Opinion
No. 2-17-0141
10-27-2017
SOPHIA HASTINGS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF NAPERVILLE COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT 203, Defendant-Appellee.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County.
No. 2016-MR-1350
Honorable Bonnie M. Wheaton Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McLaren and Schostok concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err in dismissing teacher's claims regarding paid sick leave because contractual remedies were not exhausted.
¶ 2 Plaintiff, Sophia Hastings, a teacher who gave birth during the summer recess, wished to stay home to care for her newborn at the start of the 2016-2017 school year. She asked defendant, the Board of Education of Naperville Community Unit School District 203 (the District), to use 30 days of her accumulated, paid sick leave. The Board denied the request.
¶ 3 At the District's suggestion, plaintiff took leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) (5 U.S.C. § 6381 et seq. (2006)), but she also filed a three-count complaint in the trial court to establish her right to compensation as if she had used paid sick leave instead. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice on the ground that plaintiff had prematurely filed suit before exhausting her contractual remedies under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the District and the Naperville Unit Education Association (the Association), which was representing plaintiff. We affirm.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 On October 11, 2016, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging the following facts, most of which are undisputed. Plaintiff has been employed as a full time teacher since the 2011-2012 school year. Plaintiff had accumulated 35 unused sick days by the end of the 2015-2016 school year, and she was awarded an additional 15 sick days at the start of the 2016-2017 school year.
¶ 6 On May 17, 2016, and June 3, 2016, as plaintiff's due date approached, she contacted the District's human resources department, to discuss taking leave at the beginning of the 2016-2017 school year. The District twice denied plaintiff's requests to use accumulated sick leave following the birth of her child. The District provided documentation for plaintiff to apply for unpaid leave pursuant to the FMLA.
¶ 7 Plaintiff gave birth on June 14, 2016. Independent of her right to paid sick leave, plaintiff requested and received 12 weeks' of unpaid leave under the FMLA from August 15, 2016, to November 7, 2016. The District declined to pay plaintiff for 30 accumulated sick leave days beginning on August 15, 2016, which allegedly amount to wages of $8,202.
¶ 8 The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that she had a right under section 24-6 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/24-6 (West 2016)) "to use and be paid for 30 days of accrued sick
leave for the birth of her child with no need to provide medical certification that she had a personal illness." The complaint also requested attorney fees under section 1 of the Illinois Attorneys Fees in Wage Actions Act (Wage Act) (705 ILCS 225/1 (West 2016)) and section 14(a) of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collections Act (Collections Act) (802 ILCS 115/14(a) (West 2016)).
¶ 9 On November 17, 2016, the District filed a combined motion to dismiss under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2016)). The District argued that the dispute had arisen under the CBA and was subject to contractual grievance and arbitration provisions, and therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction and the entire complaint must be dismissed under section 2-619. The District alternatively argued for dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim under section 2-615 on the grounds that (1) plaintiff is not entitled to extra compensation under section 24-6 of the School Code, (2) plaintiff did not lose any accumulated sick leave to which she is entitled under section 24-6, and (3) plaintiff and the Association were actually seeking an advisory opinion to establish a teacher's right, under section 24-6, to 30 days' paid parental leave to be used at the teacher's discretion, upon the birth of each child, regardless of when the birth occurs. Finally, the District argued that the two statutory claims for attorney fees must be dismissed under section 2-615 for failure to state a claim because the underlying wage claim lacks merit.
¶ 10 On February 21, 2017, the trial court dismissed the entire complaint with prejudice. The court made the following observations and findings:
"Article 7 of the contract has five pages of verbiage relating to sick leave, family leave, [and] long-term disability. I think it's exhaustively covered.
And this is a negotiated contract. I believe that [the District] is correct that this is a dispute which should be subject to the provisions of arbitration and that claim should be made for adjudication in that forum.
At the risk of giving an advisory opinion, I believe that the interpretation of the statute by the plaintiff is not correct. I think the provisions have to be read in pari materia that any reasonable interpretation is that they - sick leave that is granted has to follow the event in a time that is proximate to the event and cannot be delayed. I think that plaintiff is reading into the statute something that is not there."
* * *
In addition, I think the plaintiff has not been deprived of anything to which she is entitled. She still has all of her sick time and none of that has been used, so she's certainly entitled to use that for an appropriate event."
¶ 11 Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal on the same day that the court entered its order.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 A. Standard of Review
¶ 14 Plaintiff appeals the involuntary dismissal of her claims for declaratory judgment and statutory attorney fees. The District moved to dismiss the complaint under section 2-619.1 of the Code, which permits a party to file a motion to dismiss that combines a motion on the pleadings under section 2-615 and a motion for involuntary dismissal under section 2-619. 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2016). A motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint by alleging that it fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 201 Ill. 2d 134, 147 (2002). In contrast, a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code admits the legal sufficiency of the
complaint, but raises a defense that allegedly defeats the complaint. Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 31.
¶ 15 The District cited subsections 2-619(a)(1) and (a)(9), which allow involuntary dismissal where the trial court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter and the claim is barred by affirmative matter, respectively. The District argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispute because it is governed by the parties' CBA and is subject to its grievance and arbitration provisions.
¶ 16 When we review motions filed pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code, we accept all well-pleaded facts as true as well as all reasonable inferences that arise from them. Patrick Engineering, 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 31. However, we will disregard all legal and factual conclusions in the complaint that are not supported by specific factual allegations. Patrick Engineering, 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 31. We review de novo a circuit court's decision on a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 or 2-619 of the Code. Patrick Engineering, 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 31.
¶ 17 Section 2-701 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) provides that a circuit court may, "in cases of actual controversy, make binding declarations of rights, having the force of final judgments." 735 ILCS 5/2-701 (West 2016). The declaratory judgment statute is liberally construed and should not be restricted by unduly technical interpretations, but its application must still follow the general rule that a court may not pass judgment on mere abstract propositions of law, render advisory opinions, or give legal advice as to future events. Babbitt Municipalities, Inc. v. Health Care Service Corp., 2016 IL App (1st) 152662, ¶ 43. Declaratory relief is proper only if there is an actual legal controversy between the parties in that " 'there is a concrete dispute admitting of an immediate and definite determination of the parties' rights, the
resolution of which will aid in the termination of the controversy or some part thereof.' " Babbitt Municipalities, 2016 IL App (1st) 152662, ¶ 43 (quoting Underground Contractors Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 371, 375 (1977)).
¶ 18 Plaintiff argues that the order of dismissal must be reversed because (1) there is no basis for dismissing the complaint for failure to exhaust the grievance procedure in the CBA; (2) independent of the CBA, section 24-6 of the School Code entitled plaintiff to use 30 days' accumulated sick leave at the beginning of the 2016-2017 school year; and (3) contrary to the trial court's observation, plaintiff was harmed by the denial of her right to use her accumulated sick leave. Plaintiff does not separately advocate for her statutory attorney fees, apparently conceding that those claims are viable only if her underlying wage action potentially has merit.
¶ 19 B. Contractual Remedies
¶ 20 We agree with the District that plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim lacks merit because she failed to exhaust her contractual remedies. Article 7 of the CBA governs various types of leave from employment, including sick leave, long term disability, personal leave, and parental leave. Section 7.1(C) provides that "[s]ick leave shall be interpreted to mean personal illness, quarantine at home, or serious illness or death in the immediate family or household (as defined by The School Code). Sick leave shall not be granted for procedures, which in the opinion of the teacher's physician may be deferred to a recess or vacation period. As used herein, 'serious illness' shall mean a medical emergency or a threat to the life of the family member."
¶ 21 Section 7.3(C) provides that an employee shall be eligible for "maternity/child-rearing leave" without pay or other benefits and that "[s]ick leave shall not be applicable during the period of the maternity/child-rearing leave. Any accumulated sick leave available at the
commencement of the leave shall be available to the employee upon return to employment in the District."
¶ 22 In turn, Article 8 of the CBA prescribes a grievance procedure to resolve "any differences with respect to the interpretation" of the CBA. Section 8.2(A) defines grievance as "any claim by the Association or an employee that there has been a violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of this agreement." Section 8.4 sets forth a four-step procedure for hearing the grievance. Step 1 requires "every reasonable effort shall be made to resolve any potential grievance through informal discussion with the immediate supervisor and/or administrator whose determination or conduct is in question." Step 2 provides that, "[i]f the grievance cannot be resolved informally, the aggrieved may file the grievance in writing with his/her principal," who shall then convene a meeting with the aggrieved and issue a written response. If the grievance has not been satisfactorily resolved at the second step, Step 3 allows the aggrieved to file a copy of the grievance with the Superintendent, who shall convene a meeting to resolve the grievance. Finally, Step 4 provides that, "[i]f the grievance is not resolved satisfactorily, the Association may refer the grievance to arbitration by giving written notice to the Superintendent within fifteen (15) days of the Step 3 answer."
¶ 23 When a CBA provides for a grievance procedure and arbitration as a means for settling disputes, those procedures are the exclusive method to redress violations of that agreement. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 308 v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2012 IL App (1st) 112517, ¶ 17. Recourse to a lawsuit is not available until those procedures have been exhausted. Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 IL App (1st) 112517, ¶ 17; 5 ILCS 315/16 (West 2016) ("[a]fter the exhaustion of *** any procedures mandated by a collective bargaining agreement, suits for violation of agreements *** between a public employer and a labor organization
representing public employees may be brought by the parties to such agreement in the circuit court in the county in which the public employer transacts business or has its principal office"). If a union does not exhaust its contractual remedies under the CBA prior to bringing a state court claim, a circuit court must dismiss the claim. Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 IL App (1st) 112517, ¶ 17.
¶ 24 Plaintiff concedes that she did not pursue the four-step grievance procedure set forth in the CBA. But she argues that the doctrine of exhaustion does not apply because her claim could not have been brought under a contractual provision. Plaintiff accurately points out that only "grievances" are subject to arbitration, and any claims that are not covered by the agreement may be pursued in the circuit court. Amalgamated Transit Worker's Union v. Pace Suburban Bus Div. of Regional Transportation Authority, 407 Ill. App. 3d 55, 58 (2011) (citing Kostecki v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., of Illinois, 361 Ill. App. 3d 362, 369-70 (2005). However, section 7.1 of the CBA defines sick leave and sets forth when it may be taken, while section 7.3 governs "maternity/child-rearing leave" and provides that sick leave may not be used during that time. To suggest that these provisions do not cover a teacher's request to take paid sick leave instead of unpaid maternity leave is disingenuous at best. Simply omitting any mention of the CBA in the complaint did not elevate plaintiff's claim to an extra-contractual cause of action that could be pursued in the trial court without an exhaustion of remedies under the CBA.
¶ 25 Plaintiff argues for reversal because "the District failed to identify any specific provision in the CBA which [plaintiff] could have relied on to base a claim that the District violated a contractual right when it denied her request to use accumulated paid sick leave for 30 days for the birth of her child." (Emphasis added.) In other words, plaintiff faults the District for not helping her frame her argument in terms of the CBA, which the District need not do for an
involuntary dismissal. Plaintiff concludes that the dispute is not "grievable" because "there is no provision that grants paid sick leave for 30 days in connection with childbirth." Plaintiff conflates the issues of whether her claim is governed by the CBA and whether the terms of the CBA entitle her to relief.
¶ 26 Before filing this action, plaintiff should have pursued her grievance under the terms of the CBA to resolve the dispute over the interpretation of sections 7.1 and 7.3. Perhaps plaintiff's decision not to file a grievance is based on her assessment that the CBA does not entitle her to use sick leave under these circumstances, but we express no opinion regarding the merit of her underlying claim. We conclude that plaintiff's failure to exhaust her contractual remedies supports the involuntary dismissal of her declaratory judgment claim and the related claims for statutory attorney fees.
¶ 27 Finally, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in determining that her claim under section 24-6 of the School Code lacks merit and that she suffered no harm because there was no depletion of her accumulated sick leave. Since we hold that plaintiff's failure to exhaust her contractual remedies renders her complaint premature, we need not consider these issues.
¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 29 For the preceding reasons, we affirm the involuntary dismissal of plaintiff's three-count complaint.
¶ 30 Affirmed.