Opinion
Civil No. 03-4413 (PAM/RLE).
October 24, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.
The Court heard oral arguments on October 14, 2004. On October 13, 2004, Magistrate Judge Erickson heard oral arguments on Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint. Regardless if the individual Defendants are named or unnamed, qualified immunity protects the individual officers from suit. Therefore, the Motion to Amend is denied as moot.
BACKGROUND
Defendants are Anoka-Hennepin East Metro Narcotics and Violent Crimes Task Force ("Task Force"), Anoka County, Anoka County Sheriff Larry Podany, and individual unnamed officers of each agency. On October 29, 2001, sometime in the evening, Defendants executed a "knock and announce" search warrant on Plaintiff Jodie Hawkinson's home. Plaintiff heard the knock at the door and proceeded slowly to open the door. Once she opened the door, Defendants entered the house and told her to get on the floor. Plaintiff hesitated and moved slowly, while shouting at Defendants. Defendants pushed her to the ground and handcuffed her wrists behind her back. Plaintiff questioned Defendants about what was going on, and told them that she had back problems. After detaining Plaintiff, Defendants moved her to a bench by the front door, and then handcuffed her to a kitchen chair. Plaintiff insists she tried to tell Defendants about her medical condition and that they continued to ignore her. (See Hiveley Aff. Ex. A at 81 (Hawkinson Dep.).)
Plaintiff claims that while she was handcuffed to the chair, she had a seizure. (Id. at 86.) Plaintiff contends that one of the officers tried to locate her medication, but was unsuccessful. (Id. at 87.) She also claims that one of the officers looked at her and said "I hope you flop around like a fish and die you biker bitch." (Id. at 86.) Following her seizure, Defendants called the paramedics. (See Patterson Aff. Ex. B.) The paramedics arrived at 7:33 p.m. Plaintiff was uncuffed and questioned by the paramedics about her medical conditions. (Id.) Plaintiff told the paramedics that she suffered from fibromylagia, asthma, and lupus, among other ailments. (Id.) The paramedics offered to take her to the hospital, but she declined and chose to stay at her home to await the arrival of her children. (Id.; Hiveley Aff. Ex. A at 87.)
Defendants conducted a thorough search of Plaintiff's home and discovered methamphetamine, a methamphetamine lab, and other drug paraphernalia. Defendants conducted a non-custodial interview with Plaintiff, and determined that Plaintiff knew nothing about the drugs but instead was a victim of physical and emotional abuse. (See Patterson Aff. Exs. A, C.) Although Plaintiff was not formally charged, her live-in boyfriend later pled guilty to a first degree controlled substance crime. (Hiveley Aff. Ex. B.)
All of Plaintiff's claims against Defendants are premised on the contact between Defendants and Plaintiff during the search of Plaintiff's home. Plaintiff's Complaint includes common law claims of assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent training, negligent supervision, negligent retention, and invasion of privacy. The Complaint further alleges a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "Failure to Prevent" claim, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Monell claim, and a claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"). Defendants' Motion pertains to all claims.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). However, as the United States Supreme Court has stated, "summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enter. Bank, 92 F.3d at 747. A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts in the record showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Krenik v. Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995).
B. Federal Constitutional Claims
Plaintiff has asserted three theories of liability against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, Plaintiff argues that Anoka County and the Task Force maintain a policy of failing to properly train, supervise and discipline its officers, thus allowing police officers to use excessive force. (Compl. ¶¶ 45-49.) Second, Plaintiff argues that the individual Defendants acted unreasonably under color of state law in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Compl. ¶¶ 35-39.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that some of the individual Defendants failed to "take reasonable and required steps to prevent the other Defendants from violating Plaintiff's constitutional rights." (Compl. ¶ 41.)
Defendants maintain that the Task Force is not a legal entity subject to suit. See Brown v. Fifth Judicial District Drug Task Force, 255 F.3d 475, 477 (8th Cir. 2001) ("authorities . . . appear to be uniform in holding that drug task forces similar to the defendant in this case are not separate legal entities subject to suit"). Even if the Task Force was a legal entity subject to suit, Plaintiff's claims against it would fail for the same reasons that the claims against Anoka County fail.
Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) Anoka County had a policy, practice or custom; (2) of violating an individual's federally protected rights; and (3) this policy actually violated her rights. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Plaintiff must further demonstrate that "the action alleged to be unconstitutional implements a county policy or was invoked pursuant to governmental custom, and that the official policy was the `moving force' behind the violation." Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1367 (8th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
For a claim alleging a failure to train or supervise police officers, Anoka County may be liable if it "had notice of prior misbehavior by its officers and failed to take remedial steps amounting to deliberate indifference to the offensive acts." Id. at 1367. There is no evidence in the record that indicates that Anoka County had any notice of previous similar misconduct by the individual defendants. Plaintiff asserts that this particular incident involved police misconduct. "The first isolated incident of misconduct by a subordinate employee generally is not enough to establish a policy or custom." Id. Because the record is void of any evidence of prior notice to Anoka County of prior misbehavior, Plaintiff's Monell claim fails. See Adewale v. Whalen, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1012 (D. Minn. 1998) (Tunheim, J.) ("Even assuming the [conduct against plaintiff] was improper, an isolated incident of police misconduct is not sufficient to establish municipal liability.").
Morever, Plaintiff fails to present any evidence that indicates that Anoka County employs an unconstitutional practice, policy or custom of failing to train and supervise employees. Although Plaintiff contends that individual officers have not been disciplined by Anoka County for their actions against Plaintiff, this assertion does not create an issue of fact that Anoka County employed an unconstitutional practice or procedure that caused the alleged injury. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 819 (1985); see also Adewale, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1012 (Section 1983 claim fails absent evidence of widespread pattern of unconstitutional misconduct).
2. Individual Defendants
"A government official performing discretionary functions is entitled to qualified immunity if his conduct does not violate `clearly established' constitutional or statutory rights of `which a reasonable person would have known.'" Adewale, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1013. To survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must assert a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, and raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the "objective reasonableness of the officer's conduct in light of the law and the information the officer possessed at the time."Id. Plaintiff claims that the individual Defendants violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
a. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. Determining whether a particular seizure is reasonable requires the court to evaluate not only when the seizure is made, but also how it is carried out. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). This requires a balancing of "the nature and quality of the intrusion of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests" against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Id. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). The reasonableness of the force used must be examined from the "perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. Moreover, the question is whether Defendants' actions are objectively reasonable under the circumstances, without considering intent or motivation. Id. at 397.
In this case, the primary issue is whether the officers or agents were justified in ordering, or as Plaintiff claims, pushing her to the ground and handcuffing her behind her back, and detaining her while they searched the house. Plaintiff claims that she tried to tell Defendants that she had intense back problems, but that no one listened and handcuffed her nonetheless. She also contends that Defendants further denied her access to her seizure medication, resulting in a seizure. Finally, Plaintiff maintains that she remained handcuffed for over seven hours.
Generally, a valid warrant "carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted."Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981). Defendants had a proper warrant to search Plaintiff's home for contraband. Even though officials later determined that Plaintiff had no involvement with the contraband found in her home, she nonetheless was an occupant at the time of the search. Although Plaintiff objects to the reasonableness of the handcuffing, this Court has held that "handcuffing of those detained is a process by which officers can effectively execute a valid warrant and control the environment surrounding the search." Frison ex rel. Frison v. Zebro, Civil File No. 00-2688, 2002 WL 539069 at * 5 (D. Minn. Apr. 5, 2002) (Magnuson J.). Moreover, the Court further noted that "it is more than reasonable for officers to detain individuals in and around the property being searched," particularly "while executing a valid search warrant for a suspected drug house." Id. at * 4. This is precisely the situation in this case.
However, the Court has also acknowledged that "arresting officers are required to take an arrestee's preexisting injuries into account when assessing the level of force necessitated in a given situation." Eason v. Anoka-Hennepin East Metro Violent Crimes Task Force, Civil File No. 00-311, 2002 WL 1303023, * 5 (D. Minn. June 6, 2002) (Magnuson, J.). The Eighth Circuit holds that mere assertion by a plaintiff of a preexisting injury is insufficient, but rather, there must be an "objective manifestation" of the injury. See id. at *6; see also Guite v. Wright, 147 F.3d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1998). If there is some objective manifestation of a plaintiff's injury, defendant officers should make some effort to accommodate the injury, provided the circumstances allow.See Eason, 2002 WL 1303023 at *5.
Plaintiff claims that she tried to tell Defendants when they entered her home that she had rods and plates in her back. Despite her efforts, Plaintiff complains that Defendants ignored her, threw her to the ground, handcuffed her to the kitchen chair, and denied her access to her seizure medication. However, other than her initial complaint towards Defendants, which Defendants classified as "incoherent screams," there is no evidence to support that Defendants could have known that Plaintiff had severe back problems. Moreover, the entire altercation occurred very rapidly, and Plaintiff was quickly moved to a bench and then to the kitchen table. Although Plaintiff disputes the time she remained at the kitchen table and the time that the paramedics were called, the ambulance record indicates that they arrived at Plaintiff's home at 7:33 p.m. (Patterson Aff. Ex. B (ambulance report).) At that time, Plaintiff's handcuffs were removed while Plaintiff spoke with the paramedics and disclosed all of her medical ailments for the first time. (See id.) She declined further treatment and chose to remain at her home. Absent the initial screams that she had plates and rods in her back, there is no other evidence to support an objective manifestation of her injuries. An assertion by Plaintiff of her injuries is insufficient to put Defendants on notice of Plaintiff's condition.
Moreover, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as the Court must do, the Court finds that Defendants' actions were objectively reasonable. Plaintiff's home had been the subject of an intense drug investigation. Defendants searched the home pursuant to a valid warrant. Although Plaintiff was not involved with the subject matter of the search, Plaintiff was nonetheless present at home at the time of the search, and pursuant to law and for their safety, Defendants were entitled to detain Plaintiff during the search. Although Plaintiff complains that she was handcuffed to a chair for seven hours, there is no evidence in the record to support her assertion. To the contrary, the record reflects that Plaintiff was initially handcuffed when Defendants entered her home, was released from handcuffs after her seizure to receive treatment from the paramedics, and was further released during the police interview conducted at her home. Indeed, while the search of the premises ensued, Defendants questioned Plaintiff in a non-custodial setting. (See Patterson Aff. ¶ 18, Ex. A.) Plaintiff was not arrested nor charged in the matter, and following the search she was released.
Furthermore, as Defendants point out, the Court must evaluate what was reasonable at the time of the incident, and that 20/20 hindsight is inappropriate. Plaintiff's home was the subject of a drug investigation involving both the manufacture and sale of methamphetamine. The manufacture of methamphetamine involves dangerous chemicals, posing high risk not only to the officers involved but likewise a danger to the public. Entry into a methamphetamine house undoubtedly requires officers to take extreme precautions to protect themselves as well as the occupants of the home. In light of the circumstances, it is clear that reasonable officers could disagree as to the appropriate level of force to be used when entering a methamphetamine home. Under the circumstances, Defendants' actions in this case were reasonable. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Thus, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim.
b. Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff also contends that Defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights. To prevail, Plaintiff must demonstrate that "the officers' actions in causing the injury constituted an abuse of executive power so clearly unjustified by any legitimate objective of law enforcement as to be barred by the Fourteenth Amendment." Feist v. Simonson, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1144 (D. Minn. 1999). Plaintiff fails to produce any evidence to meet this standard. Alternatively, assuming that Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, the Eighth Circuit evaluates such claims under the objective reasonableness standard. See Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1060 (8th Cir. 2001). Thus, like her claims premised on a Fourth Amendment violation, Plaintiff's claims premised on the Fourteenth Amendment fail.
Defendants contend that since the Complaint pleads constitutional violations in a "shotgun manner," and because Plaintiff's claims stem from one alleged incident of excessive force, her claims should all be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) ("[ A] ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force — deadly or not — in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other `seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its `reasonableness' standard, rather than under a `substantive due process' approach."). Plaintiff contends that she can pursue both Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. Regardless, Plaintiff's claims fail because there is neither a Fourth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment violation.
3. Failure to Prevent an Unconstitutional Violation
Plaintiff claims that unnamed Defendants failed to "take reasonable and required steps to prevent the other Defendants from violating Plaintiff's constitutional rights." (Compl. ¶ 41.) This claim assumes that another officer violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Putnam v. Gerloff, 639 F.2d 415, 432-34 (8th Cir. 1981). Because Defendants did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights, Defendants, regardless of whether they are named or unnamed, are likewise entitled to summary judgment on this claim. See Brown v. City of Bloomington, 280 F. Supp. 2d 889, 894 (D. Minn. 2003) (Ericksen, J.).
C. Anoka County Sheriff Larry Podany
Plaintiff's claim against former Anoka County Sheriff Larry Podany is premised on vicarious liability. At oral argument, Plaintiff conceded that the viability of this claim was "unlikely." Minnesota law does not impose liability on a sheriff for the actions of his deputies. Thus, vicarious liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails.
Plaintiff further claims that because her common law claims of assault, battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy allow for vicarious liability, Defendant Podany should not be dismissed. Although vicarious liability may attach to these claims, the Court need not reach the merits of these claims. Because Plaintiff's federal constitutional claims fail as a matter of law, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff fails to create a genuine issue of material fact on her federal constitutional claims, and thus Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, based on all the files, records and proceedings herein IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint (Clerk Doc. No. 22) is DENIED as moot;
2. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk Doc. No. 12) is GRANTED;
3. Counts V, VI and VII of the Complaint are DISMISSED with prejudice; and
4. Counts I, II, III, IV, VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII of the Complaint are DISMISSED without prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.