Opinion
23A-CR-2352
06-24-2024
John Joseph Haworth, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Eric Grzegorski Kokomo, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Caroline G. Templeton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Howard Superior Court The Honorable Matthew J. Elkin, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 34D01-2203-F4-742
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Eric Grzegorski Kokomo, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Caroline G. Templeton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BAKER, SENIOR JUDGE
Statement of the Case
[¶1] John Joseph Haworth, Jr. pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine and admitted to being an habitual offender. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Haworth's sentence was deferred pending his completion of a drug court program. If he successfully completed the program, the State agreed it would dismiss the charges. After several violations, the trial court terminated Haworth's participation in the program and imposed the sentence he agreed to in his plea agreement. Finding no error by the trial court, we affirm.
Issue
[¶2] Haworth presents one issue for our review, which we restate as: whether the trial court abused its discretion when it terminated his participation in the drug court program.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] On March 8, 2022, while Haworth was on in-home detention in an unrelated cause, he admitted to a field officer during a home visit that he had methamphetamine in his system. The officer also found a baggie of methamphetamine in Haworth's pocket. The State charged Haworth with possession of methamphetamine as a Level 4 felony and alleged he is an habitual offender.
[¶4] First in April and then again in September 2022, the screening team recommended to the court that Haworth's application to the Problem Solving Court Program be denied. However, in January 2023, the parties filed a recommendation of plea agreement with the court that required Haworth's participation in the program. The agreement provided that Haworth would plead guilty to the Level 4 felony and be sentenced to ten years and that he would admit to being an habitual offender and receive a sentence enhancement of ten years. The agreement also provided that sentencing would be deferred during Haworth's participation in the county drug court program and that, upon his successful completion of the program, the entire cause would be dismissed. If Haworth failed to complete the program, he would be sentenced under the terms of the agreement. The court accepted Haworth's guilty plea, took the matter under advisement, deferred the proceedings pending Haworth's participation in the drug court program, and ordered Haworth to reside at a sober living facility and to follow all its rules.
A drug court is a problem solving court. See Ind. Code § 33-23-16-11(1) (2022).
[¶5] Thereafter, the court found Haworth in indirect contempt of court for violating the terms and conditions of the drug court program on four separate occasions in rapid succession-April 12, May 31, June 2, and July 6. On July 12, 2023, the drug court coordinator filed a notice of termination with the court stating the program intended to terminate Haworth due to his violation of the rules of the sober living facility as well as the terms and conditions of the drug court program. Following a fact-finding hearing on the matter, the court ordered Haworth terminated from the program. He was later sentenced in accordance with the terms of his plea agreement, and he now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] Haworth contends the trial court abused its discretion by terminating his participation in the drug court program. "Drug court is a forensic diversion program akin to" community corrections and probation. Benitez v. State, 199 N.E.3d 811, 813 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022). Accordingly, we review the termination of a drug court placement for abuse of discretion just as we do the revocation of community corrections placement or probation. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or when the court misinterprets the law. Id.
[¶7] Here, at the fact-finding hearing, probation officer Kelcey Moss testified that she supervised Haworth while he was in the drug court program. She stated that when Haworth entered the program, he signed an acknowledgment of the rules. Tr. Vol. II, p. 5. She further testified that Haworth had touched a guard's radio while living at the work release facility and that it is against the rules of the facility to touch a guard in any way. Id. at 4, 5. As for violations of the drug court program rules, Moss testified that Haworth had been caught with cigarettes and had engaged in prohibited communication. Id. at 5. Specifically, he emailed an individual who is a felon, and the drug court rules prohibit both communication with anyone outside the program and communication with other felons. Id.
[¶8] A man identified only as Mr. Pace, who was employed as a "CO" at the work release facility, testified on behalf of Haworth. Id. at 12. Defense counsel inquired about the "made you look game" he was playing with Haworth at the time that Haworth touched his radio and asked, "Do you believe what he did was was [sic] a violation of the rules of work release?" Id. at 10, 13. Pace responded: "I do." Id. at 13.
[¶9] If a problem solving court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a participant has violated a condition of the program, the court may either continue or terminate the individual's participation in the program. See Ind. Code § 33-23-16-14.5 (c)(1), (e) (2011). Haworth does not dispute that he committed violations of the program's rules, but he argues he should not have been terminated from the program because they were "merely technical violations that have absolutely nothing to do with drug offenses." Appellant's Br. p. 10. For instance, he asserts that his email communication to the felon was about returning a bicycle he had borrowed but nothing "that should amount to a termination" from the drug court program. Id. He further explains that the touching of the guard's radio was an interaction initiated by Pace, performed in a casual, joking manner, and comprised of no physical contact with Pace's person.
[¶10] Nevertheless, the court found that Haworth had violated the rules by having contact with a felon and touching the detention officer's radio, which the court noted "is a serious business regardless of what . . . Mr. Haworth's actual intent may have been." Tr. Vol. II, p. 16. Indeed, although Haworth proffered justifications for the violations, the acts still constitute violations. Moreover, he committed four violations within a short time period, suggesting that he had little regard for the rules he signed and that he was not exerting much of an effort to succeed in the program. Notably, following his placement at the county jail for his violation and indirect contempt on May 31, he was returned to the facility the morning of June 2 and then ordered back into custody later that same day for another violation and instance of indirect contempt. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 50-52.
[¶11] Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the court found, and Haworth does not dispute, that he violated the program's rules. Upon that finding, the court was well within its discretion to terminate his participation in the drug court program. We find no error.
Conclusion
[¶12] We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion when it terminated Haworth from the drug court program.
[¶13] Affirmed.
May, J., and Crone, J., concur.