Opinion
C.A. No. 98C-05-253-JRS
Submitted: December 15, 2000
Decided: December 18, 2000
Upon Consideration of Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant's Motion in Limine.
DENIED.Kenneth M. Doss, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant.
Brian B. Lutness, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff.
This dispute arises from an automobile accident which occurred on January 29, 1997, at the intersection of Old Baltimore Pike and Salem Church Road in New Castle County. Both parties involved in the accident, Kevin E. Hawkins ("Hawkins") and Joseph C. Schreiber ("Schreiber"), filed a claim against the other for personal injuries allegedly sustained in the accident. Hawkins' claim against Schreiber has been resolved by settlement, leaving only Schreiber's counterclaim for resolution at trial. A jury trial is scheduled to commence on December 18, 2000.
I. The Motion In Limine
Hawkins has filed a motion in limine which seeks an order of the Court excluding certain testimony from Corporal Michael Hibbert, the Delaware State Police trooper who investigated the accident. Both parties agree that Corporal Hibbert issued a traffic citation to Schreiber before completing his investigation. Schreiber entered a plea of guilty to the charge of disregarding a traffic control signal. The plea was entered by Justices of the Peace Court No. 10 on March 19, 1997.
After issuing the traffic citation to Schreiber, Corporal Hibbert interviewed additional witnesses who were unavailable at the scene of the accident. He also obtained information from the Delaware Department of Transportation regarding the timing sequence for the traffic signal which controlled the intersection where the accident occurred. This information apparently has caused Corporal Hibbert to question whether adequate evidence existed to justify the citation he issued to Schreiber. Indeed, at a deposition of Corporal Hibbert taken on September 1, 2000, he testified that "he probably would not have issued a citation" if he had known at the accident scene all of the information he uncovered during his post-accident investigation.
The witnesses interviewed by Corporal Hibbert after the accident offered conflicting versions of the accident. Some of the witnesses indicated that Schreiber entered the intersection with a green traffic signal. In addition, the information from the Department of Transportation apparently raised questions in Corporal Hibbert's mind as to whether the sequence of the traffic signal supported Schreiber's version of the accident.
Hawkins' motion in limine seeks to exclude from trial any testimony from Corporal Hibbert which suggests that he would or should not have issued the traffic citation to Schreiber. Hawkins contends that Corporal Hibbert's after-the-fact analysis of this accident has little probative value when measured against the likelihood of confusion of the jury and prejudice to him. Hawkins contends, moreover, that Corporal Hibbert's effort, in essence, to retract the traffic citation would undermine his effort to confront Scbreiber on cross examination with his guilty plea to the traffic charge and resulting admission against interest.
Schreiber opposes the motion in limine on the ground that the jury will be confused and he will be prejudiced if Hawkins is permitted to cross examine him about his guilty plea to a traffic citation which the issuing officer now believes was issued without sufficient evidentiary foundation. Hawkins argues that, in fairness, the jury should hear all of the facts surrounding the issuance of the traffic citation and should then be instructed to. draw whatever conclusions it chooses with respect to the import of the guilty plea. Under the circumstances presented here, the Court agrees.
II. Discussion
The determination of the relevancy of evidence is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It is particularly within the trial court's discretion to determine whether the probative value of certain evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the opposing party. This balancing test, articulated in D.R.E. 403, is directly implicated by the dispute sub judice.
Firestone Tire Rubber Co. v. Adams, Del. Supr., 541 A.2d 567, 570 (1988).
Id. (Citing Williams v. State, Del. Supr., 494 A.2d 1237, 1241 (1985)).
The relevancy of a guilty plea in a subsequent civil action arising from the same conduct is well settled in Delaware:
[I]t has been long settled that the record in a criminal case reflecting a plea of guilty by the accused is admissible in a subsequent civil action against him arising out of the same offense. [citation omitted] However, the record of such a conviction is not admissible as proof of the fact in issue in the civil case but rather the plea of guilty is regarded as having the weight of a solemn admission against interest on the part of the defendant. [citation omitted]
Ralston v. Ralston, Del. Super., 72 A.2d 441, 442 (1950).
Thus, while Delaware trial courts will admit a plea of guilty to a traffic offense as an admission by the pleading party of the conduct underlying the charge, the fact of the traffic charge itself is generally held to be inadmissible for fear that the jury may be unduly "influenced by the fact that the police found . . . one of the parties to be `at fault'." Although it is generally the rule that an officer will not be permitted to explain why he did or did not issue a ticket, it is also well settled in Delaware that when a witness in a civil trial is confronted with his plea of guilty to a traffic charge, the witness will be afforded an opportunity to explain why he entered the plea of guilty and the jury will then be instructed to consider that explanation, along with all other circumstances of the case, when determining what weight to give to the evidence of the guilty plea.
e.g. Boyd v. Hammond, Del. Supr., 187 A.2d 413, 416 (1963).
Laws v. Webb, Del. Supr., 658 A.2d 1000, 1008-09 (1995).
Boyd, 187 A.2d at 416; White v. Clark, Del. Super., C.A. No. 95C-01-107-JOH, Herlihy, J., mem. op. at 3 (Dec. 16, 1998); Baio v. Zalis, Del. Super., C.A. No. 86C-JN-56, Del Pesco, J., mem. op. at 6 (Oct. 19, 1990).
Despite these clear pronouncements of Delaware evidentiary protocol, the precise circumstances presented here, to the Court's knowledge, have yet to be addressed in Delaware: if a party to a civil claim is to be confronted with his plea of guilty to a traffic charge, should he then be permitted to present evidence that the issuing officer believes the citation was issued in error? The Court's duty to attempt to eliminate the presentation of confusing evidence to the jury compels the Court to conclude that such evidence is admissible under the circumstances presented here.
If the Court granted Hawkins' motion, he would then be able to present to the jury Schreiber's plea of guilty to a traffic ticket that, according to Corporal Hibbert, never should have been issued. For his part, Schreiber could explain why he entered his plea of guilty, but could not present evidence that the ticket itself may not have been supported by the underlying facts of the accident. Under these circumstances, the evidence of Schreiber's guilty plea would confuse the jury and be unduly prejudicial to Schreiber.
It is settled that a police officer may testify regarding his investigation of an accident, and may testify regarding his conclusions of how the accident occurred, assuming a proper foundation of the officer's experience has been laid. Thus, Corporal Hibbert would be permitted to testify regarding both his accident scene investigation, including his interviews of witnesses not available at the scene, and his review of the Department of Transportation information regarding the time sequence of the traffic signal controlling the intersection at issue.
Laws, 658 A.2d at 1010.
Hawkins contends that any investigation performed by Corporal Hibbert after he issued the traffic citation to Schreiber is irrelevant and prejudicial to his defense. While the result of the subsequent investigation may not help him, Hawkins has failed to articulate any basis for the Court to conclude that the information discovered by the officer after he left the scene of the accident is any less probative than the information he discovered at the accident scene. The officer will, therefore, be permitted to testify regarding his post-accident investigation. The Court would allow this testimony even if the officer was to be prohibited from testifying regarding his current views of the legitimacy of the traffic citation he issued to Schreiber.
If Corporal Hibbert continued to believe that the ticket was appropriately issued, the Court would stop his testimony regarding his investigation and resulting conclusions short of any discussion regarding the traffic citation or the reasons for issuing it. could be cross examined about his plea of guilty and could explain why he paid the ticket. Since the officer now concludes that the ticket was improperly issued, however, such evidence should be presented to the jury so that they can place the plea of guilty to the citation in the proper context.
Laws, 658 A.2d at 1009; Ralston, 57 A.2d at 442.
Laws, 658 A.2d at 1009; Asmuth v. Kemper, Del. Super., 174 A.2d 820, 824 (1961).
Boyd, 187 A.2d at 416 ("A plea of guilty to a charge of negligence in a prosecution for violation of the Motor Vehicle Laws is admissible in evidence as an admission against interest [citation omitted], and once admitted the proper inferences to be drawn from it are a matter for the decision of the jury [citation omitted]). Absent Corporal Hibbert's explanation, it would be impossible for the jury to place Schreiber's plea of guilty to the traffic citation in its proper context and, consequently, it would be impossible for the jury to draw "proper inferences" from the plea.
III. Conclusion
By placing the guilty plea before the jury when he knows that the ticket may have been issued without adequate supporting evidence, Hawkins will "open the door" to evidence relating to the issuance of the ticket, including Corporal Hibbert's post-accident "retraction." On the other hand, if Hawkins chooses not to confront Schreiber with the guilty plea, any and all evidence regarding the traffic ticket will be excluded as irrelevant. If Hawkins chooses not to mention the traffic citation, Corporal Hibbert's testimony will be limited to his investigation — on-scene and post-accident — and any conclusions he drew from his investigation. The choice of how to proceed is Hawkin's to make.
Certainly, as stated, Hawkins must be permitted to confront Schreiber with his plea of guilty to the traffic citation. If he does so, Schreiber will then be permitted to present Corporal Hibbert's testimony that he probably should not have issued the citation. cf. State v. Flagg, Del. Super., 739 A.2d 797, 801 (1999) (Court noted that certain evidence otherwise irrelevant may become relevant if the defendant "opens the door" to the presentation of the evidence by virtue of his own presentation of evidence).
Schreiber is cautioned that Corporal Hibbert may not, in any event, testify regarding "the legal or proximate cause of the accident." Compare, Laws, 658 A.2d at 1010. His testimony will be limited to his own conclusions regarding the accident. Id.
Counsel shall prepare their witnesses to testify consistently with this opinion.