This Court "harmonize[s] statutes when possible to avoid conflict between them." See Haugenoe v. Workforce Safety Ins., 2008 ND 78, ¶ 8, 748 N.W.2d 378. [¶ 10] "Our interpretation of a statute `must be consistent with legislative intent and done in a manner [to further] the policy goals and objectives of the statutes.
The determination of whether an intervening force is the efficient cause of an injury involves a number of considerations including whether or not the intervening cause is an extraordinary one or one which might be normally expected by a reasonable person in view of the situation existing at the time of its intervention. . . . The foreseeability of the act of the unknown person in this case is the crucial point of the sufficiency of the evidence.Haugenoe v. Workforce Safety Ins., 2008 ND 78, ¶ 36, 748 N.W.2d 378 (quoting State v. Columbus Hall Ass'n, 27 N.W.2d 664, 668 (1947)). "[I]ssues of causation and foreseeability are generally questions of fact, not matters of law."
"Our interpretation of a statute must be consistent with legislative intent and done in a manner which will accomplish the policy goals and objectives of the statutes." Haugenoe v. Workforce Safety & Ins. , 2008 ND 78, ¶ 8, 748 N.W.2d 378 (citation and quotation omitted). [¶7] The statute covers two classes of prospective defendants: (1) North Dakota residents who have been continuously absent from the state for at least six months post-accident, and (2) nonresidents at any time.
[¶ 8] "`We presume the Legislature did not intend an unreasonable result or unjust consequence.'" Industrial Contractors, 2009 ND 157, ¶ 11, 772 N.W.2d 582 (quoting Haugenoe v. Workforce Safety Ins., 2008 ND 78, ¶ 8, 748 N.W.2d 378). We will apply the literal meaning of the word "or" unless it renders the statute inoperable or its meaning becomes questionable.
[¶ 23] Because we conclude Wanner has not shown he was prejudiced and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Lieutenant Shirey to testify, we do not reach this issue. See, e.g., State v. Zajac, 2009 ND 119, ¶ 19, 767 N.W.2d 825; Haugenoe v. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2008 ND 78, ¶ 26, 748 N.W.2d 378; Hsu v. Marian Manor Apartments, Inc., 2007 ND 205, ¶ 17, 743 N.W.2d 672; State v. Westmiller, 2007 ND 52, ¶ 15, 730 N.W.2d 134. IV
Id. at ¶ 10. "[This Court] presume[s] the [l]egislature did not intend an unreasonable result or unjust consequence." Id. (quoting Haugenoe v. Workforce Safety Ins., 2008 ND 78, ¶ 8, 748 N.W.2d 378). In construing statutes, we consider "the context of the statutes and the purposes for which they were enacted.
We will harmonize statutes if possible to avoid conflicts between them, and our statutory interpretation "must be consistent with legislative intent and done in a manner [to further] the policy goals and objectives of the statutes." Haugenoe v. Workforce Safety Ins., 2008 ND 78, ¶ 8, 748 N.W.2d 378 (citations omitted). "We presume the Legislature did not intend an unreasonable result or unjust consequence."
We first look to the language of the statute to determine legislative intent, and if the language is clear and unambiguous, we presume the legislative intent is clear from the face of the statute. Haugenoe v. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2008 ND 78, ¶ 8, 748 N.W.2d 378. Section 65-05-10, N.D.C.C., does not state that WSI may only decide to waive the time limit at the end of the five-year benefit period. We conclude WSI may waive the five-year limit on temporary partial disability benefits at any time under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-10.
This disclaimer acknowledges that an amplifier defect might damage “another product,” but this statement is far too vague to give any sense that the fire and smoke damage here was one of the allocated risks considered during the bargaining. Foreseeability of harm generally “is a question of fact for the jury, unless the facts are such that reasonable minds could not differ.” Barsness v. Gen. Diesel & Equip. Co., 383 N.W.2d 840, 843 (N.D.1986); accord Haugenoe v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 748 N.W.2d 378, 387 (N.D.2008); see also Foremost Farms USA Coop. v. Performance Process, Inc., 297 Wis.2d 724, 726 N.W.2d 289, 297 (Ct.App.2006) (considering foreseeability, as used in the economic loss doctrine, a “factual question”). In Dakota Gasification, the structural nature of the defect made the resulting damage a practical inevitability, a fact reflected by a limitation of liability clause specifically addressing damage to the building's furnishings and contents.
This disclaimer acknowledges that an amplifier defect might damage “another product,” but this statement is far too vague to give any sense that the fire and smoke damage here was one of the allocated risks considered during the bargaining.Foreseeability of harm generally “is a question of fact for the jury, unless the facts are such that reasonable minds could not differ.” Barsness v. Gen. Diesel & Equip. Co., 383 N.W.2d 840, 843 (N.D.1986) ; accord Haugenoe v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 748 N.W.2d 378, 387 (N.D.2008) ; see also Foremost Farms USA Coop. v. Performance Process, Inc., 297 Wis.2d 724, 726 N.W.2d 289, 297 (Ct.App.2006) (considering foreseeability, as used in the economic loss doctrine, a “factual question”). In Dakota Gasification, the structural nature of the defect made the resulting damage a practical inevitability, a fact reflected by a limitation of liability clause specifically addressing damage to the building's furnishings and contents.