Opinion
Civil Action 22 CV 4030
11-17-2022
WALID HASSAN PLAINTIFF v. THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AND THE CITY OF NEW YORK DEFENDANTS
EDGARDO RAMOS, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiffs reply to defendant's opposition letter (ECF No. 18) Plaintiffs request his motion for Monell discovery (ECF No.17) to be construed as a letter for a pre-motion conference rather than a direct motion
Your Honor:
I, Walid Hassan, the plaintiff in the above-referenced matter
1. Prior to the defendant letter in apposition on Monell Discovery motion (ECF No. 18), Plaintiff was not aware of FRCP 37.2 and individual practices of Judge Edgardo Ramos, section 2(A)(i), which require the moving party to request informal conference with the court before filling a motion in respect to 26(b)(1), as a result, Plaintiffs requests his motion for Monell discovery to be construed as a letter for a pre-motion conference on Monell discovery, with consideration that any potential motion on Monell discovery is not limited to the discovery requested and mentioned in plaintiffs letter (ECF No. 17)
2. Plaintiffs claims are not time-barred, on July 27, 2015 plaintiff was falsely arrested and falsely imprisoned, and maliciously prosecuted by the defendants, on May 24, 2019 this criminal action and all criminal charges were dismissed as was mentioned in the amended complaint (ECF NO. 10).
a. In respect to malicious prosecution claim, plaintiff has initiated this action on May 17, 2022 before the period of 3 years statute of limitations has
elapsed from the termination of the criminal charges on May 24, 2019, therefore this claim is not time-barred
b. In respect to the false arrest and false imprisonment claim that was initiated on May 17, 2022, plaintiff did not initiate this claims within 3 years normal statute of limitations, however as the plaintiff explained in his amended complaint (ECF No. 10, paragraph 27, page 5-6) that the 3 years statute of limitations for this claim started on May 24, 2019, therefore this claim is not time-barred, same as malicious prosecution claim.
3. Under Rule 26(b), "[a] district court has latitude to determine the scope of discovery." In re Agent Orange Prod, Liability Litig., 517 F.3d 76, 103 (2d Cir. 2008). Courts utilize this broad discretion to ensure that each party is" afforded meaningful opportunity to establish the facts necessary to support his claim." In re Agent Orange Prod. Liability litig.,517 F.3d at 103 (citing Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793, 795 (2d Cir. 1985)). Indeed, the very purpose of discovery for all claims "is to provide both parties with information essential to proper litigation of all the facts ." Spencer v. International Shoppes, Inc., 2011 wL 3625582, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.Aug. 16, 2011) (quoting Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 173 F.R.D.356.361 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)). As the "right of Litigants to discover and present relevant evidence in civil litigations is given great weight in federal court" Apicella v. McNeil Labs., 66 F.R.D. 78, 82(E.D.N.Y.1975)).
For all the reasons states above, Plaintiff request this Honorable Court to construe his motion on Monell discovery (ECF No. 17) as a letter for a pre-motion conference rather than direct motion
Certification: I, Walid Hassan, the Plaintiff in this action, being duly sworn, deposes and says that: I affirm under penalty of perjury under the law of the United States of America that all the above statements to be true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
Plaintiff's request for a pre-motion conference to obtain leave to file a motion to compel discovery is denied. Plaintiff is directed to file a Second Amended Complaint, or to inform the Court of his intention not to do so, by December 9, 2022. At that time, Plaintiff may renew his request for a pre-motion conference. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate Doc. 17 from the docket and to send a copy of this order to Plaintiff.
IT SO ORDERED.