A public nuisance is one that injures the citizens generally who may be so circumstanced as to come within its influence." Nolan v. New Britain, 69 Conn. 668, 678, 38 A. 703; Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 476, 12 A.2d 646; Croughwell v. Chase Brass Copper Co., 128 Conn. 110, 112, 20 A.2d 619. The rule is well established, based upon reason and applicable to the instant case.
A condition is not a nuisance as a matter of law where the "danger would only exist as a result of an unusual combination of circumstances contributing to the result." Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 476, 12 A.2d 646 (1940); Heritage Village Master Assn., Inc. v. Heritage Village Water Co., supra, 30 Conn.App. 709. For these counts, the plaintiffs for these counts rely on the same facts as their negligence counts.
"There are two necessary elements to a claim of negligence per se. First, the plaintiff must be in the class of persons for whose benefit the statute was enacted." Law v. Camp, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 303; Innis Arden Golf Club v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (D. Conn. 2007) ("requirement that negligence per se actions be based on a clear statutory standard of behavior aimed at individuals"); Hassett v. Palmer, 12 A.2d 646 (Conn. 1940) (the inquiry is whether the defendants were guilty of a breach of duty in failing to provide safeguards to prevent the injuries suffered by the plaintiff). "Second, the plaintiff must prove that the violation of the statute, that is, the breach of duty imposed by the statute, was a proximate cause of the injury."
In determining the first element, the inquiry is whether the defendants were guilty of a breach of duty in failing to provide safeguards to prevent the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. See Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 12 A.2d 646 (1940). Contrary to Law's argument, there is nothing to support his claim that ยง 19a-504a establishes a legislative standard of care that in all instances governs the medical determination of brain death or a duty of care regarding the removal of life support systems.
A public nuisance is one that injures the citizens generally who may be so circumstanced as to come within its influence. Nolan v. New Britain, 69 Conn. 668, 678, 38 A. 703; Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 476, 12 A.2d 646; Croughwell v. Chase Brass Copper Co., 128 Conn. 110, 112, 20 A.2d 619." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
'First, the plaintiff must be within the class of persons protected by the statute. [ Coughlin v. Peters, 153 Conn. 99, 101, 214 A.2d 127 (1965)]; Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 473, 12 A.2d 646; Monroe v. Hartford Street Ry. Co., 76 Conn. 201, 207, 56 A. 498. Second, the injury must be of the type which the statute was intended to prevent.
`First, the plaintiff must be within the class of persons protected by statute. [Coughlin v. Peters, 153 Conn. 99, 101, 214 A.2d 121 (1965)]: Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 473, 12 A.2d 646 [1940]; .Monroe v, Hartford Street Ry. Co., 76 Conn. 201, 207, 56 A. 498 [1903]. Second, the injury must be of the type which the statute was intended to prevent.
"First, the plaintiff must be within the class of persons protected by the statute. [Coughlin v. Peters, 153 Conn. 99, 101, 214 A.2d 127 (1965)]; Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 473, 12 A.2d 646; Monroe v. Hartford Street Ry. Co., 76 Conn. 201, 207, 56 A. 498. Second, the injury must be of the type which the statute was intended to prevent. Toomey v. Danaher, 161 Conn. 204, 212, 286 A.2d 293; Longstean v. McCaffrey's Sons, 95 Conn. 486, 493, 111 A. 788. See Prosser, Torts (4th Ed.) 36; Restatement (Second), 2 Torts 286, 288.
This finding makes it clear that he is in no position to claim the benefit of 1004, which is limited to residents of this state and of no-bail compact jurisdictions. Wright v. Brown, 167 Conn. 464, 468, 356 A.2d 176 (1975); Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 473, 12 A.2d 646 (1940) (a party must be within the class of persons protected by a statute to claim a violation of a statutory duty). Our conclusion that the arrest of the defendant was lawful imports that his motion to suppress was properly denied.
The defense of assumption of risk is applicable when a person knows or as a reasonable person should know that in pursuing a certain course he will expose himself to the risk of injury, comprehends or ought as a reasonable person to comprehend the nature and extent of the risk and voluntarily subjects himself to it. He thus assumes the risk and cannot recover damages resulting from it. Meyers v. Paro Realty Mortgage Co., 128 Conn. 249, 251. 21 A.2d 379; Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 477, 12 A.2d 646; Restatement, 2 Torts 463. The plaintiff may not foresee the exact manner by which injury may ensue but he must know and comprehend that the peril exists. The jury could reasonably have concluded from the evidence as indicated in the claims of proof that the information imparted to the plaintiff by the defendant, together with the plaintiff's inspection of the braking system, furnished him with sufficient knowledge to conclude that the car was practically without a braking system.