Opinion
Civil Action No. 97-3411-CM
April 27, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the court is plaintiff Timothy Hatten's motion for reconsideration and clarification pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) (Doc. 33). Plaintiff requests the court to "(1) Reconsider its Judgment, and (2) Recall its Mandate in this matter." Finding no manifest error of law or fact, plaintiff's motion is denied.
Plaintiff, a federal inmate, filed in forma pauperis suit against current and former employees of the Federal Bureau of Prisons seeking relief for alleged tortious activity under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346 2671, et seq. Plaintiff also asserted claims against defendant employees in both their official and individual capacities for alleged constitutional violations in a Bivens action. In both claims, plaintiff sought declaratory judgment and damages for the alleged mishandling of his property by staff at the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas, through their alleged premature application of a prison property regulation. Plaintiff also sought relief in his Bivens action for the disciplinary actions taken against him related to his efforts to retain his personal property.
Upon consideration of the arguments presented to the court both in defendants' "motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment" (Doc. 25), and in plaintiff's "brief response to defendants' motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment" (Doc. 27), the court granted defendants' motion in part and dismissed plaintiff's complaint in its entirety.
• Standard
Whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is committed to the court's discretion.
GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. , 130 F.3d 1381, 1386 (10th Cir. 1997); Phelps v. Hamilton , 122 F.3d 1309, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997). In exercising that discretion, courts in general have recognized that a motion to alter or amend judgment may be granted only if the moving party can establish: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that could not have been obtained previously through the exercise of due diligence; or (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. See Brumark Corp. v. Samson Resources Corp., 57 F.3d 941, 948 (10th Cir. 1995); D. Kan. R. 7.3 (listing three bases for reconsideration of order).
Such a motion does not permit a losing party to rehash arguments previously addressed or to present new legal theories or facts that could have been raised earlier. See Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 101 F.3d 1324, 1332 (10th Cir. 1996). "A party's failure to present its strongest case in the first instance does not entitle it to a second chance in the form of a motion to reconsider." Sithon Maritime Co. v. Holiday Mansion, 177 F.R.D. 504, 505 (D.Kan. 1998).
Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is premised on the third ground noted above. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that reconsideration of the court's order dismissing his complaint is necessary to correct clear error and prevent manifest injustice. Plaintiff asserts three arguments in support of his motion. First, plaintiff argues the court's "fact finding" is in clear error because it accepted false statements presented in defendants' affidavits. Second, plaintiff asserts that because there is a conflict in the allegedly false affidavits presented by defendants and the documentary evidence presented by plaintiff, the court should have drawn all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. Third, plaintiff argues the court refused to examine plaintiff's response to defendants' motion and refused to examine all evidence plaintiff submitted in that response. As discussed below, the court finds no grounds to alter its order.
• Discussion
• No Clear Error in "Fact Finding"
The court examines plaintiff's first and second arguments together, as they are logically related. Plaintiff argues the court's "fact finding" is in clear error because it accepted false statements in defendants' affidavits when it granted summary judgment on plaintiff's Bivens claim against defendants in their individual capacities. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that defendants' affidavits wherein they state the prison property regulation applied to plaintiff went into effect in November 1995 are false. Plaintiff asserts that his documentary evidence establishes the prison property regulation was not in effect until June 28, 1996 — a date after the regulation was applied to him. Plaintiff also argues that by accepting defendants' affidavits as true, even though they conflicted with documentary evidence presented by plaintiff, the court failed to draw all inferences in favor of plaintiff. The court finds no material error in its review of the facts.
• Fact at Issue Not Material
The court notes that it does not step into the role of "fact finder" when deciding dispositive motions such as motions for summary judgment. Instead, the court is guided by the standards set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and in relevant case law. A review of the court's order shows such standards were acknowledged and followed by the court. Specifically, the court's order noted that pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), the court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. (Ct.'s order, at 12) (citing Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1988); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). Further, the court noted that in accordance with Rule 56, the facts relayed were uncontroverted or related in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party. (Ct.'s order, at 2 n. 1).
However, even assuming the court improperly accepted defendants' affidavits where they were controverted, the fact at issue (i.e., the effective date of the prison property regulation) was not material to the court's decision to grant summary judgment on plaintiff's Bivens claim against defendants in their individual capacities. Therefore, even if plaintiff had successfully controverted defendants' assertion as to the effective date of the prison property regulation, thereby creating a genuine issue of fact, because this fact was not "material" to the court's analysis, it had no impact on the court's decision.
A fact is "material" if, under the applicable substantive law, it is "essential to the proper disposition of the claim." Adler, 144 F.3d at 670 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Plaintiff claims the court's reliance on defendant's affidavits caused it improperly to grant summary judgment to defendants on his Bivens claim against defendants in their individual capacities. Plaintiff's Bivens claim asserted that defendants' premature application of a prison property regulation to him and defendants' decision to place him in administrative confinement while his property was forwarded out of the prison, violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process.
The court construed plaintiff's Bivens claim as asserting a procedural due process claim related to the deprivation of his property and his liberty. "Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of `liberty' or `property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). Pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, prisoners may not be denied life, liberty or property without due process of the law. See id. at 333 (noting some form of hearing is required before an individual is deprived of protected interests); Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands."
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
"In determining whether an individual has been deprived of his right to procedural due process, courts must engage in a two-step inquiry: (1) did the individual possess a protected interest such that the due process protections were applicable; and if so, then (2) was the individual afforded an appropriate level of process." Farthing v. City of Shawnee, Kan., 39 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 1994).
a. Deprivation of Personal Property
In its decision, the court found plaintiff failed to establish that he had a protectable property interest based upon Kansas state law. The court recognized that "there is a difference between the inmate's ownership rights in the property and the inmate's right to possess the property while in prison." Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 419-420, 960 P.2d 227, 237-38 (1998). Accordingly, where an inmate has been allowed to send property the inmate owns, but is not allowed to possess in prison, from the institution to an address of his own choosing, the inmate has not been deprived of the property so as to implicate the due process clause. Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 998 (10th Cir. 1991).
Based upon this case precedent, the court determined that plaintiff did not establish that he suffered a "taking" sufficient to implicate the due process clause. Although plaintiff was not allowed to retain all of his property due to the application of the prison property regulation (whether prematurely applied or not), he was allowed to specify where it would be sent and he did not lose ownership of the property. Accordingly, the court found plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiff's procedural due process claim related to the deprivation of his property. When the prison property regulation at issue became effective was irrelevant (i.e., not material) to this analysis.
• Deprivation of Liberty During Disciplinary Detention
In its decision, the court also found plaintiff failed to establish that he was not given the process due when he was placed in disciplinary detention. The court recognized that "[l]awfully incarcerated persons retain only a narrow range of protected liberty interests." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983). Further, the court recognized an inmate subject to disciplinary charges that could potentially result in punitive segregation is entitled "at a minimum, to advance written notice of the charges against him and of the evidence available to the fact finder. He must be permitted to marshal the facts and prepare his defense. A written record of the proceedings must be kept. The inmate must be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense." Patterson v. Coughlin, 761 F.2d 886, 890 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)).
Based upon this case precedent, the court determined that plaintiff failed to establish that he was not provided with all process due. As the court explained in its opinion, plaintiff was provided advance written notice of the charges against him. He was provided with written notice of the charges on March 22, 1996 at 4:45 p.m. and on March 23, 1996 at approximately 10:30 a.m. Further, it appeared plaintiff was provided access to the evidence available against him. The Incident Reports contain the charging officer's account of the incident and recites the plaintiff's comments regarding the incident. Plaintiff did not assert, nor produce evidence, to indicate he was not afforded access to such evidence. Finally, plaintiff was permitted to defend himself at the subsequent hearings and written records were kept related to the proceedings. Only following these procedures was plaintiff found guilty as charged and given sanctions for his actions. Accordingly, the court found plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiff's procedural due process claims related to his disciplinary detention. When the prison property regulation at issue became effective was irrelevant (i.e., not material) to this analysis. Accordingly, the court reaffirms its decision that no genuine issue of material fact existed to preclude summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's Bivens claim against defendants in their individual capacities.
B. Court's Examination of Submitted Papers and Exhibits
Plaintiff also argues the court refused to examine plaintiff's response (Doc. 27) and the exhibits submitted with the response. However, the court finds all submitted materials were reviewed by the court in making its decision. On December 13, 1999, defendants filed their motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for summary judgment, with supporting memoranda and exhibits for the court's consideration. Subsequently, on January 10, 2000, plaintiff filed a response to defendants' motion, with supporting exhibits. Where the court reviews a pending motion, all materials relevant to such motion are considered. Accordingly, the court reviewed each of these submittals in arriving at the decision at issue here.
Plaintiff seems to suggest that because the court did not outline the factual underpinnings of all the arguments and exhibits submitted in his response, the court refused to consider his response. Typically, a court's order recites only those facts and arguments deemed relevant to the issues placed before it and necessary to the analysis of those issues. It is not a logical to infer that simply where the court did not outline all the exhibits and arguments set forth by plaintiff, that such exhibits and arguments were disregarded by the court.
Plaintiff also argues that language in the court's order provides evidence that the court improperly refused to examine his response and exhibits. Specifically, the court noted "[I]n his response (Doc. 27), plaintiff appears to ask the court to grant his motion to dismiss and summary judgment. No such motions are pending and even if they were pending, the court's ruling herein would render such motions moot." (Ct.'s order, at 16). The court's language does not give rise to the inference that the content of plaintiff's response (Doc. 27) was not considered by the court. Rather, it indicates that no separate motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment was pending by plaintiff at the time the court entered its decision. The court simply recognized that plaintiff had not filed a motion, separate from his response, asking the court to grant summary judgment in his favor. The court then noted that even if plaintiff had filed a separate motion requesting relief, because the court granted summary judgment to defendants, any separate motion requesting relief would have been moot.
The court directs plaintiff to that portion of the language cited above, wherein it recognizes that plaintiff filed a response. Specifically, the court noted, " [I]n his response (Doc. 27), plaintiff appears to ask the court to grant his motion to dismiss and summary judgment." This language indicates plaintiff's response was recognized and reviewed by the court.
The court notes that a review of the court's opinion evidences the court's consideration of plaintiff's response and exhibits. Absent such consideration, the court would not have been able to make the references made in its opinion. For example, the court notes in its statement of facts that "plaintiff provides a copy of the first page of a document entitled `Institution Supplement.'" (Ct.'s order, at 3). Without reviewing plaintiff's response, the court's reference would not have been feasible.
Accordingly, for the reasons noted herein, the court is unpersuaded by plaintiff's argument that the court failed to consider his response (Doc. 27) in reaching its decision on defendants' motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment.
Finally, the court notes that plaintiff asked the court to "[f]orward petitioner a more and complete `Clarification' of where in the law can petitioner locate the fact of law relied on by the court to support its ruling to refuse to examine all of the evidence petitioner presented in this matter before ruling in favor of defendants." The court finds plaintiff's request for clarification moot, where the court has established that it reviewed all evidence presented by plaintiff prior to issuing its order dismissing plaintiff's claims.
• Order
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (Doc. 33) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.