Haugen v. Henry County

39 Citing cases

  1. Diamond Crystal Brands v. Food Movers Intern

    593 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2010)   Cited 456 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Finding specific jurisdiction when the non-forum defendant "purposefully engag[ed] in fourteen such transactions in just six months," thus establishing "a substantial and ongoing relationship with a Georgia manufacturer"

    The courts cannot reject the plain language of a statute unless it will lead to unreasonable consequences or absurd results not contemplated by the Legislature. See generally Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743(2), 594 S.E.2d 324 (2004); Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 681, 279 S.E.2d 430 (1981). Accordingly, under these circumstances, the courts may not interpret OCGA § 9-10-91 to provide what the Legislature chose to omit.

  2. Seals v. State

    311 Ga. 739 (Ga. 2021)   Cited 56 times
    In Seals, this Court made clear that when one or more counts of an indictment remain pending following convictions on other counts, the defendant is authorized to appeal the judgment on the convictions only by following the procedures for interlocutory review set forth in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b).

    By construing the word "pending" in OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) to include charges that are dead and inactive, the majority has interpreted the statute in a manner that obtains absurd results, which this Court should not countenance and which the legislature could not have intended. See, e.g., Haugen v. Henry County , 277 Ga. 743, 746 (2), 594 S.E.2d 324 (2004) ("The judiciary has the duty to reject a construction of a statute which will result in unreasonable consequences or absurd results not contemplated by the legislature.") (citations and punctuation omitted).

  3. State v. Riggs

    301 Ga. 63 (Ga. 2017)   Cited 43 times
    Holding that the split-sentence requirement of OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b) applied to each sexual offense conviction, and not to the aggregate sentence for multiple sexual offense convictions

    If our statute were written in the disjunctive like the statutes of Indiana and Oregon, we might arrive at a conclusion similar to Indiana’s high court. See Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743 , 744-745 (2) (594 SE2d 324 ) (2004) (“The natural meaning of‘or,’where used as a connective, is to mark an alternative and present choice, implying an election to do one of two things[.]”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

  4. Cardinale v. City of Atlanta

    290 Ga. 521 (Ga. 2012)   Cited 8 times
    Affirming dismissal of that portion of a complaint against a municipality and individual members of the city council seeking to impose misdemeanor penalties for alleged violations of the Open Meetings Act, but reversing dismissal of that portion of the complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged violations

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743, 745(2), 594 S.E.2d 324 (2004). As we have explained, the Act “was enacted in the public interest to protect the public—both individuals and the public generally—from ‘closed door’ politics and the potential abuse of individuals and the misuse of power such policies entail.”

  5. Stowell v. Huguenard

    288 Ga. 628 (Ga. 2011)   Cited 15 times
    Applying guidelines in context of child support modification action

    This is, of course, because it cannot be done. A statute must not be interpreted in a manner that leads to an absurd result, See Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743 (2) ( 594 SE2d 324) (2004), and when a practical, workable method for dealing with situations such as that presented here is authorized by the plain language of the statute, there is no reason to hold otherwise.

  6. Spalding County Board of Elections v. Mccord

    287 Ga. 835 (Ga. 2010)   Cited 5 times
    Noting that "[a]though a preamble is not part of the act and therefore cannot control over its plain meaning, it may be considered as evidence of the meaning of an ambiguous, codified law"

    It also produces a non-sensical enforcement regime. See Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743, 745 ( 594 SE2d 324) (2004) (noting that statutes should not be construed to produce absurd results). And it overlooks the evolution of the relevant statutes, including the preamble to the 2003 legislation.

  7. Watson v. Matthews

    692 S.E.2d 338 (Ga. 2010)   Cited 1 times

    However, no mandamus nisi issued, and Judge Matthews was served with the petition in the normal manner. See Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743, 744 (1) ( 594 SE2d 324) (2004); DeKalb County v. Chapel Hill, Inc., 232 Ga. 238, 239-240 (1) ( 205 SE2d 864) (1974). Neither Watson nor Judge Matthews requested oral argument under Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3. Accordingly, it was not error to rule on the mandamus petition without holding a hearing.

  8. Trawick Constr. Co. v. Georgia Dept. of Revenue

    286 Ga. 597 (Ga. 2010)   Cited 7 times

    ]" Echols v. Thomas, 265 Ga. 474, 475 ( 458 SE2d 100) (1995).Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743, 745 (2) ( 594 SE2d 324) (2004). The legislature's clear intent in this case was to ensure that a federal "S" corporation election would not allow a corporation to improperly circumvent Georgia corporate income tax. Given this fact, Trawick's interpretation of OCGA § 48-7-21 (b) (7) cannot have merit unless this single provision is read in a vacuum, without consideration of the entire statute as a comprehensive whole.

  9. Harris v. State

    286 Ga. 245 (Ga. 2009)   Cited 35 times
    Holding that the reversal of a conviction allows the guilty verdict that had merged into it to “unmerge” and a conviction and sentence to be entered on that count after remand

    As such, the majority's interpretation cannot stand. See Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743, 746 (2) ( 594 SE2d 324) (2004) ("The judiciary has the duty to reject a construction of a statute which will result in unreasonable consequences or absurd results not contemplated by the legislature.") (citation omitted). OCGA § 16-5-44.

  10. Dove v. Dove

    285 Ga. 647 (Ga. 2009)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that husband's failure to disclose his income when he and his wife executed the antenuptial agreement did not constitute non-disclosure of material facts so as to render the agreement unenforceable, as the financial statement that the husband provided to his wife revealed him to be a wealthy individual with significant income-producing assets, and the wife lived with him for four years before the antenuptial agreement was executed

    Simmons v. Sonyika, 279 Ga. 378, 379 ( 614 SE2d 27) (2005).Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743, 745 ( 594 SE2d 324) (2004) (construction of statutes must square with common sense and sound reasoning). 5.