Relevant evidence may be excluded where the prejudicial effect substantially outweighs the probative value. Hatchett v. W2X, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 121758, ¶ 20, 993 N.E.2d 944.¶ 76 The testimony Sarah sought to enter into evidence involved incidents from George's childhood, approximately 30 years before.
¶ 22 Paliatka argues that, notwithstanding the absence of a written instrument, he holds an equitable mortgage against the property. In support, he relies on Trustees of Zion Methodist Church v. Smith , 335 Ill. App. 233, 81 N.E.2d 649 (1948), and Hatchett v. W2X, Inc. , 2013 IL App (1st) 121758, 373 Ill.Dec. 385, 993 N.E.2d 944. His reliance is clearly misplaced as neither case stands for the proposition that an equitable mortgage can be enforced without a written instrument.
Id. Second, if the plaintiff presented some evidence on each element, the court must then consider and weigh the totality of the evidence presented, including evidence favorable to the defendant, to determine whether the prima facie case survives. Hatchett v. W2X, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 121758, ¶ 35, 373 Ill.Dec. 385, 993 N.E.2d 944. If the trial court finds that the plaintiff has failed to present a prima facie case as a matter of law, the appellate standard of review is de novo. Minch v. George, 395 Ill.App.3d 390, 398, 335 Ill.Dec. 105, 917 N.E.2d 1169 (2009). However, if the trial court moves on to consider the weight and quality of the evidence and finds that no prima facie case remains, the appellate standard of review is the “manifest weight of the evidence” standard.
Because Palmer premised his fraud claims on defendants' purported omissions, he was required to show that defendants had a special or fiduciary duty to Martha. See Hatchett v. W2X, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 121758, ¶ 62, 993 N.E.2d 944 (" 'The intentional omission or concealment of a material fact may be the basis of a fraud action if a special or fiduciary relationship exists which gives rise to the duty to speak.' ") (quoting State Security Insurance Co. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 258 Ill. App. 3d 588, 592, 630 N.E.2d 940, 943 (1994)). Relying, in part, on Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 374 F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 2004), Palmer contended that the aforementioned Good Samaritan exception imposed a duty upon defendants to ask Martha—the payee and purported endorser of the August 1988 check—about the validity of that instrument.
” Moreover, under “Relief sought from Reviewing Court” in the notice of appeal, defendant clearly states “vacate Oct. 10, 2012 order and dismiss entire foreclosure case.” Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(2) (eff. Sept. 1, 2006), when an appeal is taken from a specified judgment, the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review other judgments or parts of judgments not specified or inferred from the notice of appeal. See General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill.2d 163, 176, 351 Ill.Dec. 308, 950 N.E.2d 1136 (2011) (“[a] notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on a court of review to consider only the judgments or parts of judgments specified in the notice of appeal”); accord Hatchett v. W2X, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 121758, ¶ 26, 373 Ill.Dec. 385, 993 N.E.2d 944; see, e.g., In re J.P., 331 Ill.App.3d 220, 234, 264 Ill.Dec. 464, 770 N.E.2d 1160 (2002).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hatchett v. W2X, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 121758, ¶ 20, 373 Ill.Dec. 385, 993 N.E.2d 944. “It is the province of the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, and to decide the weight to be given to the witnesses' testimony.”
” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hatchett v. W2X, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 121758, ¶ 20, 373 Ill.Dec. 385, 993 N.E.2d 944. ¶ 79 Objector relies on People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park District, 66 Ill.2d 65, 80–81, 4 Ill.Dec. 660, 360 N.E.2d 773 (1976), and argues that the public trust doctrine applies to property set aside for the use of the public at large, and Scott stands for the proposition that financial benefits from the sale of land which is for public use are not sufficient reasons to sell it.
When the “common knowledge or experience of lay persons is extensive enough to recognize or infer negligence from the facts, or ... an attorney's negligence is so grossly apparent that a lay person would have no difficulty appraising it,” a plaintiff can proceed to trial without expert testimony. Hatchett v. W2X, Inc., 373 Ill.Dec. 385, 993 N.E.2d 944, 963 (Ill.App.Ct.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Ball v. Kotter, 723 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir.2013). The standard of care for accountants is established in the same manner as it is for attorneys—with expert testimony.
plaintiff can proceed to trial without expert testimony.” Hassebrock, 815 F.3d at 341 (quoting Hatchett v. W2X, Inc., 993 N.E.2d 944, 963 (Ill.App.Ct. 2013)). Illinois courts “have found the common knowledge exception to apply in cases where, for example, the attorney fails to comply with the statute of limitations or where the attorney fails to take any action whatsoever.
Helen Hatchett v. W2X, Inc.Lower Court: 2013 IL App (1st) 121758, 373 Ill.Dec. 385, 993 N.E.2d 944 Disposition: Denied.