(Emphasis supplied.)Harvey v. Meadows, 280 Ga. 166, 169–170(3), 626 S.E.2d 92 (2006) Sheppard's written sentence contains a section for “General and/or Other Conditions of Probation,” which was checked along with seven boilerplate conditions such as avoiding “injurious and vicious habits” and avoiding “persons or places of disreputable or harmful character.”

1 (a) are that the trial court warn of the consequences of violating a special condition; that the warning be in writing; and that the warning be in the court's sentence." Harvey v. Meadows, 280 Ga. 166, 169-170 (3) ( 626 SE2d 92) (2006). See also Gardner v. State, 259 Ga. App. 375, 378 (1) ( 577 SE2d 69) (2003) (to constitute a special condition, the sentencing document must reflect in writing that failure to successfully complete the condition authorizes the court to "require[] the defendant to serve up to the balance of the sentence in confinement") (punctuation and footnote omitted).

See OCGA § 42-7-9 (a) ("Nothing in [the Youthful Offender Act] shall limit or affect the power of any court to proceed in accordance with any other applicable provisions of law."); Woods v. State, 233 Ga. 347, 349 (4), 211 S.E.2d 300 (1974). Compare Harvey v. Meadows, 280 Ga. 166, 168 (3), 626 S.E.2d 92 (2006) ("[C]onfinement under a sentence that is longer than that permitted by state law constitutes a denial of liberty without due process of law." (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied)).

1(a) so as to authorize revocation of the balance of Jowers' probation for violating a “ special condition of probation." See Harvey v. Meadows, 280 Ga. 166, 626 S.E.2d 92 (2006).           Jowers filed a pro see brief attempting to address this question.

As a result, the revocation of more than two years of Sullivan’s suspended sentence was prohibited. See Harvey v. Meadows, 280 Ga. 166, 170 (3), 626 S.E.2d 92 (2006); Gardner, 259 Ga. App. at 379 (1), 577 S.E.2d 69.We find unpersuasive the State’s argument that the failure to identify the condition in writing in the sentence was a mere scrivener’s error.

In this respect, the commissioner substantially complied with the mandates of OCGA § 31-6-44 (k) (1). See OCGA § 1-3-1 (c) ("A substantial compliance with any statutory requirement, especially on the part of public officers, shall be deemed and held sufficient[.]"); Harvey v. Meadows, 280 Ga. 166, 168 (3) (626 S.E.2d 92) (2006) ("[S]ubstantial compliance does not require that the language should be exactly as prescribed by the statute but that all the essential requirements of the form be prescribed. When there is actual compliance as to all matters of substance then mere technicalities of form or variations in the mode of expression should not be given the stature of noncompliance.")

In this respect, the commissioner substantially complied with the mandates of OCGA § 31-6-44 (k) (1). See OCGA § 1-3-1 (c) ("A substantial compliance with any statutory requirement, especially on the part of public officers, shall be deemed and held sufficient[.]"); Harvey v. Meadows , 280 Ga. 166, 168 (3), 626 S.E.2d 92 (2006) ("[S]ubstantial compliance does not require that the language should be exactly as prescribed by the statute but that all the essential requirements of the form be prescribed. When there is actual compliance as to all matters of substance then mere technicalities of form or variations in the mode of expression should not be given the stature of noncompliance.")

We note that although the trial court in the final disposition sheet mistakenly referred to OCGA § 42-8-37.1, the court met the substantive requirements of OCGA § 42-8-34.1 for imposing special conditions of probation. See Harvey v. Meadows , 280 Ga. 166, 169-170 (3), 626 S.E.2d 92 (2006) (applying substantial compliance standard in context of OCGA § 42-8-34.1 and holding that "the substantive or essential requirements of OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (a) are that the trial court warn of the consequences of violating a special condition; that the warning be in writing; and that the warning be in the court's sentence"). Judgment affirmed and remanded with direction.

See OCGA § 42–8–34.1(a)(2) (special conditions of probation must be “identified in writing in the sentence”); Harvey v. Meadows, 280 Ga. 166, 169–70(3), 626 S.E.2d 92 (2006) (same).Jayko filed a notice of appeal on October 28, 2005.

Consequently, “the substantive or essential requirements of OCGA § 42–8–34.1(a) are that the trial court warn of the consequences of violating a special condition; that the warning be in writing; and that the warning be in the court's sentence.” Harvey v. Meadows, 280 Ga. 166, 169–170(3), 626 S.E.2d 92 (2006). Here, Singleton's written sentence contains only a section for general conditions of probation, of which several pertinent items are checked, such as the provision that Singleton shall not violate any laws and that he must pay court fines and fees in full.