The courts cannot reject the plain language of a statute unless it will lead to unreasonable consequences or absurd results not contemplated by the Legislature. See generally Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743(2), 594 S.E.2d 324 (2004); Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 681, 279 S.E.2d 430 (1981). Accordingly, under these circumstances, the courts may not interpret OCGA § 9-10-91 to provide what the Legislature chose to omit.
By construing the word "pending" in OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) to include charges that are dead and inactive, the majority has interpreted the statute in a manner that obtains absurd results, which this Court should not countenance and which the legislature could not have intended. See, e.g., Haugen v. Henry County , 277 Ga. 743, 746 (2), 594 S.E.2d 324 (2004) ("The judiciary has the duty to reject a construction of a statute which will result in unreasonable consequences or absurd results not contemplated by the legislature.") (citations and punctuation omitted).
If our statute were written in the disjunctive like the statutes of Indiana and Oregon, we might arrive at a conclusion similar to Indiana’s high court. See Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743 , 744-745 (2) (594 SE2d 324 ) (2004) (“The natural meaning of‘or,’where used as a connective, is to mark an alternative and present choice, implying an election to do one of two things[.]”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743, 745(2), 594 S.E.2d 324 (2004). As we have explained, the Act “was enacted in the public interest to protect the public—both individuals and the public generally—from ‘closed door’ politics and the potential abuse of individuals and the misuse of power such policies entail.”
This is, of course, because it cannot be done. A statute must not be interpreted in a manner that leads to an absurd result, See Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743 (2) ( 594 SE2d 324) (2004), and when a practical, workable method for dealing with situations such as that presented here is authorized by the plain language of the statute, there is no reason to hold otherwise.
It also produces a non-sensical enforcement regime. See Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743, 745 ( 594 SE2d 324) (2004) (noting that statutes should not be construed to produce absurd results). And it overlooks the evolution of the relevant statutes, including the preamble to the 2003 legislation.
However, no mandamus nisi issued, and Judge Matthews was served with the petition in the normal manner. See Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743, 744 (1) ( 594 SE2d 324) (2004); DeKalb County v. Chapel Hill, Inc., 232 Ga. 238, 239-240 (1) ( 205 SE2d 864) (1974). Neither Watson nor Judge Matthews requested oral argument under Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3. Accordingly, it was not error to rule on the mandamus petition without holding a hearing.
]" Echols v. Thomas, 265 Ga. 474, 475 ( 458 SE2d 100) (1995).Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743, 745 (2) ( 594 SE2d 324) (2004). The legislature's clear intent in this case was to ensure that a federal "S" corporation election would not allow a corporation to improperly circumvent Georgia corporate income tax. Given this fact, Trawick's interpretation of OCGA § 48-7-21 (b) (7) cannot have merit unless this single provision is read in a vacuum, without consideration of the entire statute as a comprehensive whole.
As such, the majority's interpretation cannot stand. See Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743, 746 (2) ( 594 SE2d 324) (2004) ("The judiciary has the duty to reject a construction of a statute which will result in unreasonable consequences or absurd results not contemplated by the legislature.") (citation omitted). OCGA § 16-5-44.
Simmons v. Sonyika, 279 Ga. 378, 379 ( 614 SE2d 27) (2005).Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743, 745 ( 594 SE2d 324) (2004) (construction of statutes must square with common sense and sound reasoning). 5.