Opinion
CV-14-12
10-28-2016
DAWN H. HASKELL, MARTIN W. WITHAM, Plaintiffs, v. DONALD R. YORK, JR., DONALD R, YORK, SR.5 BRENDA YORK, TORIE M. YORK, DESIREE JEAN YORK, and GROVER BRAGG, JR., Defendants.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Hon. Robert Murray Justice.
Plaintiffs, Dawn H. Haskell and Martin W. Witham, filed their Complaint with the Court on March 10, 2014. On June 17, 2014, Plaintiffs' request for a default was entered against Defendant, Grover Bragg. Prior to trial the plaintiff dismissed the claims asserted against defendants Donald York Sr, Desiree Jean York, Brenda York and Torie York.
On June 17, 2016, this Court held a hearing on damages, where Plaintiffs sought: compensatory damages from both Defendants, Mr. Bragg and Mr. York, Jr., for Plaintiffs' property damage and medical bills; damages from both Mr. Bragg and Mr. York, Jr. for Plaintiffs' pain and suffering; punitive damages from only Mr. York, Jr. for his outrageous conduct; and prejudgment and postjudgment interest. Defendant, Donald York, Jr. was present at the hearing, but presented no evidence on his behalf. Defendant, Grover Bragg, contends that, despite the default entered against him, he was entitled to present evidence and argue at the damages hearing issues relating to (1) causation and (2) the plaintiffs' comparative negligence. Defendant Bragg also argues that the amount of any prejudgment interest that Plaintiffs may be entitled to should be reduced. The Court discusses Mr. Bragg's claims below.
BACKGROUND
In the early morning of March 27, 2013, Plaintiffs were suddenly awakened by the sound of their windows breaking and someone yelling "get out of bed!" Donald York, Jr. was under the influence of some combination of intoxicants. He thought that his dead friend, Jared, was in Plaintiffs' home, and he was trying to get inside. Ms. Haskell called the police, while her boyfriend, Mr. Witham, went outside to see what was going on. By then, Mr. York had returned to his vehicle, which was driven by Mr. Bragg. Mr. Witham stood in front of the vehicle and refused to let them leave until the police arrived.
A short time later, Mr. York ran from the vehicle and jumped through the kitchen window of Plaintiffs' home. Mr. York then began to destroy Plaintiffs' furniture, television, walls, and other items in their home. Ms. Haskell, who was in the home at the time and on the phone with the police, ran and hid inside her garage.
Mr. Witham lured Mr. York outside of the home and away from Ms. Haskell, but was severely beaten by Mr. York and left incapacitated, bleeding, and in the snow. Mr. York then went back inside the home, and Ms. Haskell fled outside and attempted to aid Mr. Witham. Soon thereafter, Mr. York's family arrived and coaxed him out of the house and into their car.
Earlier that evening, Mr. York became intoxicated while in the home of Mr. Bragg. Mr. York woke Mr. Bragg up around 2:30 a.m., and claimed lo have seen his dead friend Jared, who Mr. Bragg knew was dead. Mr. Bragg was worried that Mr. York was a danger to himself, to the people in his home, and to his personal property. Rather than calling the authorities for assistance, Mr. Bragg decided to drive Mr. York somewhere away from his own home. While they were driving, Mr. York told him to go down what was Plaintiffs' road, because he had seen Jared there. Mr. Bragg complied and Mr. York then got out of the car, started yelling, and began breaking Plaintiffs' windows.
As a result of the defendants' conduct, the plaintiffs suffered extensive property damage, physical and emotional injuries, and considerable pain and suffering. Specifically, the evidence indicates the property damage described above totaled $9,093.50. Medical expenses incurred as a result of the injuries suffered on March 27, 2013 totaled $18,978.14. Each of the plaintiffs directly experienced significant trauma stemming from the events of March 27, 2013 which were caused by the defendants. The conduct by Defendant York, Jr., in particular, was so extreme and outrageous, this Court finds that punitive damages against him are warranted.
DISCUSSION
A. Carnation
1. Mr. Bragg is Not Entitled to Litigate Causation
M.R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) provides in relevant part: "If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to cany it into effect, it is necessary. . . to determine the amount of damages, the court may conduct such hearings. . . as it deems necessary." When a default is entered against a defendant, the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint are deemed to be true and are treated as findings of fact. McAlister v. Slosberg, 658 A.2d 658, 660 (Me. 1995).
Here, Plaintiffs' Complaint stated, "Each of the Defendants was aware of and assisted Defendant York, Jr. in reaching that level of intoxication, and permitted and/or assisted his transportation to the Plaintiffs1 home, despite their awareness of the danger he presented to Plaintiffs and others in his state of intoxication." (Pls.' Comp. ¶ 22.) The Complaint further states, "Each of the Defendants, by and through their actions, was negligent and through their negligence caused Plaintiff to suffer and continue to suffer pain, medical bills, lost earnings, and lost earning capacity." (Id. ¶ 25.) The entry of default against Defendant Bragg was never set aside.
When the default was entered against Mr. Bragg, these allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint were deemed to be true and are treated as findings of fact. Accordingly, and specifically, this Court finds Mr. Bragg was aware of and assisted Mr. York in becoming intoxicated; Mr. Bragg transported Mr. York to Plaintiffs home; and Mr. Bragg was negligent and through his negligence caused Plaintiffs' damages. Mr. Bragg is not entitled to challenge these previously established findings in the context of the June 17, 2016 damages hearing.
B. Comparative Negligence
1. Mr. Bragg can Introduce Evidence of Plaintiff's Comparative Negligence
Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Bragg is precluded by the default from presenting evidence of Plaintiffs' comparative negligence at the damages hearing. However, in Maine, the default establishes only liability, and the defendant may still be allowed to present evidence of comparitive negligence at the damages hearing. Edwards v. Eastman Outdoors, inc. (In re Game Tracker, Inc.), 799 F.Supp.2d 102, 108 (D. Me. 2011); see also Jackson v. Federick's Motor Inn, 418 A.2d 168, 172-74 (Me. 1980) (Stating that there are two separate and distinct phases of a tort related case. The first being the liability phase and the second being the damages phase.) The "Act. entitled comparative negligence, demands from the jury that the respective fault of the parlies be compared both in the liability phase of the process as well as in the apportionment-of-the-damages phase, but under different microscopic lenses." Jackson, 418 A.2d at 173.
In this case, a default was entered against Mr. Bragg. This established liability only, and Mr. Bragg is not precluded from presenting evidence of comparilive negligence at the damages hearing. Any such evidence would not be for the purpose of challenging the liability against Mr. Bragg which was established by the entry of the default, but only for the purpose of possibly reducing the total damages to the extent deemed just and equitable giving regard to the plaintiffs' share in the responsibility for the damages.
2. Plaintiffs Were Not Negligent
The Maine Comparative Negligence Act provides in relevant part:
When any person suffers death or damage as a result partly of that person's own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that death or damage may not be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof must be reduced to such extent as the jury thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the damage.14 M.R.S.A. § 156 (2003). For two separate and distinct reasons, this court concludes that these plaintiffs were not negligent. First, the evidence presented at the damages hearing does not suggest to this court that the plaintiffs* conduct on the night of March 27, 2013 was in any way negligent. Second, Plaintiffs' Complaint states, "At all times pertinent to this Complaint, Plaintiffs were in exercise of due care." (Pls.' Compl. ¶ 24.) When Mr. Bragg defaulted, the allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint were deemed to be true and, correspondingly, were treated as findings of fact. McAlisler, 658 A, 2d at 660. Therefore, as a matter of fact, Plaintiffs were at all times in the exercise of due care.
C. Notice of Claims
The Maine prejudgment interest statute provides in relevant part:
Prejudgment interest accrues from the time of notice of claim setting forth under oath the cause of action, served personally or by registered or certified mail upon the defendant until the date on which an order of judgment is entered. if a notice of claim has not been given to the defendant, prejudgment interest accrues from the date on which the complaint is filed. If the prevailing part}' at any time requests and obtains a continuance for a period in excess of 30 days, interest is suspended for the duration of the continuance.14 M.R.S. § 1602-R (2016).
Mr. Bragg argues that Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim exhibit did not include his signature indicating that it had been received. Mr. Bragg also argues that since the trial was scheduled for February 24, 2016, and Plaintiffs requested, and were granted, a continuance until June 17, 2016, that prejudgment interest should be suspended for the period of the continuance. Plaintiffs' argue that Mr. Bragg's default established that his Notice of Claim was adequately served.
The statute requires that notice of claim be either served personally on the defendant or by registered or certified mail. The evidence shows that on June 17, 2013, Notice of Claim was sent to Mr. Bragg by certified mail, and that Mr. Bragg did not claim the letter. Therefore, Mr. Bragg was not effectively served with his Notice of Claim, and under the statute, the prejudgment interest will accrue from March 10, 2014, the date the Complaint was filed.
Plaintiffs twice requested a continuance of the trial: first on January 29, 2016, which was granted until the next available trial date; the second was on March 11, 2016, and requested a continuance for various dates in April, which the Court granted. This case was eventually scheduled for trial on June 17, 2016. Under 14 M.R.S. § 1602-B, Plaintiffs are not entitled to interest during their continuance. Based on these facts, Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest beginning on March 10, 2014, through the date of this judgment, except that Plaintiffs are not entitled to interest from February 22, 2016, to June 17, 2016.
CONCLUSION
Based on a careful review of the evidence and the parties' submissions, the Court finds that both Defendants, Donald R. York Jr. and Grover Bragg, are jointly and severally liable for the full amount of Plaintiffs' compensatory damages and damages for pain and suffering resulting from the defendants' negligence. In addition, Mr. York, Jr. is liable for punitive damages based on his outrageous conduct. The specific damages established by the evidence include:
1) Property damages in the amount of $9,093.50;
2) Medical expenses in the amount of $18,978.14;
3) Pain and suffering in the amount of $200,000 for each Plaintiff; and
4) Punitive damages in the amount of $250,000 for each Plaintiff.
Accordingly, Judgment is to be entered as follows:
1) As to Count I, Judgment in favor of both Plaintiffs in the total amount of $428,071.64 plus interest and costs in accordance with the discussion above. Defendants York, Jr. and Bragg are jointly and severally liable for the Judgment in this Count.
2) As to Counts II through V, Judgment in favor of both Plaintiffs and against only Defendant York, Jr. in the total amount noted above, plus interest and costs.
3) As to Count VI, Judgment in favor of both Plaintiffs and against only Defendant York, Jr. in the total additional amount of $500,000 plus interest and costs.
The Clerk is directed to incorporate this Decision and Judgment, by reference, in accordance with MRCivP 79(a).