Opinion
April 12, 1961.
June 15, 1961.
Unemployment Compensation — Voluntary termination of employment — Cause of necessitous and compelling nature — Pregnancy.
Under § 402(b)(1) of the Unemployment Compensation Act, as amended by the Act of December 17, 1959, P.L. 1893, § 8, an employee who voluntarily leaves work because of pregnancy is ineligible for compensation, in that her unemployment is due to her leaving work without "cause of a necessitous and compelling nature", as the amended act limits that phrase.
Before ERVIN, WRIGHT, WOODSIDE, WATKINS, MONTGOMERY, and FLOOD, JJ. (RHODES, P.J., absent).
Appeal, No. 25, April T., 1961, by claimant, from decision of Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, No. B-59382, in re claim of Lorraine Davies Havrilla. Decision affirmed.
Lorraine Davies Havrilla, appellant, in propria persona, submitted a brief.
Sydney Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, with him Anne X. Alpern, Attorney General, for Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, appellee.
Argued April 12, 1961.
Because of her pregnancy, the applicant left her employment after the effective date of the Amendment of December 17, 1959, P.L. 1893, § 8, to the Unemployment Compensation Act, 43 P. S. § 802 (b)(1).
Whatever might have been the applicant's status prior to the 1959 Amendment (Cf. Flannick Unemployment Compensation Case, 168 Pa. Super. 606, 82 A.2d 671 (1951)), the amendment specifically provides that "a voluntary leaving work because of pregnancy, whether or not the employer is able to provide other work, shall be deemed not a cause of a necessitous and compelling nature". Therefore, under the provision of Section 402(b)(1), as amended in 1959, she is ineligible for compensation because her unemployment is due to her leaving work without "cause of a necessitous and compelling nature", as the amended act now limits that phrase.
Her own testimony before the referee was that she did not ask for leave of absence, but resigned because of her pregnancy.
Decision affirmed.