Opinion
2002-08725
Submitted April 2, 2003.
May 5, 2003.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Dunn, J.), dated August 12, 2002, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d).
Kushel Horvat, Riverhead, N.Y. (David M. Reilly of counsel), for appellants.
Mallilo Grossman, Flushing, N.Y. (Francesco Pomara, Jr., of counsel), for respondent.
Before: DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, LEO F. McGINITY, SANDRA L. TOWNES, BARRY A. COZIER, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by submitting, among other things, the affirmations of their examining physicians, which indicated that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Kallicharan v. Sooknanan, 282 A.D.2d 573; Santoro v. Daniel, 276 A.D.2d 478). Thus, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to come forward with admissible evidence to raise a triable issue of fact (see Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955). The plaintiff met her burden of demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether she suffered a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 345).
RITTER, J.P., FEUERSTEIN, McGINITY, TOWNES and COZIER, JJ., concur.