When a contract contains a bilateral attorney fee provision, the definition of prevailing party in RCW 4.84.330 does not apply. Hawk v. Branjes, 97 Wn.App. 776, 781, 986 P.2d 841 (1999); Walji v. Candyco, Inc., 57 Wn.App. 284, 288, 787 P.2d 946 (1990).
Unlike this case, Cork did not involve enforcement of a settlement, the terms of which were in dispute. Moreover, the Court of Appeals subsequently explained the limited scope of its holding in Cork in Hawk v. Branjes, 97 Wash.App. 776, 782, 986 P.2d 841 (1999). In Hawk, the trial court awarded the defendant tenant costs and attorney fees after granting the landlords' motion to voluntarily dismiss their complaint.
The trial court also denied Jones's and Saarinen's motion for reconsideration. The Wilcoxes then moved for an award of attorney fees under provision 8.1 of the CC&Rs, citing Hawkv. Branjes, 97 Wn.App. 776, 778, 986 P.2d 841 (1999). They argued that
Hawk v. Branies. 97 Wn.App. 776, 781, 986 P.2d 841 (1999); Walji v. Candyco. Inc., 57 Wn.App. 284, 288, 787 P.2d 946 (1990).
Whether or not to award the expenses following a voluntary nonsuit is within the discretion of the trial court, in light of the facts and circumstances of the entire case. The same standard is used when reviewing sanctions imposed under CR 11 and RCW 4.84.185. Hawk v. Branjes, 97 Wn. App. 776, 782-83, 986 P.2d 841 (1999). Hawk, 97 Wn. App. at 783-84 (citing Walji v. Candyco, Inc., 57 Wn. App. 284, 290, 787 P.2d 946 (1990)).
Where a lease contains a bilateral attorney fees provision that does not require a final judgment, however, a voluntary dismissal may result in an award of attorney fees. See Hawk v. Branjes, 97 Wn. App. 776, 780, 986 P.2d 841 (1999) (where agreement already contains a bilateral attorney fees provision, RCW 4.84.330 is inapplicable and a voluntary dismissal may warrant an award of fees); Walji v. Candyco, Inc., 57 Wn. App. 284, 288, 787 P.2d 946 (1990) (statutory provision requiring final judgment does not control in interpreting lease provision following voluntary nonsuit and fees may be awarded).
Where a lease contains a bilateral attorney fees provision that does not require a final judgment, however, a voluntary dismissal may result in an award of attorney fees. See Hawk v. Branjes, 97 Wn. App. 776, 780, 986 P.2d 841 (1999) (where agreement already contains a bilateral attorney fees provision, RCW 4.84.330 is inapplicable and a voluntary dismissal may warrant an award of fees); Walji v. Candyco, Inc., 57 Wn. App. 284, 288, 787 P.2d 946 (1990) (statutory provision requiring final judgment does not control in interpreting lease provision following voluntary nonsuit and fees may be awarded).
136 Wn. App. 153, 156-57, 147 P.3d 1305 (2006). 97 Wn. App. 776, 779-82, 986 P.2d 841 (1999). ΒΆ29 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the superior court's denial of attorney fees under RCW 59.18.290(1) and (2).
As we explained in Council House, when the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer action "takes a voluntary dismissal, the defendant has prevailed for purposes of fees" under RCW 59.18.290(2). 136 Wn. App. at 159-60 (citing Hawk v. Branjes, 97 Wn. App. 776, 782, 986 P.2d 841 (1999)). See also Soper v. Clibborn, 31 Wn. App. 767, 768-69, 644 P.2d 738 (1982).
As we have previously noted, "where, as here, the agreement already contains a bilateral attorneys' fee provision, RCW 4.84.330 is generally inapplicable." Hawk v. Branjes, 97 Wn. App. 776, 780, 986 P.2d 841 (1999); accord Walji v. Candyco, Inc., 57 Wn. App. 284, 288, 787 P.2d 946 (1990) (where contract at issue contains a bilateral attorney fee clause, the statutory "prevailing party" provision of RCW 4.84.330 does not control over the contract's plain language). Because the leases at issue herein contained bilateral attorney fee clauses, RCW 4.84.330 does not apply.