Hassett v. Palmer

42 Citing cases

  1. Higgins v. Connecticut Light Power Co.

    129 Conn. 606 (Conn. 1943)   Cited 86 times
    In Higgins v. Connecticut Light Power Co., 129 Conn. 606, 611, 30 A.2d 388 (1943), the court held that "if the annoyance is one that is common to the public generally then it is a public nuisance.... The test is not the number of persons annoyed, but the possibility of annoyance to the public by the invasion of its rights.

    A public nuisance is one that injures the citizens generally who may be so circumstanced as to come within its influence." Nolan v. New Britain, 69 Conn. 668, 678, 38 A. 703; Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 476, 12 A.2d 646; Croughwell v. Chase Brass Copper Co., 128 Conn. 110, 112, 20 A.2d 619. The rule is well established, based upon reason and applicable to the instant case.

  2. Doe One v. Oliver

    2004 Ct. Sup. 12172 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004)

    A condition is not a nuisance as a matter of law where the "danger would only exist as a result of an unusual combination of circumstances contributing to the result." Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 476, 12 A.2d 646 (1940); Heritage Village Master Assn., Inc. v. Heritage Village Water Co., supra, 30 Conn.App. 709. For these counts, the plaintiffs for these counts rely on the same facts as their negligence counts.

  3. Anchundia v. Northeast Utilities Service Company

    CV 07-4446 (AKT) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010)

    "There are two necessary elements to a claim of negligence per se. First, the plaintiff must be in the class of persons for whose benefit the statute was enacted." Law v. Camp, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 303; Innis Arden Golf Club v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (D. Conn. 2007) ("requirement that negligence per se actions be based on a clear statutory standard of behavior aimed at individuals"); Hassett v. Palmer, 12 A.2d 646 (Conn. 1940) (the inquiry is whether the defendants were guilty of a breach of duty in failing to provide safeguards to prevent the injuries suffered by the plaintiff). "Second, the plaintiff must prove that the violation of the statute, that is, the breach of duty imposed by the statute, was a proximate cause of the injury."

  4. Law v. Camp.

    116 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Conn. 2000)   Cited 15 times
    Collecting Connecticut cases and discussing expert testimony requirement for medical malpractice claims

    In determining the first element, the inquiry is whether the defendants were guilty of a breach of duty in failing to provide safeguards to prevent the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. See Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 12 A.2d 646 (1940). Contrary to Law's argument, there is nothing to support his claim that ยง 19a-504a establishes a legislative standard of care that in all instances governs the medical determination of brain death or a duty of care regarding the removal of life support systems.

  5. Ganim v. Smith Wesson Corp.

    258 Conn. 313 (Conn. 2001)   Cited 258 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the Mayor and City of Bridgeport do not have standing to sue handgun manufacturers for harm to the city

    A public nuisance is one that injures the citizens generally who may be so circumstanced as to come within its influence. Nolan v. New Britain, 69 Conn. 668, 678, 38 A. 703; Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 476, 12 A.2d 646; Croughwell v. Chase Brass Copper Co., 128 Conn. 110, 112, 20 A.2d 619." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

  6. Gore v. People's Savings Bank

    235 Conn. 360 (Conn. 1995)   Cited 228 times
    Upholding negligence per se action for violation of lead-paint standards based on legislative history and implicit intent of statute

    'First, the plaintiff must be within the class of persons protected by the statute. [ Coughlin v. Peters, 153 Conn. 99, 101, 214 A.2d 127 (1965)]; Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 473, 12 A.2d 646; Monroe v. Hartford Street Ry. Co., 76 Conn. 201, 207, 56 A. 498. Second, the injury must be of the type which the statute was intended to prevent.

  7. Doe v. Manheimer

    212 Conn. 748 (Conn. 1989)   Cited 234 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that criminal attack on plaintiff was superseding cause of plaintiff's injuries notwithstanding plaintiff's claim that defendant's allowed overgrowth of vegetation on property where attack occurred was substantial factor in both occurrence and duration of attack

    `First, the plaintiff must be within the class of persons protected by statute. [Coughlin v. Peters, 153 Conn. 99, 101, 214 A.2d 121 (1965)]: Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 473, 12 A.2d 646 [1940]; .Monroe v, Hartford Street Ry. Co., 76 Conn. 201, 207, 56 A. 498 [1903]. Second, the injury must be of the type which the statute was intended to prevent.

  8. Berchtold v. Maggi

    191 Conn. 266 (Conn. 1983)   Cited 65 times
    In Berchtold v. Maggi, 191 Conn. 266, 464 A.2d 1 (1983) the defendant moved for judgment of dismissal under ยง 302 after the plaintiff rested.

    "First, the plaintiff must be within the class of persons protected by the statute. [Coughlin v. Peters, 153 Conn. 99, 101, 214 A.2d 127 (1965)]; Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 473, 12 A.2d 646; Monroe v. Hartford Street Ry. Co., 76 Conn. 201, 207, 56 A. 498. Second, the injury must be of the type which the statute was intended to prevent. Toomey v. Danaher, 161 Conn. 204, 212, 286 A.2d 293; Longstean v. McCaffrey's Sons, 95 Conn. 486, 493, 111 A. 788. See Prosser, Torts (4th Ed.) 36; Restatement (Second), 2 Torts 286, 288.

  9. State v. Christian

    189 Conn. 35 (Conn. 1983)   Cited 5 times
    In State v. Christian, 189 Conn. 35, 454 A.2d 262 (1983), the defendant, ostensibly a resident of Canada, was stopped on Interstate 95 in Milford for speeding.

    This finding makes it clear that he is in no position to claim the benefit of 1004, which is limited to residents of this state and of no-bail compact jurisdictions. Wright v. Brown, 167 Conn. 464, 468, 356 A.2d 176 (1975); Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 473, 12 A.2d 646 (1940) (a party must be within the class of persons protected by a statute to claim a violation of a statutory duty). Our conclusion that the arrest of the defendant was lawful imports that his motion to suppress was properly denied.

  10. Nally v. Charbonneau

    169 Conn. 50 (Conn. 1975)   Cited 15 times

    The defense of assumption of risk is applicable when a person knows or as a reasonable person should know that in pursuing a certain course he will expose himself to the risk of injury, comprehends or ought as a reasonable person to comprehend the nature and extent of the risk and voluntarily subjects himself to it. He thus assumes the risk and cannot recover damages resulting from it. Meyers v. Paro Realty Mortgage Co., 128 Conn. 249, 251. 21 A.2d 379; Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 477, 12 A.2d 646; Restatement, 2 Torts 463. The plaintiff may not foresee the exact manner by which injury may ensue but he must know and comprehend that the peril exists. The jury could reasonably have concluded from the evidence as indicated in the claims of proof that the information imparted to the plaintiff by the defendant, together with the plaintiff's inspection of the braking system, furnished him with sufficient knowledge to conclude that the car was practically without a braking system.