Opinion
No. 5-137 / 04-0389
Filed April 28, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carla T. Schemmel, Judge.
Jerry Hauge appeals the denial of his claim for workers' compensation benefits. AFFIRMED.
Joseph Walsh of Hedberg, Owens, Hedberg Walsh, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
James Huber of Huber, Book, Cortese, Happe Lanz, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Jerry Hauge worked as a mold operator at Minnesota Rubber from 1994 to 1999. In 1995 and 1997, he sustained injuries to his thumbs for which he received workers' compensation benefits. In early 1999, Hauge began experiencing burning pain, swelling, and discoloration in both hands and through his wrists. He again sought workers' compensation benefits. This time, a deputy workers' compensation commissioner issued an arbitration decision denying his petition. The commissioner affirmed the denial of benefits.
Hauge sought judicial review. The district court rejected his several assignments of error, concluding:
The Arbitration Decision, when read as a whole, is supported by the substantial evidence in the record. The Deputy Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in her legal decision. Those factual errors the Deputy Commissioner committed were harmless, and therefore not reversible. The Deputy Commissioner's Arbitration Decision is therefore affirmed in whole.
Hauge now seeks further judicial review. He contends the agency misapplied (1) the legal standard on causation, (2) the law on manifestation of a cumulative injury, and (3) "vital facts" contained in the record.
I. Legal Standard on Causation
Hauge concedes the deputy commissioner correctly stated the law on causation as follows:
The claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury is a proximate cause of the disability on which the claim is based. A cause is proximate if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the result; it need not be the only cause.
He contends the deputy commissioner misapplied this standard when she subsequently stated "claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged condition of his right and left thumbs, hands, and arms, is the direct and proximate result of any injury that occurred in 1999." (emphasis added). In his view, the emphasized language suggests that the deputy impermissibly required proof of "the only cause" rather than "one cause." Blacksmith v. All-American, Inc., 290 N.W.2d 348, 354 (Iowa 1980).
We will reverse the agency's application of law to fact only if it is "irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable."Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(m) (1999); Berger v. Dep't of Transp., 679 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Iowa 2004). We conclude the deputy commissioner did not act irrationally, illogically or wholly unjustifiably when she used the pronoun "the" rather than "a" and added the term "direct" to modify "proximate cause." The deputy set forth the facts, correctly stated the law on causation, and summarized the facts she found dispositive in light of the law. The two contested words, "the" and "direct," do not materially affect her ruling or require correction as a matter of law. See Nelson v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 259 Iowa 1209, 1214, 146 N.W.2d 261, 264 (1966) (stating reversal is not required where commissioner "inadvertently misstated a rule of law but actually resorted to and correctly determined the case under the proper rule"); cf. Norland v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 412 N.W.2d 904, 911 (Iowa 1987) (finding "no explicit assignment of the burden of proof to the wrong party, which we would be able to correct as a matter of law").
II. Manifestation of Cumulative Injury
Hauge next takes issue with the deputy's statement that "[t]here is no medical testimony to support the alleged dates of injury." He contends he did not need to establish the dates of injury as a factual matter because, in the case of a cumulative injury, "the date of injury is a subjective legal test, not an expert medical test." We again apply the judicial review standard set forth in Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(m). Applying this standard, we reject Hauge's argument for two reasons.
First, the deputy commissioner found that this is not a case involving a cumulative injury. See Ellingson v. Fleetguard, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 440, 444 (Iowa 1999) (defining cumulative injury as one that "develops over time from performing work-related activities and ultimately produces some degree of industrial disability"). She stated Hauge suffered from the "same condition [he] had in 1995 with his work related left thumb condition and in 1997 with his work related right thumb condition." We agree with the district court that this finding is supported by substantial evidence. As Hauge did not suffer from a cumulative injury, the deputy was not required to apply the law on "manifestation" of a cumulative injury. See Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. v. Tasler, 483 N.W.2d 824, 829 (Iowa 1992).
Second, even if the agency had found that Hauge sustained a cumulative injury, the date of injury in such a case is "an inherently fact-based determination" rather than a legal determination as Hauge claims. Id. (citations omitted).
For these reasons, we cannot find the agency's application of law to fact "irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable." Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(m).
III. Misapplication of "Vital Facts"
Finally, Hauge contends the deputy (1) ignored evidence that Hauge suffered from a new injury in 1999, (2) failed to cite a second report of an independent medical examiner and (3) inappropriately suggested the independent medical examiner had no way to compare his later injuries to the earlier ones. He argues these claimed errors "are indicative of the deputy commissioner's overall misunderstanding of the vital facts necessary to determine the existence of a new injury." As this again appears to be a challenge to the deputy commissioner's application of law to fact, we will reverse the agency only if its application is "irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable."Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(m).
This also may be construed as a contention that the agency decision is not supported by substantial evidence. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f). As noted, we agree with the district court that the agency fact finding concerning the existence of a new injury is supported by substantial evidence.
With respect to the first argument, the physician whose reports the deputy found more persuasive consistently opined that Hauge's symptoms in 1999 were the continuation of injuries suffered in 1995 and 1997 rather than a new injury. As for the second argument, the deputy cited one of the independent medical examiner's reports and explained why she believed it was less persuasive than that of Hauge's treating physician. The fact that she made no mention of a second report does not render her ruling irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable, in light of her explanation that this physician's opinions were not as compelling. On the third question, the deputy correctly found that the independent medical examiner did not observe Hauge in 1995 and 1997. The deputy logically could have concluded that this physician's paper review was entitled to less weight than a diagnosis based on personal observation. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Caselman, 657 N.W.2d 493, 500-01 (Iowa 2003).
IV. Disposition
We, like the district court, affirm the agency ruling.