Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. 37-2008-00062681-CU-BC-EC, Laura W. Halgren, Judge.
HUFFMAN, ACTING P. J.
Defendant and appellant Rafael Miranda appeals a judgment in favor of his former tenant, plaintiff and respondent Joshua Havins, awarding $25,536.05 in compensatory and punitive damages for wrongful eviction and conversion. Miranda asserts the trial court erred as a matter of law in misconstruing the requirements of Civil Code section 1951.3 relating to Miranda's right to terminate the tenancy by giving a notice of abandonment. Miranda also contends the trial court erred in awarding Havins certain damages for conversion, because they were not supported by substantial evidence.
All statutory references are to the Civil Code unless specifically designated otherwise.
We conclude that Miranda cannot show, as a matter of law, he complied with the requirements of section 1951.3, or is entitled to reversal of the judgment on that basis. Further, he did not meet his burden to show on appeal that the damages awarded for conversion, including punitive damages, were not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Eviction
On October 6, 2007, Havins signed a lease agreement to rent the upstairs portion, designated as Unit D, of a home owned by Miranda and his wife Blandina. Mrs. Miranda is no longer a party in this appeal. The Mirandas had previously rented the downstairs portion of their home, which they designated Unit A, to Erika Vallejo and Jason Schnetzer, who are also not parties here.
Havins and Miranda agreed that rent for Unit D would be $1,200/month plus a $1,200 deposit, with a prorated amount of $600 due for October. Havins apparently moved into the home several days before the date in the lease agreement and apparently did not pay in full for October. Subsequently, Havins did not pay any rent for November. Miranda served Havins with several notices to pay rent, but never filed an unlawful detainer action against him. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1166 et seq.) On December 10, 2007 Miranda also served Havins with a notice of belief of abandonment pursuant to section 1951.3. Miranda used certified mail to deliver the notice to the mailbox all of the tenants shared at the subject property. The record does not show that Havins ever received the notice at the subject property, nor that Miranda attempted any alternative service at another known address.
At the same time, Miranda was having problems with the downstairs tenants in Unit A, Vallejo and Schnetzer. In November 2007, he filed a separate unlawful detainer against them. (Miranda v. Vallejo (Super. Ct. San Diego, 2007, No 37-2007-00035295-CL-UD-EC) (the related action).) However, when Miranda filed the related action against those tenants he identified the subject property as 1222 Pepper Drive, without distinguishing between the upstairs and downstairs units he had created. In that related action, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of the Mirandas against the named defendants Vallejo and Schnetzer, and issued a minute order stating: "All unknown occupants are not included in the judgment."
Following that default by Vallejo and Schnetzer, the San Diego County Sheriff served the notice to surrender the premises on them, but the deputies did not serve any documents on Havins. On January 16, 2008, Havins came home to find Miranda's father and a locksmith changing locks throughout the home. Miranda's father apparently told Havins that he had to get out because he did not pay rent. Havins responded that he was not a party to the lease agreement for Vallejo and Schnetzer, and Miranda's father simply replied that it was his property and he could do what he wanted. Havins asked a deputy sheriff to examine his lease agreement and the deputy agreed that the eviction took place in the related action, which did not include Havins, and that Havins could remain on the property.
On January 17, Vallejo and Schnetzer were completely evicted. Havins returned home from work the next day to find Miranda's father, who again denied Havins access to the home. Deputy sheriffs arrived and again evaluated the eviction paperwork. The deputies advised Havins to go to court to get a copy of the related action's eviction order. Havins ultimately returned with a copy of the minute order that stated the judgment did not include unknown occupants. The deputies told Havins he had to leave the property anyway because the related order included the entire home and did not contain any references to unit numbers. Miranda also posted a notice on Havins's door informing him that he had been "legally locked out" and that he had to move everything out the next day between 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.
When Havins arrived to move out, Miranda was also present. Havins approached Miranda with his lease agreement and protested that he was in a separate unit from the tenants in Unit A. Miranda responded that there was no such thing as Unit D; he had simply made it up. Havins was unable to move all of his personal property that day and a few weeks later he came back to find items left outside in the dirt. Miranda listed some of Havins's property on Craigslist.com and held a garage sale in February, but left some property outside, where it was damaged by rain.
B. Havins's Lawsuit
Havins sued Miranda for breach of contract, breach of the warranty of habitability alleging plumbing problems, wrongful eviction, conversion and punitive damages. Miranda denied all the allegations and filed a cross-complaint for breach of contract for payment of all past due rent and for physical damage to the property.
After a one and one-half day bench trial, the trial court found that Havins did not meet his burden on his breach of contract and habitability claims because he did not pay rent. However, the trial court did find that Havins was wrongfully evicted because Miranda did not comply with section 1951.3, regarding abandonment, nor with Code of Civil Procedure section 425.12 [use of forms] and section 1166 et seq., the unlawful detainer procedures. The trial minutes were formalized in a statement of decision. First, Havins was awarded $3,600 in damages for the three months he was without a home.
Next, the trial court found that because the eviction was wrongful, "everything that transpired regarding Havins' property was wrongful, too." The trial court also found Miranda, as a landlord, had not properly stored Havins's leftover personal property as mandated by sections 1983 and 1988 through 1990. On the conversion claim, the trial court awarded $16,000 in fair market value, $1,436.05 in interest and $2,000 for emotional distress damages for Havins's lost personal property.
The trial court also noted that punitive damages were available for wrongful eviction or conversion claims. The trial court explained that since Miranda continued to act as a landlord, punitive damages were necessary to ensure that he followed the law. The trial court found that Miranda acted with malice and oppression towards Havins, as defined by section 3294, subdivision (c).
The trial court evaluated Miranda's net worth and financial condition to determine a proper sanction. The trial court found that Miranda was "upside down" on his real property and noted that the rent collected does not cover his mortgage expenses. The trial court further found that Miranda earned approximately $150,000 per year and had more than $20,000 available in bank accounts. After considering the evidence, the trial court awarded Havins $2,500 in punitive damages.
As to Miranda's cross-complaint, the trial court found that he was not entitled to recover any past due rent. The trial court reasoned that most of his claimed damages had arisen from events caused by the unlawful eviction. The trial court also denied Miranda's other claim for physical damage to the septic system, because there was no evidence that Havins was responsible for that damage. Additionally, the trial court denied Miranda's claim for unpaid rent because the house was illegally subdivided and rented. In sum, Havins was awarded a total of $25,536.05. Miranda appeals the judgment. The record includes the clerk's transcript and lodged exhibits, but does not include a reporter's transcript of the trial proceedings.
DISCUSSION
I
MIRANDA'S NOTICE OF ABANDONMENT
Miranda claims the judgment is invalid, because the court should have found that his service of the section 1951.3 notice of belief of abandonment, coupled with no response from Havins, entitled Miranda to terminate the lease agreement and lawfully evict him. Essentially, Miranda is challenging the trial court's determination that Miranda's belief Havins had abandoned the property was unreasonable under the circumstances. Before we analyze that claim, it is necessary to discuss the parameters of our review.
A. Standard of Review
Where the outcome of an appeal hinges upon the meaning of statutory phrases, in this case whether Havins abandoned the subject property, as section 1951.3 defines the term, the factual record is analyzed for conflicting evidence. If the facts are undisputed the matter can be decided as a pure issue of law. (Harustak v. Wilkins (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 208, 213.) Pure questions of law, such as statutory interpretation, are subject to independent de novo review on appeal and accordingly no deference is owed to the trial court's ruling or reasoning. (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 800.) Here, Miranda concedes that he is not contesting the trial court's factual findings. The trial court applied the statutory criteria for abandonment, as defined in section 1951.3, to this set of undisputed facts, and accordingly we independently review the trial court's conclusions. For that reason, we do not view any of Havins's arguments in support of the judgment as having been waived, even in light of the cursory, and unintelligible, nature of his respondent's brief.
B. Elements of Section 1951.3 Abandonment Claim
Section 1951.3, subdivision (b) provides the framework for when a landlord may serve a tenant with a notice of abandonment:
"The lessor may give a notice of belief of abandonment to the lessee only where the rent has been due and unpaid for at least 14 consecutive days and the lessor reasonably believes that the lessee has abandoned the property."
Although the precedent construing section 1951.3 is scarce, the established general rule is that abandonment contains two elements: intent to abandon, which is of primary importance, and an external manifestation of that intent. (Pickens v. Johnson (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 778, 787 (Pickens).) Abandonment may be proven by just a single act, but absent a showing of intent to abandon, even multiple acts would be insufficient. (Ibid.) Thus, an element, such as time, alone is not an essential factor unless it proves the intentions of a party. (Ibid.) To justify a finding that a property has been abandoned, there must be a " 'clear and unmistakable affirmative act indicating a purpose to repudiate the [tenancy]; the mere relinquishment of the possession of a [residence] is not an abandonment in the legal sense of the word.' " (Ibid.)
Although abandonment turns primarily on intent, which may be proved through the conduct of the party that is alleged to have abandoned the property, any "finding of abandonment must be based upon evidence from which an inference of abandonment can reasonably be drawn." (Pickens, supra, 107 Cal.App.2d at p. 788 .) It is well established that " 'the trier of fact is ordinarily the exclusive judge of the existence of the elements thereof, including the cardinal element of intention.' " (Boral v. Caldwell (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 157, 162.)
C. Application of Rules
In consideration of all the evidence, the trial court found that Miranda did not succeed in showing he complied with section 1951.3, because he never had a good faith belief that Havins had abandoned the property. Miranda believes the trial court erred as a matter of law by misconstruing the statutory requirements. Specifically, Miranda argues that after he served the notice, the burden should have been shifted to Havins to prove he had not abandoned the property. However, this assertion ignores the language in section 1951.3, subdivision (e) that provides in relevant part:
"The real property shall not be deemed to be abandoned pursuant to this section if the lessee proves any of the following: [¶] (1) At the time the notice of belief of abandonment was given, the rent was not due and unpaid for 14 consecutive days. [¶] (2) At the time the notice of belief of abandonment was given, it was not reasonable for the lessor to believe that the lessee had abandoned the real property. The fact that the lessor knew that the lessee left personal property on the real property does not, of itself, justify a finding that the lessor did not reasonably believe that the lessee had abandoned the real property." (Italics added.)
As quoted above, section 1951.3, subdivision (e) merely provides alternative options for Havins to prove he did not abandon the property. Here, the trial court correctly rejected Miranda's argument that Havins should have filed a prejudgment claim of right of possession if he wanted to avoid being evicted, since unknown occupants were not included in the related default judgment. Thus, there is no single statutory defense that is required by this statute. The record reflects that the trial court refused to shift the burden of proof to Havins on the issue of contesting the related unlawful detainer action filed against Vallejo and Schnetzer only. The trial court correctly applied the statute by interpreting the requirements that were to be imposed on lessee Havins, not on some unrelated tenants (here, Vallejo and Schnetzer).
Moreover, Miranda cannot point to anything in the record to show his belief of Havins's intent to abandon the property or to relinquish possession was reasonable. (Pickens, supra, 107 Cal.App.2d at p. 787.) In fact, the uncontroverted evidence in the record supports an inference that Miranda was having a very difficult time getting Havins to move out. That is, Miranda, who resides out of town, sent his father more than once to try and lock Havins out of the house without a move out order. Havins vigorously protested Miranda's attempts to remove him from the property during the eviction of Vallejo and Schnetzer. Although he was behind on the rent, Havins left a large amount of his personal property at the home before being wrongfully evicted. While the amount of property left behind is not determinative when considering abandonment, it should at least be considered in the context of determining Havins's intentions. (Ibid.) The trial court was in the best position to evaluate all the evidence and testimony and it properly considered the factual evidence and allocated the burden of proof, under the statute, under the relevant circumstances.
Miranda next contends that the trial court construed the service requirements of section 1951.3 too narrowly. Section 1951.3, subdivision (c) lays out the requirement of service for such a notice:
"The lessor's notice of belief of abandonment shall be personally delivered to the lessee or sent by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to the lessee at his last known address and, if there is reason to believe that the notice sent to that address will not be received by the lessee, also to such other address, if any, known to the lessor where the lessee may reasonably be expected to receive the notice." (Italics added.)
Miranda is arguing that service via certified mail, which he used, should be considered the equivalent of first class mail for service of a notice of abandonment, because the terms are used interchangeably in the statute. However, it is unnecessary for us to engage in any hypertechnical discussion comparing the various services provided by the United States Postal Service. Miranda simply did not comply with the plain language of the abandonment statute. There was no evidence presented to prove Havins ever received the notice in the mailbox all of the tenants shared, by first class or certified mail. In fact, Miranda's own exhibits show that Havins never received the notice. The trial court also noted no evidence was produced to prove Miranda attempted alternative service, which is required under section 1951.3, subdivision (c), as indicated above, by using any other known address for Havins, such as the address written on his rental application.
After independently reviewing the record, we conclude the trial court did not err in interpreting section 1951.3 or in applying it to these facts. First, Havins met his burden to prove he did not abandon the property, because there was no evidence of his affirmative intent to abandon the property, upon which Miranda could have reasonably relied. (Pickens, supra, 107 Cal.App.2d at p. 787.) Second, Havins was not required to take affirmative steps to assert his right as a tenant when the related judgment for possession did not include him nor "unknown occupants." Apparently, Miranda was trying to take several shortcuts to evict Havins without filing an individualized unlawful detainer action. Therefore, the trial court was correct in concluding that Miranda's belief that Havins abandoned the property was unreasonable. It follows that the wrongful eviction findings were adequately supported by statute and the record.
II
DAMAGES AWARDED FOR CONVERSION
Miranda next asserts the trial court erred in awarding damages for conversion because no substantial evidence supports the award. Specifically, Miranda contends that Havins had the burden to produce evidence to prove the value of the lost personal property, but failed to do so.
When reviewing a claim of lack of substantial evidence, our focus is upon the quality of the evidence. (Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 864, 871-872.) It is well settled that Miranda, as the appellant, bears the burden of providing an adequate record to establish error occurred. (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 132 (Aguilar).) It is also clear that absent an adequate record, a reviewing court will presume the judgment is supported by the evidence. (In re Angel L. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136-1137.)
Here the trial court issued a statement of decision after trial. The rules of review for judgments following statements of decision are well established. "Where [a] statement of decision sets forth the factual and legal basis for the decision, any conflict in the evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts will be resolved in support of the determination of the trial court decision." (In re Marriage of Hoffmeister (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 351, 358.)
Miranda is challenging the quantum of evidence upon which the trial court made its findings, by claiming only speculation of value was provided. However, without an oral transcript of the trial proceedings, Miranda has not met his threshold burden in suggesting the trial court relied solely on speculation. (Aguilar, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 132.)
Miranda contends there was a significant dispute between the parties about the value of Havins's belongings. This contention is undermined by the fact that he himself advertised on Craigslist.com that the items in question were in excellent condition. It is true, as Miranda asserts, that Havins did not provide the court with receipts or any other documentation to substantiate the value of the lost personal property. The trial court also commented on the general presumption that litigants tend to overvalue the value of their property and acknowledged that Havins should have provided more. In the end, the record shows the trial court weighed the photographic evidence provided by both parties and assessed the fair market value of the property plus interest.
We conclude that the record furnished by Miranda on appeal is not sufficient to support any reversal of the judgment for damages for conversion. Without a transcript of the oral proceedings, we do not know what information, beyond photographs, was used for the trial court's findings of value. Error is never presumed on appeal. Miranda had the burden of proving error, and he failed to provide an adequate record to do so. (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141.)
In reaching these conclusions, we recognize that Miranda did not directly challenge the validity of the trial court's punitive damages award. Rather, Miranda merely contends that because the underlying judgment was reached in error, so too were the awards for compensatory and punitive damages. In light of our conclusions that the underlying judgment was properly based in statute and in the evidence, we find it unnecessary to set forth any separate analysis of the punitive damages award.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondent.
WE CONCUR: McDONALD, J., McINTYRE, J.