Opinion
Case No. 02-4064-JAR
December 18, 2002.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Steven Richards' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) Plaintiff's Complaint. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant, in his official capacity as the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Revenue, violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when he imposed a tax on illegal drugs recovered from Plaintiff, executing a tax warrant in the amount of $29,600.00. These funds were levied from Plaintiff's account at Kaw Valley State Bank and Trust Company.
While the Complaint does not clearly state the basis for the claim, the Plaintiff, in his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10), confirms his intention to bring this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The asserted bases for the motion to dismiss are, among others: (1) that the Complaint is barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and (2) that the applicable statute of limitations for an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has run. Because the Court finds that the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Revenue is immune from a civil action of this nature under the Eleventh Amendment, and because this action was not filed within the period of limitations, the Court grants Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Background
Plaintiff Jerry J. Hattley served in the United States Army and is a veteran of the Viet Nam War. As a result of his traumatic combat experience, Plaintiff suffers from, and is debilitated by, post traumatic stress disorder. In November 1990, the Social Security Administration found Plaintiff to be unemployed and unemployable because of his post traumatic stress disorder. In addition to past due benefits, the Social Security Administration awarded Plaintiff disability benefits of $465.90 per month, which from January 1990 until January 1995, was his only source of income.
In January 1995, the Department of Veterans Affairs awarded Plaintiff a 100% disability rating for his post traumatic stress disorder effective July 1, 1989. With these accrued benefits, Plaintiff bought a $50,000.00 certificate of deposit at Kaw Valley State Bank and Trust Company in Topeka, Kansas, and deposited approximately $20,000.00 in a savings account at the same institution. Prior to this award of past and present benefits from the V.A., Plaintiff supplemented his income by acting as a courier of illegal drugs. Upon the execution of a search warrant, the State seized a quantity of illegal drugs from Plaintiff's residence. On February 24, 1995, the State imposed a tax on the seized drugs, executing a tax warrant in the amount of $29,600, which was levied on Plaintiff's funds at Kaw Valley State Bank and Trust Company. Plaintiff claims that the execution of the tax warrant violated 38 U.S.C. § 5301, because it was levied on funds from his V.A. disability benefits.
Section 5301 deals with the nonassignability and exempt status of benefits.
Motion to Dismiss
Dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is appropriate "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." A Rule 12(b)(6) motion allows a defendant to test whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief even if everything alleged in the complaint is true. The Court accepts as true the well-pleaded factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Van Deelen v. City of Eudora, Kan., 53 F. Supp.2d 1223, 1226 (D.Kan. 1999) (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Discussion
1. Plaintiff's Claim is Barred under the Eleventh Amendment.Although by its terms the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against a State by its own citizens, the Supreme Court has "consistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State." Even though a state may not be named in the complaint, it is well established that the suit may nonetheless be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In Edelman v. Jordan, the Supreme Court stated that "when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants." Accordingly, the rule has emerged that a suit by a private party seeking to impose liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (citations omitted).
Id. at 663.
Id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 350 (1945)).
Id. (citation omitted).
The Ex parte Young doctrine excepts from the Eleventh Amendment bar, actions for prospective, equitable relief. But Plaintiff seeks a monetary recovery in this action, not prospective, equitable relief. Plaintiff argues that the Ex parte Young doctrine should be extended to his suit. But Plaintiff's reliance on Justice Brennan's dissent in Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, to support his argument, is not persuasive; the court is bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to follow the Supreme Court's decisions, not dissenting opinions. Moreover, Atascadero is inapposite, addressing whether the Rehabilitation Act abrogated the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, because an imposition of liability against the Defendant must be paid from public funds in the state treasury, Plaintiff's action is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
See Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996).
473 U.S. 234, 248, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (overruled by subsequent legislation) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. Plaintiff's Claim is not Timely under the Relevant Statute of Limitations.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) because it is barred by the statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4). Although Plaintiff does not suggest an alternate statute of limitations, he asserts that the application of the two-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) to his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is incorrect. The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's argument.
In this federal district it is well settled that a two-year statute of limitations applies to civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Although federal law governs the characterization of actions under § 1983, courts must look to state law for the length of the limitations period." "Claims under § 1983 [are] best characterized as personal injury actions for statute of limitations purposes." Kansas law specifies a two-year statute of limitations period for "[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated." Therefore, in Kansas, 60-513(a)(4) provides the applicable statute of limitations for claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because the cause of action presented by Plaintiff arose on February 24, 1995, and his complaint was filed more than seven years later on April 25, 2002, Plaintiff's complaint is barred pursuant to the applicable two-year statute of limitations.
Johnson v. City of Overland Park, 1990 WL 134341 (D.Kan. Aug. 30, 1990) (citing Hamilton v. City of Overland Park, 730 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1052 (1985)); see also Laurino v. Tate, 220 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2000).
Oyler v. Finney, 870 F. Supp. 1018, 1023 (D.Kan. 1994) (citation omitted).
Id. (quoting Massey v. Shepack, 12 Kan. App. 2d 770, 774, 757 P.2d 329 (1988)).
The Court, therefore, grants Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff's claim is barred by both the Eleventh Amendment and the applicable two-year statute of limitations. The Court does not find it necessary to review Defendant's alternate grounds for dismissal.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) Plaintiff's Complaint is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.