Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co.

34 Citing cases

  1. Brookhaven S. Laundry v. Watts

    214 Miss. 569 (Miss. 1952)   Cited 101 times
    In Brookhaven Steam Laundry v. Watts, 214 Miss. 569, 626, 59 So.2d 294 (1952), we denied compensation where an irate husband killed an employee laundry man, suspecting him to be his wife's paramour.

    Secs. 6998-02, subsec. (2), 6998-04 Code 1942; Barry v. Sanders Co., (Miss.), 52 So.2d 493; 58 Am. Jur. pp. 765-767; Myers v. Louisiana Ry. Nav. Co., 140 La. 937, 74 So. 256; O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc. 71 S.Ct. 470; Keyhea v. Woodward-Walker Lbr. Co., Inc., (La.), 147 So. 830; Petroleum Casualty Co. v. Kincaid, et al., (Tex.), 93 S.W.2d 499, appl. for writ of error dismissed, 122 S.W.2d 1048; Harvey v. Caddo DeSoto Cotton Oil Co., (La.), 6 So.2d 747; Dyer, et al. v. Rapide Lumber Co., 154 La. 1091, 98 So. 677; Ferguson v. Cady-McFarland Gravel Co., 156 La. 871, 101 So. 248; Selser et al. v. Bragman's Bluff Lbr. Co., Inc., (La.), 146 So. 690; Sweat v. Allen, 145 Fla. 733, 200 So. 348; Stone-Brady, Inc., et al. v. Heim, (Fla.), 12 So.2d 888; Southern Surety Co. v. Shook, et al., (Tex.), 44 S.W.2d 425. IV. When it is established that injuries were sustained in the course of employment the presumption arises as a matter of law that the injuries were caused by the employment.

  2. Madin v. Industrial Acc. Com

    46 Cal.2d 90 (Cal. 1956)   Cited 38 times
    In Madin v. Industrial Acc. Com., 46 Cal.2d 90, 94-95 [ 292 P.2d 892], we construed the meaning of the phrase "arising out of" the employment.

    ' ( Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 86 Cal.App.2d 726, 728.) This case also cites with approval the following from Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co., 199 La. 720 [ 6 So.2d 747, 750]: `". . . that his death was due to the fact that his employment necessitated that he be at the place where the accident occurred and that, therefore . . . the accident arose out of, and was incident to the employment."' ( Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, p. 733.)

  3. Majure v. Wm. H. Alsup Associates

    216 Miss. 607 (Miss. 1953)   Cited 53 times
    In Majure et al. v. William H. Alsup Associates, Inc., 216 Miss. 607, 63 So.2d 113, we held: "It is generally held that when it is shown that an employee was found dead at a place where his duties required him to be, or where he might properly have been in the performance of his duties during the hours of his work, in the absence of evidence that he was not engaged in his master's business, there is a presumption that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment within the meaning of the compensation acts."

    I. Appellants' evidence was sufficient to allow the claim. Rogers v. Mengel Co., 180 So. 499; Harvey v. Caddo DeSoto Cotton Oil Co., 6 So.2d 747; Whittemore Bros. Corp. v. De Grandpre, 30 So.2d 896; Cone Bros. Contracting Co. v. Allbrook, 16 So.2d 61; Diagle v. Moody, 144 So. 596; Wells v. Morris, 35 So.2d 55; Tallent v. M.C. Lyle Son, 216 S.W.2d 7; O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 71 S.Ct. Rep. 471; "Current Trends in Workmen's Compensation" โ€” Samuel B. Horovitz; Simmons National Bank v. Brown, 195 S.W.2d 539; Hunter, et al. v. Summerville, 169 S.W.2d 579; Railway Express Agency v. Lewis, 159 S.E. 188; Jordan v. Dixie Chevrolet Co., 61 S.E.2d 654. II. Appellants' evidence raised a presumption which was not rebutted by appellees. 120 A.L.R. 684; Sanford v. A.P. Clark Motors, 45 So.2d 185; Martin v. Industrial Commission, 242 P.2d 286; Schmitt v. Bay Ridge Hospital, et al., 99 N.Y.S.2d 632; Browne v. Marvel Transportation Co., 283 N.Y.S. 209; Capitol Paper Co. v. Conner, 144 N.E. 474; Keeler v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 183 A. 20; Sullivan v. Suffolk Peanut Co., 199 S.E. 504; Flucker v. Carnegie Steel Co., 263 Pa. 113, 106 A

  4. Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com.

    95 Cal.App.2d 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950)   Cited 20 times
    In Industrial Indem. Co. v. IndustrialAcc. Com., supra, 95 Cal.App.2d 804, 807, after calling attention to the requirement for liberal construction of workmen's compensation laws, Mr. Justice Bray stated: "One of the departures was in `street risk' cases, of which FrigidaireCorp.

    " ( Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 86 Cal.App.2d 726, 728.) This case also cites with approval the following from Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co., 199 La. 720 [ 6 So.2d 747, 750]: "`. . . that his death was due to the fact that his employment necessitated that he be at the place where the accident occurred and that, therefore . . . the accident arose out of, and was incident to the employment.'" ( Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, p. 733.)

  5. Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com.

    86 Cal.App.2d 726 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948)   Cited 22 times
    In Pacific Indemnity Co v. Ind. Acc. Com., 86 Cal.App.2d 726, at p. 729, 195 P.2d 919, the court stated: 'By the constitutional amendment of 1918 (Art.

    The conclusion derived in the Kern case was confirmed by the Harvey decision in which the court based its conclusions upon the fact that "the deceased by reason of his employment was required to be in a building which fell upon him; that his death was due to the fact that his employment necessitated that he be at the place where the accident occurred and that, therefore . . . the accident arose out of, and was incident to the employment." ( Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co., 199 La. 720 [ 6 So.2d 747, 750].) The Supreme Court of Ohio held that because the decedent was killed in a large house in which he found asylum from a storm his dependents were entitled to compensation.

  6. Nesmith v. Reich Bros

    14 So. 2d 325 (La. Ct. App. 1943)   Cited 4 times
    In Nesmith v. Reich Bros., La.App., 14 So.2d 325, 326, plaintiff sued for workmen's compensation for injuries sustained as the result of a collision between a truck operated by him and that of another on a highway in Grant Parish.

    These are: (1) where the master furnishes transportation to and from work, and (2) where the injury occurs near to the master's place of business and results from a hazard to which the employee was exposed because of his employment, such hazard being greater to him than to members of the public generally. However, the test involved in the latter exception, as said in Harvey v. Caddo DeSoto Cotton Oil Company, 199 La. 720, 6 So.2d 747-749, has not been uniformly followed. It was not adhered to but clearly deviated from in Kern v. Southport Mill, Ltd., 174 La. 432, 141 So. 19, 20.

  7. Circle K Store No. 1131 v. Indus. Com'n

    165 Ariz. 91 (Ariz. 1990)   Cited 39 times
    Recognizing and applying the unexplained fall presumption

    See, e.g., Martin v. Industrial Comm'n, 75 Ariz. 403, 411, 257 P.2d 596, 601 (1953); Martin v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Ariz. 401, 404, 242 P.2d 286, 288 (1952); State Comp. Fund v. Delgadillo, 14 Ariz. App. 242, 244, 482 P.2d 491, 493 (1971). See, e.g., Nippert v. Shinn Farm Const. Co., 223 Neb. 236, 388 N.W.2d 820 (1986) (positional-risk doctrine applied to injury resulting from tornado); National Fire Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 152 Ga. App. 566, 263 S.E.2d 455 (1979) (injury by tornado); Whetro v. Awkerman, 383 Mich. 235, 174 N.W.2d 783 (1970) (injury by tornado); Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co., 199 La. 720, 6 So.2d 747 (1942) (death resulting from cyclone); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Colo. 233, 254 P. 995 (1927) (injury resulting from lightning). Circle K asserts that a claimant may only prevail on the "arising out of" element by establishing: 1) the cause of the unexplained fall, and 2) the relationship of the cause to the employment.

  8. Grayson v. D.C. Dept. of Employment Services

    516 A.2d 909 (D.C. 1986)   Cited 25 times
    In Grayson, both the agency and this court similarly applied the positional-risk test, though our opinion does not illuminate the predicate question of whether Grayson's injuries stemmed from a neutral risk (this court's precedents had not yet articulated that concept).

    See Hughes v. Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral, 245 N.Y. 201, 156 N.E. 665 (1927). Whetro v. Awkerman, 383 Mich. 235, 174 N.W.2d 783 (1970); Mixon v. Kalman, 133 N.J.L. 113, 42 A.2d 309 (1945); Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co., 199 La. 720, 6 So.2d 747, 751 (1942); National Fire Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 152 Ga. App. 566, 263 S.E.2d 455, 456 (1979); London Guarantee Accident Co. v. McCoy, 97 Colo. 13, 45 P.2d 900 (1935). The four other standards are the peculiar-risk, increased-risk, actual-risk and proximate cause tests. Under the peculiar-risk test, the employee has to show that the source of the harm was peculiar to his employment.

  9. Wiggins v. Knox Glass, Inc.

    219 So. 2d 154 (Miss. 1969)   Cited 7 times

    Many of the states are moving toward the "positional risk test" as pointed out by Professor Larson in 1 Workmen's Compensation Law ยง 8.12 (1968). Our sister state of Louisiana has met the problem by adopting the positional risk test in the case of Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Company, 199 La. 720, 6 So.2d 747, 751 (1942). In that case the Court said:

  10. Danielsen v. Security v. N Lines, Inc.

    245 La. 450 (La. 1963)   Cited 23 times

    It is, of course, well settled that the statute must be given a liberal interpretation to effectuate its beneficent purpose of relieving the workmen of the crushing economic burden of work-connected injuries by diffusing the cost in the channels of commerce. See Harvey v. Caddo DeSoto Cotton Oil Co., 199 La. 720, 6 So.2d 747 and Dyer v. Rapides Lumber Co., 154 La. 1091, 98 So. 677. In the instant case, the Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff's employment was not continuous. It found that he was neither on duty nor on call for twenty-four hours each day.