is more questionable. See, e.g., Hawkinson v. Montoya, 2007 WL 776674, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 12, 2007). This Court need not take a position on that question because, as explained below, Plaintiffs' motion and the record is insufficient to resolve any βissueβ as a matter of law.
The case cited by Plaintiff is readily distinguishable. [#44 at 5-6 (citing Hawkinson v. Montoya, 479 F.Supp.2d 1164 (D. Colo. 2007))] In Montoya, the plaintiff sought to recover damages resulting from default judgments being entered against him in state court after the defendants denied the plaintiff the access to the courts needed to defend against those state court actions.
A state's affirmative obligation to assure its inmates access to the courts through legal assistance requires it to provide persons trained in the law to aid inmates in the preparation of state or federal petitions for writs of habeas corpus or initial pleadings in civil rights actions challenging conditions of current confinement. Hawkinson v. Montoya, 479 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1173 (D. Colo. 2007). Other than habeas corpus or civil rights actions regarding current confinement, a state has no affirmative constitutional obligation to assist inmates in general civil matters but may not erect barriers that impede the right of access of incarcerated persons.
A state's affirmative obligation to assure its inmates access to the courts through legal assistance requires it to provide persons trained in the law to aid inmates in the preparation of state or federal petitions for writs of habeas corpus or initial pleadings in civil rights actions challenging conditions of current confinement. Hawkinson v. Montoya, 479 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1173 (D. Colo. 2007).
However, Plaintiff explicitly states in his Amended Complaint that he does not seek damages for mental or psychological anguish. (Am. Compl. at 8, ΒΆ 4.) The PLRA does not apply where the plaintiff does not request damages for mental or emotional injury. See Hawkinson v. Montoya, 479 F.Supp.2d 1164, 1169 (D. Colo. 2007) (rejecting interpretation of the statute as prohibiting a prisoner from recovering compensatory damages of any type unless he has suffered a physical injury). Thus, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is properly denied to the extent it seeks to dismiss Plaintiff's request for compensatory damages pursuant to the PLRA.
The PLRA does not apply where the plaintiff does not bring an action for mental or emotional injury. See Hawkinson v. Montoya, 479 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1169 (D. Colo. 2007) (rejecting interpretation of the statute as prohibiting a prisoner from recovering compensatory damages of any type unless he has suffered a physical injury). Thus, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's compensatory damages claims under the PLRA is denied.
(Docket No. 313 at 1-5.) The plaintiff cites, among other cases, Hawkinson v. Montoya, No. 04-cv-01271, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20426 (D. Colo. Mar. 12, 2007). Hawkinson parsed the then-current language of Rule 56 and held that a motion that "seeks to resolve only specified issues relevant to [a party's] claims," as opposed to a motion that seeks to resolve the entire claim, is "entirely inappropriate under any provision of Rule 56."