The court noted, however, that, analogously, certain types of indemnification agreements between a plaintiff and one of multiple co-defendants, as well as compensation agreements between a party and its expert witness, have both been deemed admissible by Pennsylvania courts as relevant impeachment evidence to show the bias of testifying witnesses. Polett, 83 A.3d at 224-25 (citing Hatfield v. Continental Imports, 530 Pa. 551 , 610 A.2d 446 (1992) (settlement agreement between one of multiple co-defendants and the plaintiff was relevant to show bias of settling defendant’s witnesses in favor of plaintiff, due to the fact that, *466 because of the agreement, defendant stood to financially benefit in the event of a larger plaintiffs verdict against co-defendant); Coward v. Owens-Corning, 729 A.2d 614 (Pa.Super.1999) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiff to cross-examine defendant’s expert witness on the amount of fees he received to give testimony on behalf of asbestos defendants and whether his opinions in the case in which he testified were affected by that compensation)). Further, the majority found guidance from an unpublished opinion of a federal magistrate judge for the District Court of New Jersey, AMEC Civil, LLC v. DMJM Harris, Inc., 2008 WL 8171059 , *2 (Dist.Ct.N.J.2008), in which that judge found that, because “settlement or tolling agreements can be used as impeachment evidence

In addressing a similar query, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court eloquently opined: "This Agreement, when viewed in its entirety, can hardly be described as a conclusive resolution or final disposition of the disputed matters between the plaintiffs and the original defendants. Rather, it is merely the first act in a two-act play, and matters between them will not be conclusively resolved or finally disposed until the final curtain has come down." Hatfield v. Continental Imports, Inc., 530 Pa. 551, 562, 610 A.2d 446, 451 (1992). There can be no question but that the agreement's purpose was to effect the settlement of some issues before the court, albeit conditional upon the outcome of the trial.

Brief for Appellant at 15. Particularly, Kirby cites Hatfield v. ContinentalImports, Inc., 530 Pa. 551, 610 A.2d 446 (1992), and asks this Court to determine "whether, under the Hatfield test, the [Settlement] Agreement is in fact a settlement or merely a Mary Carter type of agreement that settles nothing until the litigation between Kirby and Ragnar is forever put to an end by either settlement or a final judgment," Brief for Appellant at 15. Kirby further argues that "the trial court [does not] analyze or even acknowledge the existence of the applicable Hatfield decision[,]" and this provides a basis upon "which to conclude that the trial court failed to recognize the distinction between [the] Hatfield rule and the parol evidence rule."

First, the agreement in question cannot be characterized as a "Mary Carter Agreement." See Hatfield v. Continental Imports, Inc., 530 Pa. 551, 610 A.2d 446 (1992). Since Zimmerman was still liable for a claim of contribution, the agreement did not alter Zimmerman's "normal" interest such that he benefited by fostering Frey's case.

The term "Mary Carter agreement" refers not to the Mary Ward Carter whose estate is one of the plaintiffs in this matter, but to the case in which appeals of this type were first reviewed by an appellate court. See Hatfield v. Cont'l Imports, Inc., 530 Pa. 551, 554 n. 1, 610 A.2d 446, 447 (1992) [citing Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So.2d 8 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1967), overruled on other grounds in Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So.2d 385, 387 (Fla. 1973)]. At trial, the Kosmack Estates and National presented the testimony of an expert in highway design.

To implement this policy, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6141, which states: "[E]xcept in an action in which final settlement and release has been pleaded as a complete defense, any settlement . . . [of a personal injury claim] shall not be admissible in evidence on the trial of any matter." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6141(c); see also Hatfield v. Cont'l Imports, Inc., 610 A.2d 446, 452 n. 13 (Pa. 1992) (observing that § 6141(c) prohibits introduction of a settlement agreement reached between the plaintiff and a joint tortfeasor at the trial of the remaining tortfeasors). Although § 6141 is not binding on a federal district court sitting in diversity, see Chamberlainv.

(4) the agreement is "secret" in that there is an understanding that it will not be disclosed unless required by rules of court or a court of competent jurisdiction.Hatfield v. Continental Imports, Inc., 610 A.2d 446, 448-49 (Pa. 1992) (footnote omitted). In Hatfield, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not hold that "Mary Carter agreements" are void as against public policy, but held only that their existence should be disclosed to the jury at a trial to allow the trier of fact to take into consideration the possible bias of the agreeing defendant insofar as that party testifies in a manner adverse to the non-agreeing defendant.

For example, these agreements may be used to impeach the settling defendant if he testifies at trial, but are not permitted to be used for the purpose of proving liability or damages. See, e.g., Cal. Civil Proc. Code § 877.5 (Deering 2008); Stockstill v. C.F. Industries, Inc., 665 So. 2d 802, 812-13 (La.App. 1995), cert. denied, 669 So. 2d 428 (La. 1996); General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 Md. 714, 727-30, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980); Bedford School District v. Caron Construction Co., 116 N.H. 800, 804-806, 367 A.2d 1051 (1976); In the Matter of Eighth Judicial District Asbestos Litigation, supra, 723; Hatfield v. Continental Imports, Inc., 530 Pa. 551, 558-60, 610 A.2d 446 (1992). Dosdourian v. Carsten, supra, 624 So. 2d 246; Schwartz v. Eliades, 113 Nev. 586, 590-91, 939 P.2d 1034 (1997); Cox v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 594 P.2d 354, 359-60 (Okla.

However, once the intent of the General Assembly has been ascertained that intent cannot be ignored, rather, it must be given effect. Hatfield v. Continental Imports, Inc., 530 Pa. 551, 610 A.2d 446 (1992); Frontini v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 527 Pa. 448, 593 A.2d 410 (1991); 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). Without reference to the intent of this legislation the specific subsections that Appellant has been convicted under are difficult to comprehend.

Turning to an analysis of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6141, the clear and unambiguous words of Subsection (a) provide that settlement with or any payment to an injured person is not "an admission of liability by the person making the payment or on whose behalf the payment was made[ .]" 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6141(a) (bold added). SeeHatfield v. Continental Imports, Inc. , 530 Pa. 551, 610 A.2d 446, 451 (1992) (holding the rules of statutory construction are used to interpret Section 6141 ). In the case sub judice , there is no dispute that the "settlement" at issue (the workers' compensation compromise and release) was not made by Appellants, and Appellants were not in any way a party to the settlement.