Opinion
1:2 2-CV-00036-SPB-RAL
06-14-2024
JAMES MELVILLE HASKIN, Petitioner v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al., Respondents
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
ECFNO. 4
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the petition for habeas corpus, ECF No. 4, be denied and that no certificate of appealability issue.
II. Report
A. Procedural history
Before the Court is a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner James Melville Haskin pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 4. At the time that he filed this petition, Petitioner was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest, serving a sentence of imprisonment imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County, Pennsylvania.
A review of the record and the criminal docket sheet for Petitioner's underlying convictions in Commonwealth v. Haskin, Nos. CP-61-CR-00388-2017 and CP-61-CR-00161-2018, reveals the following relevant facts. A jury in Venango County found Petitioner guilty of Failing to Register as a Sex Offender in Case No. CP-61-CR-00388-2017 on November 13, 2017. ECF No. 4 at 1. After failing to appear at sentencing, Petitioner was arrested and charged with Flight to Avoid Apprehension at Case No. CP-61-CR-00161-2018 on April 10,2018. ECF No. 21 at 17. Petitioner pled guilty to the Flight to Avoid Apprehension charge on April 12, 2018, id. at 18, and was sentenced on both charges on June 18, 2018. Id. at 10. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.
On April 5, 2019, Petitioner filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et seq. Id. at 55. After obtaining counsel, he filed a supplemental petition on February 13, 2020. Id. at 80. On October 1, 2020, the PCRA court granted relief and vacated the conviction at CP-6 l-CR-003 88-2017. Id. at 93. However, the Court took no action on the conviction at CP-61 -CR-00161 -2018. Id.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on October 20, 2020, arguing that the Flight to Avoid Apprehension conviction should also be vacated. Id. at 94. Following a hearing, the PCRA court denied Petitioner's motion on May 12,2021, noting that it lacked merit and amounted to an untimely second PCRA petition. Id. at 97. Petitioner did not appeal.
The instant petition was lodged on February 1, 2022. ECF No. 1. Respondents filed a response on September 16, 2022. ECF No. 21. The petition is now ripe for review.
B. Analysis
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a one-year limitations period for state prisoners seeking federal habeas review. It is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and provides:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of -
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this section.28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
In analyzing whether a petition for writ of habeas corpus has been timely filed under the one-year limitations period, a federal court must undertake a three-part inquiry. First, the court must determine the “trigger date” for the one-year limitations period pursuant to section 2244(d)(1). Caldwell v. Mahally, etal., 2019 WL 5741706, *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 5,2019). Second, the court must determine whether any “properly filed” applications for post-conviction or collateral relief were pending during the limitations period that would toll the statute pursuant to section 2244(d)(2). Id. at *6. Third, the court must determine whether any of the other statutory exceptions or equitable tolling should be applied on the facts presented. Id. at *8.
Turning first to the “trigger date,” Petitioner's judgment of sentence became final on or about July 18, 2018, at the expiration of the time for filing a direct appeal from the judgment of sentence. Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 419 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review). Unless he can demonstrate that he is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling, the statute of limitations for Petitioner to file a timely habeas petition expired one year later, on July 18, 2019.
Section 2244(d)(2) provides that the one-year limitations period is tolled during the pendency of a “properly filed” state post-conviction proceeding. Petitioner filed his PCRA petition on April 5, 2019, at which time 262 days of his one-year limitations period had expired. Those proceedings were “properly filed,” and, thus, tolled the statute of limitations until they were concluded (at the latest) on June 12, 2021, when the time for Petitioner to appeal the denial of his motion for reconsideration expired. Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); Swartz, 204 F.3d at 420-21. At that time, Petitioner had 103 days remaining (365 days minus 262 days) in which to file his federal habeas petition. His petition, placed in the prison mailbox on January 28, 2022, missed that mark by four months.
It is unclear whether the “motion for reconsideration” filed by Petitioner tolled the statute of limitations given that the PCRA court construed it as an untimely second PCRA petition. However, since the instant § 2254 Petition is untimely under either calculation, the Court need not address this question.
Before dismissing the petition as untimely, the Court must consider whether AEDPA's statute of limitations should be equitably tolled. See Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2002), cert, denied, 540 U.S. 826 (2003) (citing sources omitted). To receive the benefit of equitable tolling, Petitioner must demonstrate that he: (1) pursued his rights diligently, and (2) extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing a timely petition. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). Petitioner bears a “strong burden to show specific facts” supporting equitable tolling. Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 928 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Brown v. Barrow, 512 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008)). See also Martin v. Adm'r N.J State Prison, 23 F.4th 261, 272 (3d Cir. 2022) (noting that federal courts are to use equitable tolling sparingly and do so “only in the rare situation where [it] is demanded by sound legal principles as well as the interests of justice.”) (quoting LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 275 (3d Cir. 2005)).
Because Petitioner did not file a traverse, he has not made any explicit attempt to meet this burden. The Court notes, however, that Petitioner consistently alleges throughout his Petition that his trial counsel failed to file a direct appeal. See, generally, ECF No. 4. It is unclear how this prevented him from filing a timely petition. However, even if counsel's failure to file a direct appeal could be characterized as sufficiently “extraordinary” to have prevented Petitioner from filing a timely petition, he has failed to establish that he pursued his rights diligently. As noted by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, “a finding that attorney malfeasance is an extraordinary circumstance, without more, is not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling.” Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 77 (3d Cir. 2004). See also LaCava, 398 F.3d at 278 (noting that “attorney error, miscalculation, inadequate research, or other mistakes have not been found to rise to the ‘extraordinary' circumstances required for equitable tolling” in non-capital cases). Rather, the petitioner must also demonstrate that he exercised “due diligence in pursuing the matter under the specific circumstances he faced.” Id. (citing Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2003)). Petitioner has not offered any explanation for the delay in filing his Petition or described any steps he took to diligently pursue his federal claims.
In short, Petitioner has failed to establish that this case presents the rare situation where equitable tolling is demanded by sound legal principles and the interests of justice. Accordingly, equitable tolling should not be applied. Thus, the petition is untimely and should be denied on that basis.
C. Certificate of Appealability
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 codified standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition. It provides that “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from ... the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). It also provides that “[a] certificate of appealability may issue ... only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Applying that standard here, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether Petitioner's claims should be denied as untimely. Accordingly, no certificate of appealability should issue.
III. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).