Dry Storage Corp. v. Piscopo, 249 Ga.App. 898, 900, 550 S.E.2d 419 (2001). See also La Quinta Inns v. Leech, 289 Ga.App. 812, 817(1), 658 S.E.2d 637 (2008); Harvey v. Nichols, 260 Ga.App. 187, 193–194(2), 581 S.E.2d 272 (2003); Kobeck v. Nabisco, 166 Ga.App. 652, 654(3), 305 S.E.2d 183 (1983); and other cases cited infra in footnotes 2 and 3.Tucker v. Pearce, 332 Ga.App. 187, 191, 771 S.E.2d 495 (2015), cert. granted (Sept.

The issue here is whether Officer Tucker's failure to medically screen Pearce “was the proximate cause of [Pearce's] suicide or whether the suicide was an unforeseeable act that was not caused by [Officer Tucker's] failure to [act].”Harvey v. Nichols, 260 Ga.App. 187, 193(2), 581 S.E.2d 272 (2003). From a legal point of view, proximate cause means that the suicide must have been a foreseeable result of the negligence of the tortfeasor.

We have held, in the context of detention officers, that "the acts of following established policies of inspecting and monitoring [detainees] are ministerial tasks." Harvey v. Nichols , 260 Ga. App. 187, 192 (1) (b), 581 S.E.2d 272 (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted), disapproved on other grounds by City of Richmond Hill v. Maia , 301 Ga. 257, 261 (1), 800 S.E.2d 573 (2017). See also Clark v. Prison Health Svcs. , 257 Ga. App. 787, 794 (4) (c), 572 S.E.2d 342 (2002) (holding that "inspecting the cells in the unit according to the prescribed schedule ... required merely the implementation of clear and certain duties, not the exercise of personal judgment[,]" and so detention officers were not entitled to official immunity from a suit alleging that they had breached those duties).

) The doctrine of official immunity, also known as qualified immunity, affords public officers and employees limited protection from suit in their personal capacities. Harvey v. Nichols, 260 Ga. App. 187, 190, 581 S.E.2d 272, 276 (2003) (quoting Cameron v. Long, 274 Ga. 122, 123, 549 S.E.2d 341 (2001)). "Qualified immunity protects individual public agents from personal liability for discretionary actions taken within the scope of their official authority, and done without wilfulness, malice, or corruption."

“ ‘A ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the execution of a specific duty.’ ” Payne v. DeKalb Cnty., 414 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1183 (N.D.Ga.2004) (quoting Harvey v. Nichols, 260 Ga.App. 187, 581 S.E.2d 272, 276 (2003)). “A discretionary act, on the other hand, ‘calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed.’ ”

In sum, under Georgia law, "a public officer or employee may be personally liable only for ministerial acts negligently performed or discretionary acts performed with malice or intent to injure." Harvey v. Nichols, 581 S.E.2d 272, 276 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).

"'A ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the execution of a specific duty.'" Payne v. DeKalb Cnty., 414 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1183 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (quoting Harvey v. Nichols, 581 S.E.2d 272, 276 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)). "A discretionary act, on the other hand, 'calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed.'"

This assertion is not supported by Plaintiff's factual allegations or Georgia law. See Middlebrooks v. Bibb Cnty., 261 Ga. App. 382, 385 (2003) (holding that training, supervision, and adoption of an official policy regarding supervision of suicidal inmates are not ministerial functions but rather are discretionary); see also Harvey v. Nichols, 260 Ga. App. 187, 191 (2003) (holding that sheriff's responsibilities with respect to the operation of a jail, the supervision of its officers and employees, and the establishment of policies and procedures were discretionary in nature). Accordingly, the applicable question under state law is whether Plaintiff has properly alleged that Defendant Robinson acted with "actual malice" or an "actual intent" to harm Love.

The language of these decisions is clear: the duty is not owed to the public at large, but, instead, the duty is owed specifically to prisoners or detainees. We note that the Court of Appeals has failed to consistently recognize the special-relationship exception as a general matter, see, e.g., Dry Storage Corp. v. Piscopo, 249 Ga. App. at 900 (implying that the rage-or-frenzy exception is the lone exception to the general rule regarding suicide), and, further, has failed to apply the special-relationship exception as it specifically pertains to law enforcement, even in cases involving jail suicides, see Harvey v. Nichols, 260 Ga. App. 187 (2) (581 SE2d 272 ) (2003) (addressing only the rage-or-frenzy exception in case involving suicide of prisoner). See also Tucker v. Pearce, 332 Ga. App. 187 , 191-193 (771 SE2d 495 ) (2015) (relying on Harvey and applying only rage-or-frenzy exception in jail suicide case), aff’d on other grounds, Pearce v. Tucker, 299 Ga. 224 (787 SE2d 749 ) (2016).

Accordingly, we address Appellant's claim against Officer Tucker with respect to his individual capacity. See Harvey v. Nichols, 260 Ga.App. 187(2), 581 S.E.2d 272 (2003). The issue of Officer Tucker's immunity is a question of law and is reviewed de novo.