A party seeking to change the venue of an action has the burden of proving the change is warranted by the facts of the case. Cassady v. Souris River Telephone Co-op, 520 N.W.2d 803, 805 (N.D. 1994); Haugo v. Haaland, 349 N.W.2d 25, 27 (N.D. 1984). [¶ 7] Whether a change in venue is required to obtain a fair and impartial trial is a question of fact. Cassady, at 805; see, e.g., Slaubaugh v. Slaubaugh, 499 N.W.2d 99, 106 (N.D. 1993).

The decision to grant or deny a motion for a change of venue is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown. Haugo v. Haaland, 349 N.W.2d 25, 27 (N.D. 1984). A court abuses its discretion when it acts unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably.

The burden is on the party moving for a change of venue to show that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county from which the transfer is sought. E.g., Haugo v. Haaland, 349 N.W.2d 25 (N.D. 1984); Marshall v. City of Beach, 294 N.W.2d 623 (N.D. 1980). The fact that a number of persons in a county have a bias or prejudice against a party will not justify a change of venue against the objections of the adverse party, if, notwithstanding that bias or prejudice, a fair and impartial trial can be had in that county. Haugo v. Haaland, supra. Boeren v. McWilliams, 33 N.D. 339, 157 N.W. 117 (1916).

See Ex parte Monsanto Co., 862 So.2d 595, 600 (Ala. 2003). Next, in Haugo v. Haaland, 349 N.W.2d 25 (N.D. 1984), the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision granting a change in venue. However, the affidavits that the trial court relied on in rendering its decision provided actual insight as to the thoughts and attitudes of the residents in that county.

"Generally, no abuse of discretion will be presumed or inferred where there are conflicting affidavits." Haugo v. Haaland, 349 N.W.2d 25, 27 (N.D. 1984). The conflicting affidavits in the record here do not provide clear and convincing evidence that an affair occurred; therefore, Belgarde has not met her burden.

Moreover, although the county imposes a 1.5 mill levy for the library, we have consistently held that an affidavit which merely asserts that an action is one against a political subdivision and that prospective jurors are taxpayers of the political subdivision is insufficient in itself to effect a change of venue under N.D.C.C. § 28-04-07(2). See Haugo v. Haaland, 349 N.W.2d 25, 28 (N.D. 1984); Marshall v. City of Beach, 294 N.W.2d 623, 627 (N.D. 1980); Hanson v. Garwood Indus., 279 N.W.2d 647, 650 (N.D. 1979). Bartusch in this case has done no more than assert potential jurors are taxpayers subject to the mill levy for the library. [¶ 23] Bartusch's reliance on Willesen v. Davidson, 90 N.W.2d 737, 738-39 (Iowa 1958), is misplaced because the decision is based on an Iowa statute mandating a change of venue when a county is a party to the action.

The burden is on the party seeking a change of venue to demonstrate the facts warrant the requested change. Jerry Harmon Motors, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank Trust Co., 440 N.W.2d 704 (N.D. 1989); Haugo v. Haaland, 349 N.W.2d 25 (N.D. 1984). Whether a change of venue is necessary to obtain a fair and impartial trial is a question of fact.

Gillmore v. Morelli, 425 N.W.2d 369 (N.D. 1988). We recognize that we have previously considered appeals from an order granting a motion for change of venue without discussing the applicability of Rule 54(b), N.D.R.Civ.P. E.g., Haugo v. Haaland, 349 N.W.2d 25 (N.D. 1984); Marshall v. City of Beach, 294 N.W.2d 623 (N.D. 1980). However, we have recently recognized a shift in our appellate procedure regarding the applicability of Rule 54(b) certification to orders that are appealable pursuant to Section 28-27-02, N.D.C.C. See Sargent County Bank v. Wentworth, 434 N.W.2d 562 (N.D. 1989); Regstad v. Steffes, 433 N.W.2d 202 (N.D. 1988); Gast Construction Co. v. Brighton Partnership, 422 N.W.2d 389 (N.D. 1988); Gillan v. Saffell, 395 N.W.2d 148 (N.D. 1986).

We do not have before us a sufficient record to make a determination on this matter. See Haugo v. Haaland, 349 N.W.2d 25 (N.D. 1984). Johnson will have an opportunity on remand to amplify the record in support of the request. ERICKSTAD, C.J., GIERKE, J., and NEUMANN and SCHMALENBERGER, District Judges, concur.

Two conclusions can be drawn from these cases: (1) the trial court has much discretion in making its fact-sensitive ruling on a motion to change venue; and (2) a party should not be penalized for its good reputation.See Haugo v. Haaland, 349 N.W.2d 25, 28-29 (N.D. 1984) (holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a motion to change venue in a case based on Dram Shop statutes where (1) the defendant bar was organized as a nonprofit organization to support community interests, primarily a community hospital; (2) the county had a small population, and (3) community leaders had commended a local judge for his alleged leniency on traffic offenders); Althiser v. Richmondville Creamery Co., 13 A.D.2d 162, 215 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1961) (holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a motion to change venue in a case filed by dairy farmers and milk producers where the individuals interested in the outcome of litigation constituted a large portion of eligible jurors in the county).See Braswell v. Money, 344 So.2d 767 (Ala. 1977) (holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for change of venue in an action involving the county's largest employer where there was no evidence that the trial h