Hastings v. Hastings

20 Citing cases

  1. Murphy v. Murphy

    248 Md. 455 (Md. 1968)   Cited 24 times
    In Murphy v. Murphy, 248 Md. 455, 237 A.2d 523 (1968), the Court was dealing with a single act of violence and held that the act was not of sufficient magnitude to constitute constructive desertion.

    And it is well settled that, ordinarily, a single act of violence does not constitute cruelty of treatment within the meaning of the law as a cause for a divorce a mensa. Porter v. Porter, 168 Md. 296, 177 A. 464; Hastings v. Hastings, 147 Md. 177, 181, 127 A. 743; Eberwein v. Eberwein, 193 Md. 95, 101, 65 A.2d 792; Elzey v. Elzey, 193 Md. 13, 19, 65 A.2d 563. In order to constitute cruelty of treatment, a single act of violence must indicate an intention to do serious bodily harm, or be of such a nature as to threaten serious danger in the future.

  2. Harrison v. Harrison

    223 Md. 422 (Md. 1960)   Cited 12 times
    In Harrison v. Harrison, 223 Md. 422, 164 A.2d 901 (1960), cited in Applegarth with approval and followed in that case, the husband had struck his wife, pushed her out of bed to the floor, beat her about the face, neck and upper part of her body. Her eyes were quite swollen, her nose bleeding and her lips were cut. She had a bump on the back of her head. Shortly after the attack, the wife left the home and spent the night with neighbors.

    And it is well settled that, ordinarily, a single act of violence does not constitute cruelty of treatment within the meaning of the law as a cause for a divorce a mensa. Porter v. Porter, 168 Md. 296, 177 A. 464; Hastings v. Hastings, 147 Md. 177, 181, 127 A. 743; Eberwein v. Eberwein, 193 Md. 95, 101, 65 A.2d 792; Elzey v. Elzey, 193 Md. 13, 19, 65 A.2d 563. In order to constitute cruelty of treatment, a single act of violence must indicate an intention to do serious bodily harm, or be of such a nature as to threaten serious danger in the future.

  3. Hockman v. Hockman

    41 A.2d 510 (Md. 1945)   Cited 11 times

    We consider that it is in the interest of public policy to permit a spouse to set up in defense of his or her separation such misconduct on the part of the other spouse as would render it impossible to continue the matrimonial cohabitation with self-respect, health and safety. Polley v. Polley, 128 Md. 60, 66, 97 A. 526; Hastings v. Hastings, 147 Md. 177, 127 A. 743. It was suggested by appellant that her husband "set the stage" for the separation because (1) he continued to pay rent for the apartment where they lived before she went to the hospital, as well as the new apartment, and (2) he was apparently satisfied when he found the apartment door locked. However, it is not necessary for a wife to show that her husband, in committing acts of cruelty, entertained any settled purpose to drive her away; it is sufficient if the separation was the natural consequence of his acts.

  4. Galvagna v. Galvagna

    10 Md. App. 697 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971)   Cited 2 times
    Holding that where a husband was verbally abusive to wife over the course of a 26-year marriage and hit wife one time, evidence was not sufficient to allow a limited divorce based on cruelty

    And it is well settled that, ordinarily, a single act of violence does not constitute cruelty of treatment within the meaning of the law as a cause for divorce a mensa. Porter v. Porter, 168 Md. 296, 177 A. 464; Hastings v. Hastings, 147 Md. 177, 181, 127 A.2d 743; Eberwein v. Eberwein, 193 Md. 95, 101, 65 A.2d 792; Elzey v. Elzey, 193 Md. 13, 19, 65 A.2d 563. In order to constitute cruelty of treatment, a single act of violence must indicate an intention to do serious bodily harm, or be of such a nature as to threaten serious danger in the future.

  5. Ballan v. Ballan

    251 Md. 737 (Md. 1969)   Cited 26 times
    In Ballan, marital relations had continued until January, 1967. The husband moved out of the marital abode on March 2, 1967.

    (Citing cases)" 193 Md. at 101, 102. To the same effect are Harrison v. Harrison, 223 Md. 422, 164 A.2d 901 (1960); Scheinin v. Scheinin, 200 Md. 282, 89 A.2d 609 (1952); Hastings v. Hastings, 147 Md. 177, 127 A. 743 (1925). There is a corollary to this proposition which is equally well recognized.

  6. Egress v. Egress

    97 A.2d 335 (Md. 1953)   Cited 3 times

    Even if it were entirely unprovoked and unexplained, the single beating of any consequence as to which there is corroboration falls far short of what the law of this State considers cruelty sufficient for a divorce or justification of the wife in living apart from her husband. Porter v. Porter, 168 Md. 296, 177 A. 464; Hastings v. Hastings, 147 Md. 177, 127 A. 743, and most recently, Elzey v. Elzey, 193 Md. 13, 65 A.2d 563; Eberwein v. Eberwein, 193 Md. 95, 65 A.2d 792. The record shows, however, that for some months before the separation the wife was neglecting her home and children, associating with the man with whom she formerly worked, and when her husband reproved her she threatened to give him a "hard time". Not unnaturally her conduct created suspicion in the husband's mind and when he voiced his thoughts she taunted him and defied him.

  7. Scheinin v. Scheinin

    200 Md. 282 (Md. 1952)   Cited 35 times
    In Scheinin, the wife filed for a limited divorce after the husband invited his secretary, with whom he appeared to be conducting an affair, to live with them, and then kicked the wife out of the bedroom.

    Porter v. Porter, 168 Md. 296, 177 A. 464; Hyatt v. Hyatt, 173 Md. 693, 196 A. 317; Miller v. Miller, 185 Md. 79, 42 A.2d 915; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 199 Md. 594, 599, 87 A.2d 604, 606. Ordinarily a single act of violence slight in character does not constitute cruelty of treatment as a cause for divorce. Hoshall v. Hoshall, 51 Md. 72, 34 Am. Rep. 298; Goodhues v. Goodhues, 90 Md. 292, 44 A. 990; Gellar v. Gellar, 159 Md. 236, 150 A. 717. But it is now accepted in Maryland, as well as generally throughout the country, that a single act may be sufficient to constitute the basis for a divorce on the ground of cruelty, if it indicates an intention to do serious bodily harm or is of such a character as to threaten serious danger in the future. Hastings v. Hastings, 147 Md. 177, 181, 127 A. 743; Crabtree v. Crabtree, 154 Ark. 401, 242 S.W. 804, 24 A.L.R. 912, 918. In both England and the United States the modern decisions have broadened the definition of "cruelty."

  8. Sullivan v. Sullivan

    87 A.2d 604 (Md. 1952)   Cited 11 times

    We are unwilling to reverse that part of the decree which grants the divorce to defendant. We have always adhered to the rule that sallies of passion, rudeness, and the use of abusive and profane language do not constitute cruelty as a ground for divorce. Hastings v. Hastings, 147 Md. 177, 181, 127 A. 743; Short v. Short, 151 Md. 444, 135 A. 176; McKane v. McKane, 152 Md. 515, 137 A. 288; Wendel v. Wendel, 154 Md. 11, 139 A. 573; Bonwit v. Bonwit, 169 Md. 189, 181 A. 237; Faulkner v. Faulkner, 176 Md. 692, 4 A.2d 117. Although there were a number of altercations when complainant slapped and kicked at her husband and he fought back, it is significant that in 1948 she dismissed her first suit for divorce and returned to her husband and resumed cohabitation, and in 1949 she dismissed her second suit and again returned to her husband and resumed cohabitation. It is a settled rule in Maryland that a wife, by returning to her husband's home and living with him after the dismissal of her first suit for divorce on the ground of cruelty, condones his cruelty prior to that time, but his subsequent cruelty revives the previous offenses. Collins v. Collins, 184 Md. 655, 42 A.2d 680; Sensabaugh v. Sensabaugh, 186 Md. 348, 46 A.2d 635; Robertson v. Robertson, 187 Md. 560, 51 A.2d 73.

  9. Cullotta v. Cullotta

    193 Md. 374 (Md. 1949)   Cited 36 times
    In Cullotta v. Cullotta, 193 Md. 374, 384, we said: "Before us are four infant children, all under the age of ten years.

    Fischer v. Fischer, 182 Md. 281, 292, 34 A.2d 455; Collins v. Collins, 184 Md. 655, 663, 42 A.2d 680. To justify one spouse in leaving the other, the misconduct of the other spouse must be such as to render it impossible for the party who leaves the other to continue the matrimonial cohabitation with health, safety and self-respect. Hastings v. Hastings, 147 Md. 177, 127 A. 743; Brault v. Brault, 189 Md. 175, 180, 55 A.2d 497, 499; Geisey v. Geisey, 190 Md. 618, 626-627, 59 A.2d 319, 323. The appellant claims that he did not run his wife out of the house on September 11, 1948, and lock the door so she could not return and that there is no corroboration of this fact. It was said by this Court in the very recent case of Maranto v. Maranto, decided February 9, 1949, 192 Md. 214, 64 A.2d 144: "The principal object of the statutory requirement of corroboration, Code, Art. 35, ยง 4, is to prevent collusion, and when the possibility of collusion is precluded, the corroboration need be but slight.

  10. Eberwein v. Eberwein

    65 A.2d 792 (Md. 1949)   Cited 21 times
    In Eberwein, supra, the wife accused her father-in-law of attacks on her on 14 occasions; accused her husband and her mother-in-law, who were post office employees, of stealing from the mails, with the result that they lost their jobs; and accused her husband of stealing from supermarkets.

    Fischer v. Fischer, 182 Md. 281, 292, 34 A.2d 171; Collins v. Collins, 184 Md. 655, 663, 42 A.2d 680. To justify separation the misconduct of the other spouse must be such as would render it impossible for the party who leaves the other to continue the matrimonial cohabitation with safety, health and self-respect. Hastings v. Hastings, 147 Md. 177, 127 A. 743; Brault v. Brault, 189 Md. 175, 55 A. 497, 499. There is no claim in this case that the appellant is not responsible or that she is mentally impaired. The evidence in this case in the opinion of this Court is such as to show that the husband could not with safety to his health and with self-respect continue to live with his wife. It is difficult to understand why a wife would openly and groundlessly accuse her husband of lying and stealing.