Opinion
G055120
06-06-2018
In re Marriage of MARK F. HASSMAN and SARA HASSMAN. MARK HASSMAN, Respondent, v. SARA HASSMAN, Appellant.
Mark Hassman, in pro. per., for Respondent. Sara Hassman, in pro. per., for Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 09D002792) OPINION Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Claudia Silbar, Judge. Affirmed. Mark Hassman, in pro. per., for Respondent. Sara Hassman, in pro. per., for Appellant.
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Sara Hassman appeals from an order granting her ex-husband Mark Hassman's request for renewal of a Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) restraining order under Family Code section 6345, subdivision (a) (all further statutory references are to the Family Code, unless otherwise indicated). Finding no error, we affirm.
For ease of reference, we refer to the parties by their first names and intend no disrespect.
FACTS
Sara and Mark divorced in 2010. Beginning in 2009, Mark was granted several temporary domestic violence restraining orders against Sara. At one point, Mark agreed to a stay-away order to help Sara get a job. Sara violated the stay-away order several times. In June 2011, the trial court granted a one-year domestic violence restraining order against Sara (restraining order) in favor of Mark. During this same time period, Mark's new wife, Mikel, also obtained a three-year domestic violence restraining order against Sara.
In July 2012, the trial court renewed the restraining order for a period of five years, expiring July 11, 2017. The restraining order directed Sara not to harass, follow, stalk, or keep Mark under surveillance. It also ordered Sara to stay at least 100 yards away from Mark at all times. It was properly served on Sara at her home on July 18, 2012. Between 2009 and 2012, there were at least seven restraining orders and one stay-away order issued in favor of Mark, Mikel, and the Hassman children. During this same timeframe, Sara initiated dozens of lawsuits against Mark and many others, which resulted in her being designated a vexatious litigant in September 2016.
While Sara is a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order, she sought and obtained permission to file the current appeal from the presiding justice of this court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 391.7, subd. (a).)
In late 2016, Mark petitioned the court for an order of contempt after two purported violations of the restraining order. Mark alleged Sara ran towards him and Mikel outside the Orange County Superior Court and violated the 100-yard stay-away order (count 1) and posted photos and information about him on her website (count 2). Mark testified he saw something in Sara's hand and was fearful it might be a weapon. It turned out to be a cell phone. Sara came within several yards of Mark and Mikel and took their picture, which she later published on her website.
The trial court found Sara guilty of only count 1. The court determined Sara violated the restraining order by "running toward [Mark]" and "turning and following [Mark] and taking a picture."
In April 2017, Mark filed a request to renew the restraining order. In support of his request to renew, Mark filed a declaration stating he was "fearful of what [Sara] may do when my current restraining order terminates . . . [Sara] has a history over the past eight (8) years of volatile behavior and violent acts . . . ." The trial court found "reasonable and probable fear from [Mark] of future events of harassment or domestic violence" and initially extended the restraining order for 10 years. Upon Mark's oral motion, the court renewed the restraining order for 15 years. The court also granted Mark's oral request to include Mikel in the order.
DISCUSSION
We note that even though Sara represents herself, she has the same burden to demonstrate reversible error as she would if she were represented by counsel. (Stebley v. Litton Loan Servicing, LLP (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 522, 524.) Sara's opening brief is at times difficult to understand, and she often fails to support legal arguments with appropriate analysis that applies legal authority to the facts of her case. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115-1116.) Notwithstanding these procedural issues, Sara appears to argue the trial court abused its discretion by granting Mark's renewal request under the DVPA. (§ 6200 et seq.) She also contends the trial court abused its discretion by granting Mark's oral motions to extend the restraining order to 15 years and to include his current spouse. Her arguments are without merit.
We review a trial court's ruling on a request to renew a domestic violence restraining order for an abuse of discretion. (Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319, 333.) An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling exceeds the bounds of reason. (Ibid.)
The purpose of the DVPA "is to prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence." (§ 6220.) The DVPA's definition of abuse includes engaging "in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320." (§ 6203, subd. (a)(4).) Section 6320 allows the court to enjoin physical and sexual assault, as well as "stalking, threatening . . . harassing, telephoning . . . either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, . . . or disturbing the peace of the other party." (§ 6320 , subd. (a).) Pursuant to section 6320, the abuse need not rise to the level of physical injury; the section also applies to several types of nonviolent conduct. (Id.) "[T]he plain meaning of the phrase 'disturbing the peace of the other party' in section 6320 may be properly understood as conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party." (In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497.)
Section 6345, subdivision (a), provides for a renewal of a domestic violence restraining order "[i]n the discretion of the court." The section further provides that "orders may be renewed, upon the request of a party, either for five years or permanently, without a showing of any further abuse since the issuance of the original order, subject to termination or modification by further order of the court either on written stipulation filed with the court or on the motion of a party." (§ 6345, subd. (a).)
For renewal requests, "[t]he key consideration for the court is not the type or timing of abuse, but whether the protected party has a reasonable fear of future abuse. 'A trial court should renew the protective order, if, and only if, it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the protected party entertains a "reasonable apprehension" of future abuse.'" (Perez v. Torres-Hernandez (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 389, 397.)
The record demonstrates the trial court applied the correct legal standard in exercising its discretion to grant Mark's renewal request. The court considered evidence of Sara's long history of harassment and her 2016 contempt of court conviction for violating the restraining order. The court determined there was "reasonable and probable fear from [Sara] of future events, harassment and/or domestic violence." The court clarified anyone that lives with Mark is covered by the restraining order, but granted Mark's oral motion to specifically name Mikel as a protected party. We find no error.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Mark is awarded his costs on appeal.
GOETHALS, J. WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J. ARONSON, J.