Opinion
Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1612-CR-2826
06-15-2017
Darnell Hatton, a/k/a Darnal Hatton, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
APPELLANT PRO SE Darnell Hatton Michigan City, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Attorney General of Indiana Monika Prekopa Talbot Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. APPELLANT PRO SE Darnell Hatton Michigan City, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Attorney General of Indiana Monika Prekopa Talbot Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Marc T. Rothenberg, Judge Trial Court Cause No. CR-79-324B Baker, Judge. 2 [1] Darnell Hatton appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to correct erroneous sentence. Finding no error, we affirm. [2] In 1979, Hatton was convicted of Class B felony robbery, Class B felony confinement, Class D felony theft, and Class D felony receiving stolen property. He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of twenty years each on the two Class B felonies and four years each on the two Class D felonies, and his sentence was enhanced by thirty years because he was found to be an habitual offender. The sentencing order bears a stamp stating, "Commitments being held in abeyance." Appellant's App. p. 15-16. [3] On October 28, 2016, Hatton filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, arguing that the portion of the sentencing order directing that the sentence be "held in abeyance" was erroneous. Id. The trial court denied the motion, finding as follows: "Denied. Sentence herein was not postponed; Ct. simply noted it would be run consecutively to other cases." Id. at 9. Hatton now appeals. [4] A motion to correct erroneous sentence is appropriate only when the sentence is erroneous on its face. Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 786 (Ind. 2004) 3 (cautioning that "[c]laims that require consideration of the proceedings before, during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a motion to correct erroneous sentence" and emphasizing that the narrow confines of this procedure are to be strictly applied). In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to correct erroneous sentence, we will reverse only if the ruling is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court. E.g., Hobbs v. State, 71 N.E.3d 46, 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. [5] At the time Hatton committed these offenses, the statute authorizing consecutive sentences was generally found to apply only to those occasions where the trial court was meting out two or more terms of imprisonment at one time. E.g., Kendrick v. State, 529 N.E.2d 1311, 1312 (Ind. 1988), superseded by statute. At that time, however, Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(b) stated as follows: If a person commits a crime: (1) After having been arrested for another crime; and (2) Before the date he is discharged from probation, parole, or a term of imprisonment imposed for that other crime; The terms of imprisonment for the crimes shall be served consecutively, regardless of the order in which the crimes are tried and the sentences are imposed. 4 I.C. § 35-50-1-2(b) (1979). Our Supreme Court found that this statute does not require consecutive sentences where the subsequent crime was committed between arrest and sentencing for a prior crime, but does require consecutive sentences where the subsequent offense occurred after sentencing for a prior crime. Groff v. State, 488 N.E.2d 711, 712 (Ind. 1986). [6] In this case, it is impossible to tell from the face of the sentencing judgment whether Hatton committed the instant crimes after having been sentenced for another crime but not yet discharged from probation, parole, or incarceration. To make that determination, the trial court would have been required to go beyond the face of the judgment and examine the record, which is improper when evaluating a motion to correct erroneous sentence. As a result, the trial court did not err by denying Hatton's motion to correct erroneous sentence. [7] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Barnes, J., and Crone, J., concur.