Opinion
No. 2-834 / 02-0316
Filed August 27, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Alan L. Pearson, Judge.
The plaintiff appeals from a district court ruling annulling a writ of certiorari directed to the board of adjustment concerning its decision that the plaintiff was allowing its property to be used in a manner inconsistent with the applicable zoning ordinance and directing it to discontinue the use. AFFIRMED.
Donald G. Thompson and Kevin C. Papp of Bradley Riley, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Lyle R. Galliart, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Hawk Developers (Hawk) appeals from a district court ruling annulling a writ of certiorari directed to the Dubuque County Zoning Board of Adjustment (the Board) concerning its decision that Hawk was allowing its property to be used in a manner inconsistent with the applicable zoning ordinance and directing it to discontinue the use. Hawk contends the district court erred in upholding the Board's decision because (1) the Board acted illegally when it considered matters other than the language of the zoning ordinance and relied upon an improper rule of statutory interpretation and construction, (2) the service operated on Hawk's property is not inconsistent with the property's B-2 "Highway Business District" zoning designation, and (3) the use was protected by Hawk's good faith reliance on representations from the county zoning administrator's office that its use of the property would not violate the zoning ordinance. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
In 1985, Hawk purchased sixteen acres of land on John Deere Road in Dubuque County. In 1997, Hawk leased two acres of the land to Hunt Transportation (Hunt). The two leased acres were zoned as "B-2 Highway Business District" under the applicable Dubuque County Zoning Ordinance.
Hunt uses the property as a transfer facility for an "on-time delivery/prep service" for vehicles produced by John Deere but already sold to Deere's customers. The vehicles include heavy machinery such as bulldozers and backhoes. Hunt loads and unloads the vehicles from tractor trailers and prepares them for shipping by cleaning and washing them, encapsulating exhaust stacks, and removing buckets or blades. The service takes from less than a day to three days.
Before entering into the lease, Hawk's co-owner, Randy Hefel, called Assistant County Zoning Administrator John Klauer and discussed Hunt's intended use of the property. Hawk claims Klauer told Hefel the intended use was acceptable under the ordinance. However, the parties dispute whether Hefel provided Klauer with an adequate description of the proposed use and whether Klauer specifically approved the use of the property as a staging area.
A complaint letter from an adjacent property owner was filed with the zoning administrator's office regarding Hunt's use of the property and the noise the use generated. Based on this complaint, Zoning Administrator Anna O'Shea viewed the property on June 7, 2000 and observed thirty-seven John Deere backhoes and three John Deere bulldozers on the property. In a letter dated June 21, 2000, O'Shea informed Hawk the presence of the backhoes and bulldozers on its property violated zoning ordinance section 1-15.9. O'Shea reaffirmed her opinion in a September 12, 2000 letter, indicating B-2 zoning does not allow "storage and sale of machinery and equipment" or any industrial or manufacturing operation.
Hawk appealed O'Shea's decision to the Board. At the public hearing, some of Hunt's neighbors addressed the Board and two of them indicated they did not want Hunt's operation on Hawk's property due to the noise it generated at all hours of the day and night. Hefel also addressed the Board at the hearing regarding the use of the land. O'Shea spoke at the hearing as well, and elaborated on the reasons for her determination. The board affirmed O'Shea's decision by a two-to-one vote.
Hawk filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The district court issued the writ. Later, following submission of the controversy, the district court annulled the writ. The court concluded the board did not exceed its authority by allowing public input at the hearing. It noted Hefel had also participated and provided input at the hearing. The court rejected the claim the Board merely "rubber stamped" O'Shea's recommendation. The court then found the Board's determination that Hunt's use violated the ordinance was well-founded, because the use would actually fall under an M-1 industrial use. The court found backhoes and bulldozers were machinery rather than vehicles, and noted Hawk's property was in a largely residential area so the Board's decision was in furtherance of its duty to act for the public health, safety, and general welfare. Finally, the court rejected Hawk's claim that it was entitled to rely on Klauer's advice, noting there had been no full disclosure to Klauer of the proposed use, Hefel had listed a different concern in seeking Klauer's advice, and reliance on an informal telephone conversation was not reasonable and did not constitute a vested right to proceed. Hawk appeals from the district court's ruling.
II. SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Our scope of review on appeal from a district court's judgment in a certiorari proceeding is governed by the rules applicable to appeals in ordinary actions. Fox v. Polk County Bd. of Supervisors, 569 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Iowa 1997). Our review is limited to the correction of errors at law. Ackman v. Board of Adjustment, 596 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Iowa 1999); Fox, 569 N.W.2d at 507. "[F]actual determinations will be broadly and liberally construed and ambiguities construed to uphold rather than defeat the trial court's judgment." Graziano v. Board of Adjustment, 323 N.W.2d 233, 237 (Iowa 1982). We are bound by the district court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Ackman, 596 N.W.2d at 100. Evidence is substantial when a reasonable mind could accept it as adequate to reach the same findings. Petersen v. Harrison County Bd. of Supervisors, 580 N.W.2d 790, 793 (Iowa 1998). If the district court's findings of fact leave the reasonableness of the board's action open to a fair difference of opinion, the court may not substitute its decision for that of the board. Id.
III. MERITS.
On appeal Hawk contends the court erred in upholding the Board's decision because (1) the Board acted illegally when it considered matters other than the language of the zoning ordinance and relied upon an improper rule of statutory interpretation and construction, (2) the service operated on Hawk's property is not inconsistent with the property's B-2 "Highway Business District" zoning designation, and (3) the use of the property was protected by Hawk's good faith reliance on representations from the county zoning administrator's office that the use would not violate the zoning ordinance. We address these issues separately.
A. Legality of the Board's Actions.
Illegality exists when the findings upon which the Board based its conclusions of law do not have evidentiary support or when the court has incorrectly applied the proper rule of law. Petersen, 580 N.W.2d at 793. The burden of showing illegality rests upon the asserting party. Id. Plaintiffs generally have a heavy burden of showing an administrative tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally. Trailer City, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 218 N.W.2d 645, 646 (Iowa 1974). "A board of adjustment's decision enjoys a strong presumption of validity." Ackman, 596 N.W.2d at 106.
Hawk contends the Board exceeded its scope of authority by allowing adjacent property owners to participate at the January 2001 public hearing because the Board's task was solely a legal one, to determine whether O'Shea's interpretation and construction of the Dubuque Zoning Ordinance was correct. Some of Hunt's neighbors spoke at the hearing. They included the one who had filed the initial complaint with the zoning administrator regarding the noise and use of the property. Two of the neighbors stated they disliked the amount of noise and the hours of use of Hawk's property by Hunt.
The Board argues it did not exceed its authority in receiving the comments of other property owners because enforcement of the zoning ordinance is complaint-driven and thus it is incumbent upon the Board to hear such comments in order to determine what type of use was occurring and the nature of the complained of activity so as to determine whether O'Shea's interpretation of the ordinance was correct. The Board further claims such public input was proper based on its broad police powers.
Zoning is an exercise of the state's police powers delegated to a municipality and thus zoning ordinances are to be strictly construed. City of New Hampton v. Blayne-Martin Corp., 594 N.W.2d 40, 44 (Iowa 1999) (citing City of Lamoni v. Livingston, 392 N.W.2d 506, 509 (Iowa 1986)).
Zoning ordinances are enacted "[f]or the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community. . . ." Iowa Code § 414.2. Such ordinances, by their very nature, infringe upon the free use of property. Yet they constitute a valid exercise of the police power.Greenawalt v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 345 N.W.2d 537, 545 (Iowa 1984).
The district court concluded the action of the Board in allowing public input was appropriate because it provided the Board with a better understanding of what the Hawk property was being used for than it would have without that input. The court noted that Hawk's co-owner, Hefel, also participated in the hearing and had the same opportunity as other participants to provide information regarding the matter. We agree with the district court's conclusions.
Although Hawk is correct that the Board's task here was to determine whether O'Shea's interpretation of the zoning ordinance was correct, it was within its authority to receive public input to aid it in this task. In order to determine whether Hawk's use of the property was in fact inconsistent with the relevant ordinance, as O'Shea believed it to be, the Board needed to determine what the property was being used for, and then apply the ordinance to that use. Any information regarding the use of the property would only aid in the Board's ability to make a fully informed decision. Hawk was allowed an equal opportunity to convey its information and opinions regarding the property and its use. We conclude the Board did not act illegally outside the scope of its authority in accepting public input at the hearing.
Hawk further argues O'Shea premised her interpretation and construction of the zoning ordinance based on an illegal rule of statutory construction that favored the County over Hawk's free use of its land, and that the Board then adopted wholesale O'Shea's interpretation without performing its own analysis. We, like the district court, do not believe the record supports Hawk's argument.
The district court did not address or decide whether O'Shea premised her interpretation and construction of an illegal rule of statutory construction, and Hawk did not file a motion requesting a ruling on such an issue. Hawk has apparently not preserved error on this part of this particular claim of error. See Meier v. Senecaut III, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (stating issue must ordinarily be raised and decided by district court before it will be decided on appeal). We nevertheless choose to address the issue as stated by Hawk.
First, the outcome of the vote by the Board on this issue shows it did not just "rubber stamp" O'Shea's decision as alleged by Hawk. Two members voted to affirm her decision, one voted not to affirm it, and one abstained. There is also evidence in the record that the Board members did not always agree with O'Shea's decisions. In addition, the depositions of the members of the Board who voted to affirm O'Shea's decision indicate not only that they based their determination on factors in addition to O'Shea's opinion on the matter, but also that they did not recall her saying anything at the hearing about construing the ordinance in favor of the County if there was any question of interpretation. Furthermore, a board of adjustment's decision enjoys a strong presumption of validity. Ackman, 596 N.W.2d at 106. Finally, absent clear evidence to the contrary we presume the Board properly performed its duty under the law. Peterson, 580 N.W.2d at 793. We conclude there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the district court's determination that the Board members performed their own independent analysis in reaching the same conclusion O'Shea had reached. Otherwise stated, the record does not compel a finding contrary to the finding made by the district court.
B. Interpretation of B-2 Zoning Provisions.
Hawk next argues the district court erred in affirming the Board's decision because Hunt's "on-time delivery/prep service" is not inconsistent with the B-2 "Highway Business District" zoning designation assigned to Hawk's property. The zoning ordinance makes no reference to "on-time delivery/prep services" nor does it define the relevant terms of "vehicle," "machinery," or "equipment" as used in the B-2 and M-1 zoning categories. Thus, both parties agree this case requires interpretation and construction of the Dubuque Zoning Ordinance. In the absence of a legislative definition of a term or a particular meaning in a law, we give words their ordinary meaning. State v. Kidd, 562 N.W.2d 764, 765 (Iowa 1997). Similarly, we construe such terms according to their accepted usage. American Home Prod. Corp. v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 302 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Iowa 1981). An ordinance must be considered in its entirety, giving each section consideration so that the enactment as a whole is given its "natural and intended meaning." Kordick Plumbing Heating Co. v. Sarcone, 190 N.W.2d 115, 117 (Iowa 1971).
Hawk argues that Hunt's use of the land is consistent with Dubuque Zoning Ordinance section 1-15.9(a)(18) under the B-2 designation. Section 1-15.9(a)(18), the section Hawk contends Hunt's use of the land fits within, provides that a permitted use under B-2 includes "Vehicle sales, service, washing and repair stations, garages, taxi stands and storage garages and service stations." In interpreting a zoning ordinance, the prime consideration is the general purpose of the ordinance, not the hardship it may impose in an individual case. Shriver v. City of Okoboji, 567 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Iowa 1997); Anderson v. City of Cedar Rapids, 168 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Iowa 1969). Ordinances enacted under authority delegated to local governments are generally considered extensions of state statutes and should therefore be construed liberally to effect their purpose. Kordick, 190 N.W.2d at 117.
The district court concluded that the "Board's interpretation of the Ordinance that Hunt's staging area of John Deere equipment does not classify as a business/commercial use is well founded." The court concluded that the property would more properly be classified under the "M-1 Industrial District." More specifically, it determined that the use fit under the M-1 permitted use for "Storage and sale of machinery and equipment" because backhoes and bulldozers fall under the category of "machinery" and not "vehicles." The court found, in looking to the "character of the area of the district," that the area surrounding the property was largely residential and concluded under its police powers the Board had the right to "confine industrial and residential areas to certain parameters." Accordingly, the district court sustained the Board's interpretation of the ordinance and determined it was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
We agree with the district court's conclusions on this issue. For the following reasons, we also conclude the district court did not err in affirming the Board's determination that Hunt's use of the property is inconsistent with the permitted principal uses under its B-2 highway business district zoning. First, we agree with the district court that, giving the relevant terms their ordinary meaning and accepted usage, backhoes and bulldozers are more commonly referred to as "machinery" than "vehicles" and thus would more appropriately fit within the "M-1 Industrial District" zoning provisions.
Second, the court did not err in looking at the general character of the area in question in accordance with the stated purpose and intent of the ordinance. The record is clear that the area where Hunt is doing business is largely residential. The Board's police powers allow them to keep residential and industrial areas separate in the interest of public health, safety, or general welfare, despite the fact it may at times cause individual hardships. See generally Shriver, 567 N.W.2d at 401; Greenawalt, 345 N.W.2d at 545,.
Finally, in viewing the ordinance as a whole we believe Hunt's use of the property in question is inconsistent with the other types of uses contemplated under the B-2 designation. An ordinance must be considered in its entirety, giving each section due regard so that the enactment as a whole is given its "natural and intended meaning." Kordick, 190 N.W.2d at 117. All of the permitted principal uses under B-2 describe businesses where the general public can come to be served in various ways. Hunt's use of Hawk's property as a John Deere staging area is clearly not such a use, and not in keeping with the general purpose and intent of the B-2 uses. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err in determining the Board correctly interpreted the relevant portions of the ordinance and that Hunt's use of Hawk's land is inconsistent with its B-2 zoning designation.
C. Good Faith Reliance.
Finally, Hawk argues the district court erred in concluding it was not protected against enforcement of the zoning ordinance by virtue of its "good faith" reliance on prior representations of the Assistant Dubuque County Zoning Administrator (Klauer) that Hunt's operations would not violate the B-2 ordinance. Specifically, Hawk alleges Hefel had a discussion with Klauer in 1997, before it leased the property to Hunt, in which Hefel asked Klauer if Hunt's use was permitted by B-2 zoning and Klauer told him use of the property as an on-time delivery/prep service station was consistent with B-2 zoning.
The court found the facts regarding the good faith claim were not altogether clear and rejected Hawk's good faith reliance argument. In doing so it found: "There was no full disclosure by Hefel regarding the use of the property." It relied on Hefel's own deposition testimony that he had described only briefly to Klauer what Hunt's use of the property would be, and that Hunt itself "was not that detailed as far as what all was going to take place'" when Hunt had discussed the matter with Hefel. The court further noted that Klauer stated in his deposition he did not recall any conversation with Hefel specifically concerning Hunt using the property as a staging area, only the possible consequences of Hawk's equipment returning after hours and thus having to be stored outside. Furthermore, Klauer stated he did not recollect approving the use of the property specifically as a staging area during his conversation with Hefel.
The court concluded Hawk could not reasonably rely on Hefel's conversation with Klauer as approval for the staging area because "an informal conversation over the phone does not carry the same weight as the issuance of a permit." The court determined,
Here, without the Board's approval, there was no legal authority to approve the proposed use. Hefel did not have a permit and did not acquire a vested right to proceed. Also, Hefel should have known that Klauer may not have seen the property at hand and could not possibly make a decision based on the informal telephone conversation.
The district court's findings are supported by substantial evidence. We fully agree with its findings and conclusions on this issue. We conclude the district did not err in determining Hawk's good faith reliance argument must fail.
IV. CONCLUSION.
For all of the reasons set forth above, we conclude the district court did not err in determining the Board acted within the proper scope of its police powers in finding Hawk's use of the property to be inconsistent with a B-2 "Highway Business District" zoning designation and annulling the writ of certiorari. We conclude the Board did not act illegally in allowing public comment in order to provide it a full and complete understanding of what the property was being used for, nor did the Board members simply adopt O'Shea's decision without performing their own independent analysis. Furthermore, the Board's finding that Hunt's use of Hawk's property as a staging area for John Deere machinery and equipment does not classify as a B-2 use was a reasonable interpretation of the ordinance and was not arbitrary or capricious. Finally, we conclude the district court did not err in finding Hawk could not reasonably rely on Hefel's informal and vague conversation with Klauer as an approval for use of the property as a staging area under a B-2 zoning designation.
We affirm the decision of the district court.