Haslauer v. Robins

10 Citing cases

  1. Rockland Exposition, Inc. v. Great American Assur

    746 F. Supp. 2d 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)   Cited 45 times   1 Legal Analyses

    There is language in several other cases, however, suggesting that, under New York law, an insurer only waives a late notice defense where it denies a claim solely on the ground that it is not covered by the policy, without mentioning the late notice defense. See, e.g., Rock Transp. Props. Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 433 F.2d 152, 153 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding that, because the defendant "specifically disclaimed liability under the policies on the sole ground" that damage resulted from normal wear and tear, the defendant "waived the notice requirement" (emphasis added)); In re Balfour Maclaine Int'l Ltd., 873 F. Supp. 862, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[E]ven if [the defendant's] late-notice defense has merit, we find that [it] waived this defense by failing to include it in its original declaratory judgment complaint. . . ."); Haslauer v. N. Country Adironack Co-op. Ins. Co., 654 N.Y.S.2d 447, 448 (App. Div. 1997) (finding that because defendant's "disclaimer was based solely on an alleged lack of coverage," it "waived the defenses of late notice or illegality" (emphasis added)); Ehrlich ex rel. Williams v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 463 N.Y.S.2d 934, 938 (App. Div. 1983) (finding that insurer refused to pay insured " solely upon the ground of lack of coverage and thereby waiv[ed] its affirmative defense of late notice" (emphasis added)); Gen. Accident Ins. Group v. Cirucci, 403 N.Y.S.2d 773, 773 (App. Div. 1978) ("[Insurer,] in its original letter of disclaimer, failed to assert the alleged unreasonable delay . . . in giving notice of the occurrence.

  2. One Beacon Ins. v. Travelers Prop

    51 A.D.3d 1198 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)   Cited 6 times

    Even though Pike's notices of claim were late, we agree with Supreme Court that the disclaimers are untimely as a matter of law and Great American cannot deny coverage based upon late notice ( see First Fin. Ins. Co. v Jetco Contr. Corp., 1 NY3d 64, 70; Matter of Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v Steiner, 199 AD2d 507, 508; Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. [Merrill], 192 AD2d 824, 825). In any event, Great American's failure to specifically disclaim upon the basis of Pike's late notice further precludes it from raising lateness as a defense to Pike's claim under its policies ( see General Ace. Ins. Group v Cirucci, 46 NY2d 862, 864; Haslauer v North Country Adirondack Coop. Ins. Co., 237 AD2d 673, 674). Great American's remaining arguments have been reviewed and found to be unavailing.

  3. Viking Pump v. Liberty Mutual Ins.

    C.A. No. 1465-VCS (Del. Ch. Apr. 13, 2007)   Cited 2 times

    Beem, 652 F.2d at 666 (quotation omitted).E.g., Haslauer v. North Country Adironack Co-op. Ins. Co., 654 N.Y.S.2d 447, 448 (App.Div. 1997). I also reject all of Liberty's arguments to the extent they are based on the principle that the doctrines of waiver and estoppel may not be used to create or extend insurance coverage where none originally existed.

  4. Viking Pump v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.

    C.A. No. 1465-VCS (Del. Ch. Apr. 2, 2007)   Cited 28 times
    Finding that the parties' "practical course of dealing reflect[ed] a reasonable reading of the [agreement at issue], and [was] the best evidence of the original intent of the parties"

    Beem, 652 F.2d at 666 (quotation omitted).E.g., Haslauer v. North Country Adironack Co-op. Ins. Co., 654 N.Y.S.2d 447, 448 (App.Div. 1997). I also reject all of Liberty's arguments to the extent they are based on the principle that the doctrines of waiver and estoppel may not be used to create or extend insurance coverage where none originally existed.

  5. Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Jiminez

    7 A.D.3d 652 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)   Cited 18 times
    Finding reasonable a 27–day delay in disclaiming coverage

    The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied the separate cross motions of Jiminez and the Alvarezes for summary judgment. A "reservation of rights" letter does not constitute an effective notice of disclaimer ( see Hartford Ins. Co. v. County of Nassau, 46 N.Y.2d 1028; Haslauer v. North Country Adirondack Coop. Ins. Co., 237 A.D.2d 673; Matter of Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. Rosen, 205 A.D.2d 684). Here, however, the plaintiff's letter dated February 6, 2001, specifically disclaimed coverage and sufficiently informed the defendants that the disclaimer was based on the Alvarezes' failure to give timely notice of the occurrence.

  6. Kokonis v. Hanover Insurance Co.

    279 A.D.2d 868 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 10 times

    However, for the first time, it asserted "further support" for its disclaimer, namely, that a particular policy exclusion also precluded coverage. By failing to include this exclusion as a ground for disclaimer in the original disclaimer letter, Hanover waived any defense based on the exclusion (see, Agoado Realty Corp. v. United Intl. Ins. Co., 260 A.D.2d 112, 118, mod 95 N.Y.2d 141; Haslauer v. North Country Adirondack Coop. Ins. Co., 237 A.D.2d 673, 674-675; Cain v. Allstate Ins. Co., 234 A.D.2d 775, 776; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Moon, 89 A.D.2d 804, 806; see also, General Acc. Ins. Group v. Cirucci, 46 N.Y.2d 862, 864).

  7. Agoado Realty v. United International Ins. Co.

    260 A.D.2d 112 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 6 times

    Therefore, the statute applies here. Case law interpreting § 3420(d) has consistently held that when an insurer denies coverage on a specific ground, it is estopped from later asserting other grounds, not previously specified, for denying coverage (Haslauer v. North Country Adirondack Co-op. Ins. Co., 237 A.D.2d 673, 674; Aguirre v. City of New York, 214 A.D.2d 692, 694). Therefore, the insurer waived its right to rely on the exclusion pertaining to "expected or intended" injury by its failure to invoke this policy provision in its original notice of disclaimer.

  8. Primavera v. Rose Kiernan, Inc.

    248 A.D.2d 842 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 28 times
    Finding insured totally disabled due to heart condition where he had specified “partner-managing” for accounting firm as his occupation, and concluding “[t]he fact that plaintiff may still have been able to perform the duties of an accountant does not ... compel a contrary conclusion since a broad construction of the term ‘occupation’ is neither fair nor reasonable under these particular circumstances”

    Supreme Court denied all motions and these appeals ensued. Initially, it is well settled that resolution of the rights and liabilities of parties to an insurance contract is a question of law for a court to determine based upon the specific provisions of the policy at issue, unless the terms of the policy are ambiguous and require consideration of extrinsic evidence as an aid to construction (see, State of New York v. Home Indem. Co., 66 N.Y.2d 669, 671; Hartford Acc. Indem. Co. v. Wesolowski, 33 N.Y.2d 169, 172). If, however, extrinsic evidence does not resolve the ambiguity, the interpretation of the ambiguous contract terms remains a question of law for the court (see, State of New York v. Home Indem. Co., supra, at 671). Courts have consistently construed ambiguous policy provisions in favor of coverage and against the insurer who drafted the policy (see, Breed v. Insurance Co., 46 N.Y.2d 351, 353; Randolph v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 242 A.D.2d 889; Haslauer v. North Country Adirondack Coop. Ins. Co., 237 A.D.2d 673, 675). In order for the insurer to prevail, it must demonstrate not only that its interpretation is reasonable but that it is the only fair interpretation (see, Jadwiga Realty v. General Acc. Ins. Co., 232 A.D.2d 831, 832).

  9. Mundell v. Nationwide Insurance Companies

    181 Misc. 2d 475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999)

    This Court finds that the Defendant waived its right to assert the "business pursuits" exclusion, by failing to notify the plaintiffs of such defense in a timely manner. General Accident Insurance Group v. Cirucci, 46 N.Y.2d 862, 864 (1979);Haslauer v. North County Adirondack Cooperative Insurance Company, 237 A.D.2d 673, 674 (3d Dept., 1997) It is noted the Defendant did not attempt to assert this defense until more than a year past its original denial and have offered no rationale for the delay in alleging such exclusion upon this motion. Since the Plaintiffs have no burden to show prejudice to them (Allstate Insurance Co. v. Gross, 27 N.Y.2d 263, 269 (1970)), there is no bona fide issue requiring a trial.

  10. Mundell v. Nationwide Ins.

    181 Misc. 2d 475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999)

    This court finds that the defendant waived its right to assert the "business pursuits" exclusion by failing to notify the plaintiffs of such defense in a timely manner. (General Acc. Ins. Group v Cirucci, 46 NY2d 862, 864 [1979]; Haslauer v North Country Adirondack Coop. Ins. Co., 237 AD2d 673, 674 [3d Dept 1997].) It is noted the defendant did not attempt to assert this defense until more than a year past its original denial and has offered no rationale for the delay in alleging such exclusion upon this motion.