Hawkeye-Security Insurance v. Reeg

11 Citing cases

  1. Technical Land, Inc. v. Firemen's Ins. Co.

    756 A.2d 439 (D.C. 2000)   Cited 14 times

    To support this contention, appellant details case law from other jurisdictions that an insurable interest in property is determined not only by legal or equitable title, but also by an insured's economic interest in the property measured by the potential for pecuniary benefit or loss that may result from the use of or damage to that property. See, e.g., Hawkeye-Security Ins. v. Reeg, 470 N.E.2d 1103, 1105 (Ill.App.Ct. 1984); Miller v. New Jersey Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 414 A.2d 1322, 1325 (N.J. 1980). We do not read the trial court's ruling as narrowly as appellant suggests.

  2. Foy v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill.

    2013 Ill. App. 121875 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

    Safeco further contends that, even if Foy's attorneys thought there was a good faith basis to assert a claim against Safeco based on the fact that Foy had a deed in her name, this basic assertion did not represent an adequate investigation into the facts of the dispute and a reasonable inquiry would have uncovered the falsity of Foy's claim. ¶ 47 One of the bases for the trial court's decision on the merits of Foy's lawsuit was that Foy was not entitled to insurance coverage because she had no insurable interest. In order to collect under an insurance policy, one must have an insurable interest in the insured item. Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. Reeg, 128 Ill. App. 3d 352, 354-55 (1984); Reznick v. Home Insurance Co., 45 Ill. App. 3d 1058 (1977). An insurable interest at the time the policy is issued and at the time of loss is essential to the validity of an insurance policy.

  3. Jason's Foods v. Peter Eckrich Sons, Inc.

    774 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1985)   Cited 5 times

    So the case cannot be decided by reference to what the parties knew or did not know; and neither can it be decided, despite Jason's urgings, on the basis of which party could have insured against the loss. Both could have. Jason's had sufficient interest in the ribs until the risk of loss shifted to Eckrich to insure the ribs until then. You do not have to own goods to insure them; it is enough that you will suffer a loss if they are lost or damaged, Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Reeg, 128 Ill.App.3d 352, 83 Ill.Dec. 683, 470 N.E.2d 1103 (1984); Prince v. Royal Indemnity Co., 541 F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 1976), as of course Jason's would if the risk of loss remained on it after it parted with title. See generally Stockton, An Analysis of Insurable Interest Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 Vand. L.Rev. 815, 816-21 (1964).

  4. Werner v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.

    Case No. 18-cv-3190 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2021)

    Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Mendenhall, 164 Ill. 458, 464, 45 N.E. 1078, 1079 (1897); see Reznick v. Home Ins. Co., 45 Ill.App.3d 1058, 1061, 360 N.E.2d 461, 463, (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1977) ("Generally speaking, a person has an insurable interest in property whenever he would profit by or gain some advantage by its continued existence and suffer loss or disadvantage by its destruction.") (quoting Couch on Insurance 2d § 24:13); see also Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Reeg, 128 Ill.App.3d 352, 355, 470 N.E.2d 1103, 1105 (5th Dist. 1984). Thus, the issue is whether Werner had an interest in the Residence that had pecuniary value at the time of the Fire and, if so, the value of Werner's insurable interest at the time of the Fire.

  5. Ryding v. Cincinnati Special Underwriters Ins. Co.

    1 N.E.3d 40 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)   Cited 1 times

    Generally speaking, a person has an insurable interest in property whenever he or she “would profit by or gain some advantage by its continued existence or suffer loss or disadvantage by its destruction.” Hawkeye–Security Insurance Co. v. Reeg, 128 Ill.App.3d 352, 355, 83 Ill.Dec. 683, 470 N.E.2d 1103 (1984). As plaintiff points out, a guardian is not vested with title to a ward's estate, but rather “ ‘is charged with its care and management.’ [Citations.

  6. Murphy v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.

    2012 Ill. App. 112143 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 3 times
    Explaining insurable interest "should not be determined by speculating about future, uncertain events"

    Reznick, 45 Ill.App.3d at 1061, 4 Ill.Dec. 525, 360 N.E.2d at 363 (quoting 3 Ronald A. Anderson, 461Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 24:13 (2d ed. 1960)); Beddow v. Hicks, 303 Ill.App. 247, 258, 25 N.E.2d 93, 98 (1940). A party may have an insurable interest in property, even if he or she does not possess the property or even own it. Hawkeye–Security Insurance Co. v. Reeg, 128 Ill.App.3d 352, 83 Ill.Dec. 683, 470 N.E.2d 1103 (1984). ¶ 10 In Cigna Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Verzi, 112 Md.App. 137, 684 A.2d 486 (1996), a building owner entered into an agreement to have the building demolished and a new one built in its place.

  7. Wolfram Partnership v. Lasalle National Bank

    328 Ill. App. 3d 207 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)   Cited 74 times
    Finding a question of fact as to whether the plaintiff exercised its option in accordance with the parties' understanding

    Clearly, the Trust, as owner of the Premises and the structures thereupon, had an insurable interest under Perillo's policies.        While a lack of an insurable interest will ordinarily render a policy of insurance void and unenforceable on public policy grounds (Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. Reeg, 128 Ill.App.3d 352, 354, 83 Ill.Dec. 683, 470 N.E.2d 1103, 1105 (1984); 22 Ill. L. & Prac. Insurance § 104, at 208 (1999)), "[w]here there are several insureds under a policy, and all do not have the requisite insurable interest, the policy is invalid only as to those lacking [an] insurable interest." 3 Couch on Insurance 3d § 41:2, at 41-8 (1995).

  8. State Farm General Ins. Co. v. Stewart

    288 Ill. App. 3d 678 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)   Cited 33 times
    Holding that a plaintiff "must show" one of the three factors to prevail

    The law is clear that one need not even own property to have an insurable interest in the property. See Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. Reeq, 128 Ill. App.3d 352, 355, 470 N.E.2d 1103 (1984); International Insurance Co. v. Melrose Park National Bank, 145 Ill. App.3d 286, 290, 495 N.E.2d 1197 (1986); IMM Acceptance Corp. v. First National Bank Trust Co., 148 Ill. App.3d 949, 954, 499 N.E.2d 1012 (1986). Stewart further contends that the doctrine of equitable conversion is inapplicable to the facts of this case.

  9. Whitten v. Cincinnati Insurance Co.

    189 Ill. App. 3d 90 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 4 times
    In Whitten v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 189 Ill. App. 3d 90, 92, 136 Ill. Dec. 394, 544 N.E.2d 1169, 1170 (1989), the plaintiffs were tenants of property owned by an individual who went bankrupt and forfeited ownership in the property to a bank; the plaintiffs renewed their lease with the bank and entered into an agreement to purchase the property.

    As the court observed in Prince v. Royal Indemnity Co. (7th Cir. 1976), 541 F.2d 646, 649, cert. denied (1977), 429 U.S. 1094, 51 L.Ed.2d 540, 97 S.Ct. 1108, the reason for the requirement of an insurable interest is "`to prevent the use of insurance for illegitimate purposes. It should not be extended beyond the reasons for it by excessively technical construction'" (quoting Womble v. Dubuque Fire Marine Insurance Co. (1941), 310 Mass. 142, 147, 37 N.E.2d 263, 266)." Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. Reeg (1984), 128 Ill. App.3d 352, 354-55, 470 N.E.2d 1103, 1105-06. This has long been the rule in Illinois.

  10. Farmer v. Koen

    187 Ill. App. 3d 47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 10 times

    • 4, 5 Farmer does not dispute that the insurance policy was issued to Charles Koen and Associates, and that prior to the fire which destroyed the bank building, Farmer conveyed his interest in Charles Koen and Associates to Koen. At one point in his brief, however, Farmer argues that standing to sue under the insurance contract should be measured at the time of the execution of the contract and not at the time of the loss. It is clear, however, that recovery under an insurance policy is predicated on the existence of an insurable interest at the time of the loss. (See Lieberman v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 948, 287 N.E.2d 38; Patterson v. Durand Farmers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. (1940), 303 Ill. App. 128, 133, 24 N.E.2d 740, 744; see also Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. Reeg (1984), 128 Ill. App.3d 352, 354-55, 470 N.E.2d 1103, 1105.) Since Farmer conveyed his entire interest to Koen before the fire occurred, he had no insurable interest in the bank building at the time of the fire.