Opinion
Civil No. 02-4098 (JRT/FLN)
September 2, 2003
Eric Hawkins, Elk River, MN, pro se
Mark R. Azman JOHNSON CONDON, Minneapolis, MN, and Dale O. Thornsjo, JOHNSON CONDON, Minneapolis, MN, for defendants
ORDER ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Eric Hawkins ("Hawkins") has sued defendants, who are all associated with the Minnesota Youth Soccer Association ("MYSA") under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his civil rights. This matter is now before the Court on Hawkins's objections to the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Franklin L. Noel dated May 8, 2003. The Magistrate Judge recommended granting defendants' motion to dismiss and awarding them attorneys' fees and costs. The Court has conducted a de novo review of Hawkins's objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b) (1) (C) and D. Minn. LR 72.1(c) (2). For the reasons set forth below, the Court does not adopt the Report and Recommendation.
BACKGROUND
On October 17, 2002, Hawkins filed suit under § 1983 against thirty-six defendants, alleging that the MYSA violated his constitutional rights by taking disciplinary action against him pursuant to its rules. On December 18, 2002, defendants filed their motion to dismiss. Hawkins filed no papers in opposition to these motions. On January 10, 2003, defendants served notice on Hawkins that the Magistrate Judge would hold a hearing on their motions on February 14, 2003. On February 13, 2003, Hawkins filed a one-sentence handwritten letter to the Clerk of Court stating that he was "canceling" his complaint. ( See Docket No. 9.) Defendants' counsel was not served with a copy of this letter. The letter also did not indicate that Hawkins would not be appearing at the hearing scheduled for the following day. Defendants' counsel was present for the hearing on February 14, but Hawkins was not. The Magistrate Judge cancelled the hearing and issued his recommendation based on the written submissions, dismissing Hawkins's complaint and awarding defendants' attorneys' fees.On June 12, 2003, the Magistrate Judge ordered defendants to submit a more detailed affidavit regarding fees and costs. On August 13, 2003, defendants filed a notice with the Court withdrawing their request for attorneys' fees and waiving any right to seek or recover fees and costs.
ANALYSIS
The Magistrate Judge recommended granting defendants' 12(b) (6) motion, because Hawkins did not allege that defendants acted under color of state law. Hawkins does not object to this determination, and the Court agrees that it is legally correct. Although this recommendation is not the question before the Court, the Court must still address it because the Magistrate Judge did not have jurisdiction to consider defendants' motion.
Rule 41(a) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court . . . by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs." Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a) (1) (i). "Because the rule permits dismissal as of right, it requires only notice to the court, not a motion, and permission or order of court is not required." Safeguard Business Sys. Inc. v. Hoeffel, 907 F.2d 861, 863 (8th Cir. 1990). See 9 Charles A. Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice Procedure § 2363 (2003). The Eighth Circuit has construed this rule strictly, stating that it "must not be stretched beyond its literal terms," and that the rule "creates a bright line that leaves no discretion to the courts." Id. (citation omitted).
In this case, Hawkins's letter clearly seeks to dismiss this action, so the Court construes the letter as a request for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a) (1). Defendants have not filed an answer or a motion for summary judgment in this case. Therefore, this case should have been dismissed without prejudice upon receipt of Hawkins's letter on February 13, 2003, and the Magistrate Judge erred by considering the merits of defendants' motion.
Defendants have filed motions to dismiss, but these do not fit the narrow strictures of Rule 41(a). See Woody v. City of Duluth, 176 F.R.D. 310, 313-15 (D. Minn. 1997) (citing cases and holding that filing 12(b) (6) motion "raises no legal barrier to the Plaintiff's right to unilaterally dismiss his complaint"); Brackett v. State Highways Transportation Comm. of Missouri, 163 F.R.D. 305, 307-08 (W.D. Mo. 1995); 9 Charles A. Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice Procedure § 2363 (2003) ("A motion to dismiss is neither an answer nor . . . a motion for summary judgment.")
Upon Hawkins's voluntary dismissal, the only remaining issue was defendants' request for attorneys' fees. Hawkins argues that he should not have to pay defendants' fees. Although the Magistrate Judge did not err in deciding that defendants' were entitled to recover fees, defendants' August 13 notice has rendered the issue moot. There being no remaining disputed issues, this case has now concluded.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, all the records, files, and proceedings herein, the Court finds that plaintiff's objections [Docket No. 12] are MOOT. The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [Docket No. 10] is REJECTED in part as to the motion to dismiss and MOOT in part as to the attorneys' fees. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Pursuant to Rule 41(a) (1) (i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff's complaint [Docket No. 1] is VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 5] is DENIED AS MOOT.
3. Defendants' request for attorneys' fees and costs has been withdrawn [Docket No. 15] and is MOOT.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.