Opinion
HHDCV175045594S
11-05-2018
Marcus T. Harvin v. Yale New Haven Health et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Budzik, Matthew J., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Budzik, J.
Defendants Lawrence and Memorial Hospital (L&M) and Yale New Haven Health/Northeast Medical Group (YNHH) move to strike plaintiff Marcus Harvin’s ten-count Amended Complaint in its entirety. Mr. Harvin proceeds pro se. The court grants defendants’ motion in part and denies it in part as follows. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants defendants’ motion to strike Counts Three, Four, Five, Six, Nine and Ten. The court also strikes that portion of plaintiff’s Prayer for Relief seeking punitive damages because there is no legal basis for that relief based on the allegations of the Amended Complaint. The court denies defendants’ motion to strike as to Counts One, Two, Seven, and Eight.
FACTS
For purposes of deciding this motion to strike, the court takes the following relevant allegations as true.
L&M is a hospital that maintains confidential health records. Am. Compl. at ¶1. YNHH is the parent corporation of L&M. Id. at ¶2. The disclosure of confidential health records is prohibited by state and federal law and YNHH internal procedures. Id. at ¶2. On or about August 14, 2015, L&M disclosed records of a May 25, 2014, psychiatric evaluation of Mr. Harvin by L&M to the Office of the Chief States’ Attorney at G.A. 10 in New London. Id. at ¶4. On February 25, 2016, nurse Laura Arre, an employee of L&M, testified as to her treatment conversations and diagnosis of Mr. Harvin at Mr. Harvin’s criminal trial. Id. at ¶6. On February 29, 2016, Dr. Bernard Ferguson, an employee of L&M, testified extensively as to Mr. Harvin’s diagnosis and X-Ray results at Mr. Harvin’s criminal trial. Id. at ¶7. Each of these disclosures of Mr. Harvin’s confidential medical information and records was without Mr. Harvin’s consent. Id. at ¶9. On the basis of these essential allegations, Mr. Harvin asserts claims against both L&M and YNHH for Negligence Per Se (Counts One and Two), Negligence (Counts Three and Four), Negligent Supervision and Training (Counts Five and Six), Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Counts Seven and Eight), and Invasion of Privacy (Counts Nine and Ten). Mr. Harvin seeks compensatory damages and punitive damages. See Relief Requested.
LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). A motion to strike requires no factual findings by the trial court. Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227 (2016). If the facts provable in the complaint support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied. Id. All well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted when deciding a motion to strike. Id. In ruling on a motion to strike, the court examines the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 117, 19 A.3d (2011). The pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically. Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., supra, 322 Conn. 398. In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint. Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). The practice book allows for a motion to strike directed toward a claim for relief if the relief sought cannot be legally awarded. Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 325, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).
ANALYSIS
Defendants first move to strike all claims against YNHH because although Mr. Harvin has alleged YNHH is the parent corporation of L&M, Mr. Harvin has not alleged that YNHH was the parent corporation of L&M at the time of the incidents Mr. Harvin complains of and nor could he because YNHH did not acquire L&M until September 8, 2016. See Mem. in Support of Mot. to Strike at 4. Defendants essentially ask the court to take judicial notice of the date of YNHH’s acquisition of L&M and what rights ended or came into being on that date. The court declines to do so. While such a defense may be appropriate on a motion for summary judgment, the court is generally confined to the pleadings on a motion to strike. A court may take judicial notice of certain undisputed facts, but the effective date of a large corporate merger and what legal rights and duties may have ended or come into existence on what dates (particularly based on a citation to news articles and websites; see id. at 4, n.1.) does not fit within that narrow category. The court construes Mr. Harvin’s allegations realistically and in a manner favorable to Mr. Harvin, as it is required to do, and concludes that Mr. Harvin has sufficiently alleged, for purposes of surviving a motion to strike, that YNHH was the parent corporation of L&M at the time of the events complained of.
The court addresses the remainder of defendants’ arguments seriatim.
Count One
Defendants ask the court to strike specific factual allegations of the Amended Complaint referencing YNHH’s policies and procedures and certain statutory provisions the defendants assert are inapplicable to Mr. Harvin’s claim. See Mem in Supp. of Mot. to Strike at 5-8. The court denies this portion of defendants’ motion. Although, defendants correctly argue that some courts have allowed parties to strike a specific paragraph within a count where that paragraph alleges a separate and complete cause of action; see Dumas v. Price Chopper, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV-09-5004896-S (March 31, 2010, Riley, J.); such is not the case here. Paragraph 14(A) of the First Count alleges several statutory and other bases (General Statutes § § 52-146d, 52-146e(a), 52-146o(a), "HIPPA" section 164.512(e), and YNHH Administrative Policy CC:P-13) for Mr. Harvin’s negligence claim. Therefore, neatly excising only certain claims from that paragraph would not dispose of any separate claim and discrete cause of action. For example, defendants do not move to strike Mr. Harvin’s reference to General Statutes 52-146e(a), which is also part of Paragraph 14(A), and thus that allegation would remain in Paragraph 14(A) even if the court were inclined to grant defendants’ motion.
Count Two
Defendants seek to strike Count Two alleging negligence per se against YNHH because Count Two makes allegations only against L&M and its employees and does not allege any conduct by YNHH or its agents or employees. That is incorrect. Count Two expressly alleges "[t]he acts and omissions of Defendant, "YNHH," by and through its employees, agents ..." Count Two at ¶14. Defendants’ motion to strike Count Two is denied.
Counts Three and Four
Defendants move to strike Counts Three and Four alleging negligence against L&M and YNHH because Mr. Harvin has alleged no physical injuries resulting from the alleged negligence of the defendants. While Mr. Harvin alleges several emotional injuries in paragraph 13 of Count Three, he does not allege any physical injury. The court grants defendants’ motion to strike Counts Three and Four on the basis of the analysis contained in Fisher v. Yale University, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. X10 NNH-CV-04-4003207-S (February 8, 2006, Munro, J.) (40 Conn.L.Rptr. 726) and Malloy v. Sally Beauty Supply, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-16-6027295-S (January 5, 2017, Vacchelli, J.) (63 Conn.L.Rptr. 680), which the court adopts here.
The court notes that Mr. Harvin alleges a "loss of liberty" in paragraph 13 of Count Three, which the court interprets as a reference to the allegation that Mr. Harvin was incarcerated after his criminal trial. While being in prison is physical in nature in that one’s body is moved and held against one’s will, the court holds that is not the type of "physical injury" contemplated by the relevant case law.
Counts Five and Six
Defendants move to strike Counts Five and Six alleging negligent supervision and training against L&M and YNHH because Mr. Harvin has failed to allege an essential element of that claim that L&M and YNHH "knew or should have known" that Nurse Arre and Dr. Ferguson had a propensity to improperly disclose patients’ confidential medical information. See Seda v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-07-5010811 (April 8, 2008, Elgo, J.). Because Mr. Harvin fails to allege this essential element of a negligent supervision claim, the court grants defendant’s motion to strike Counts Five and Six.
Counts Seven and Eight
Defendants move to strike Counts Seven and Eight alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress against L&M and YNHH on the ground that Mr. Harvin has failed to allege sufficient facts from which the court can infer that it was foreseeable that the defendants’ claimed actions would cause Mr. Harvin severe emotional distress. Mr. Harvin alleges that Nurse Arre and Dr. Ferguson disclosed his psychiatric records and diagnosis in open court and that this disclosure contributed to Mr. Harvin’s subsequent incarceration. See Am. Compl. ¶¶6-9, 13. Leaving aside the issue of whether the disclosure of Mr. Harvin’s records was in fact a violation of law (which defendants do not assert as a basis for their motion), it is plain to the court that L&M and YNHH should have reasonably foreseen that the disclosure of a patient’s psychiatric records in open court, on the public record, and in a context that might lead to that patient’s incarceration, would cause that patient emotional distress and "significant emotion injuries." See Am. Compl at ¶13. Defendants’ motion to strike Counts Seven and Eight is denied.
Counts Nine and Ten
Defendants move to strike Counts Nine and Ten alleging L&M and YNHH invaded Mr. Harvin’s right to privacy by disclosing his medical records in open court. Because Mr. Harvin was a criminal defendant at the time of challenged disclosure and therefore a person of public interest, the court grants defendant’s motion to strike counts Nine and Ten of the Amended Complaint. See Adams v. Lin Television Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-02-0562799 (July 25, 2005, Jones, J.) (39 Conn.L.Rptr. 699).