. 308, 316, 318, 15 N.E.2d 365, the Supreme Court of this State held that a hospital corporation could not legally practice medicine, and that it could not make a contract to practice medicine through licensed physicians and surgeons as its agents.

  10. Semerad v. Scavetta

    1996 Ct. Sup. 1598 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996)

    The other Connecticut cases cited by the defendants establish that a hospitalized patient is entitled to such reasonable care and attention as the patient's mental and physical condition requires. Hawthorne v. Blythewood, Inc., 118 Conn. 617 (1934); Edwards v. Grace Hospital, 130 Conn. 568, 36 A.2d 273 (1944) (holding that there was no reasonable basis for jury to find "corporate neglect" for failing to provide adequate care, supervision and oversight of decedent who leapt from a hospital window several days after surgery); Speer v. State, 4 Conn. App. 535, 495 A.2d 733 (1985) (holding state liable when decedent fell or jumped from an eighth floor window while in a detoxification center. "[T]he single most important factor in determining whether a health care facility is negligent in failing to prevent a suicide is whether its agents knew or should have known or foreseen that the patient was suicidal.")